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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Depression is one of the most frequent mental disorders with a strong impact on 
people’s daily lives. Besides a persistent negative mood, depressed individuals often 
experience a loss of interest or pleasure and are characterized by anhedonia. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that the term motivational deficit is used in association with depres-
sion. Moreover, aspects of motivation are thought to play a role when it comes to other 
distinctive features of depression. Instigated by the notion of motivational deficits in 
depression and by recent evidence for the influence of momentary moods on motiva-
tional intensity, the present research aims at investigating more closely depressed indi-
viduals’ motivation.  
Specifically, the present research is concerned with the intensity aspect of moti-
vation in terms of mobilization of energy resources for coping with mental demands. The 
theoretical framework is built by Brehm’s motivational intensity theory and the mood-
behavior-model (MBM) by Gendolla. Motivational intensity theory predicts the intensity of 
effort that people will invest in dependence on task characteristics and task demand. The 
MBM describes how moods can influence behavior-related judgments and, by this means, 
interact with task characteristics in the energy mobilization process. Moreover, the pre-
sent research takes advantage of Wright’s conceptualization of effort intensity in terms of 
individuals’ cardiovascular response.  
In a series of four experiments, we compared university students who scored low 
versus high on self-report depression scales and who were therefore referred to as 
nondysphoric versus dysphoric. After the assessment of cardiovascular baseline activity, 
participants worked either on a memory task or on a concentration task. Studies 1 and 2 
confronted participants with the respective mental task without providing a fixed per-
formance standard, whereas studies 3 and 4 presented participants with either an easy 
or a difficult version of the mental task. We hypothesized that dysphoria would result in 
high effort mobilization for tasks with easy performance standards or when no standard 
was provided. In contrast, we expected that dysphoria would result in disengagement for 
tasks with difficult performance standards. In accordance with prior research on motiva-
tional intensity theory, participants’ cardiovascular reactivity—especially their systolic 
blood pressure reactivity—to the mental tasks was considered as the central dependent 
variable referring to effort intensity.  
Confirming the main hypotheses, students with high depression scores showed 
higher systolic reactivity to the tasks without performance standards as well as to the 
tasks that involved an easy standard compared to students with low depression scores. 
Likewise in corroboration of our hypotheses, dysphoric participants showed lower systolic 
reactivity to the tasks with a difficult standard than nondysphoric participants. Moreover, 
results demonstrated that students with high depression scores were in a more negative 
mood. However, participants’ evaluations of the tasks just before performing them 
showed only partly the expected pattern of higher subjective demand in dysphoria.  
On the basis of well established theories, the present research questions the view 
that dysphoria and depression are invariably associated with a motivational deficit in 
terms of effort intensity. Rather, it depends on task characteristics and task demand if 
dysphoria leads to lower or even higher effort mobilization. With respect to application, 
our series of experiments presents possibilities how to elicit high or low task engagement 
in dysphoric individuals. Awaiting corroboration of the described effects in a clinical 
population, this line of research may have implications for research in clinical depression 
and other psychopathologies characterized by negative affectivity.  
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1. Introduction 
Depression is by far one of the most prevalent mental disorders that can dramati-
cally affect our quality of life. Recent data from surveys in the United States and in 
Europe report a lifetime prevalence of about 16% and 14%, respectively, for an episode 
of major depressive disorder (MDD; ESEMeD/MHEDEA 2000 Investigators, 2004; Kessler, 
2002; Kessler et al., 2003). Characteristic for major depression is its time of onset in 
early adulthood and its frequent comorbidity with anxiety disorders. About 60% of life-
time MDD patients also show some sort of anxiety disorder, which often precedes de-
pression (Kessler et al., 2003). The prevalence rates for women are generally twice as 
high as those for men. According to the World Health Organization (2001), depression is 
considered as the leading cause of “years of life lived with disability” and the fourth 
leading cause of “disability-adjusted life years” as a measure for the global burden of 
disease (estimates for 2000). For example, patients with MDD report being unable to 
perform their normal daily activities on 35 days per year on average (Kessler et al., 
2003). Because of this, efforts are undertaken to investigate and understand the etiology 
of depression, its phenomenology, its course, as well as the effects of different treat-
ments. Moreover, researchers also underline that subthreshold forms of depression (e.g., 
minor depression or recurrent brief depression), which do not fulfill the number or dura-
tion of symptoms for a MDD, are of particular importance because they have strong pre-
dictive power for the further development (e.g., Angst & Merikangas, 1997; Judd, 
Akiskal, & Paulus, 1997). 
Besides other important aspects, as for instance cognitive or emotional distinctive 
features in depression, an obvious deficit of depressed individuals refers to their lack of 
motivation. There has been research investigating for example behavioral approach and 
avoidance motivation, initiation of action, and responsiveness to rewards (Fowles, 1994; 
Heckhausen, 1991; Henriques & Davidson, 2000; Hertel, 2000; Layne, Merry, Christian, 
& Ginn, 1982). Even if it has been proposed by some researchers that the lowered 
motivation in depression is a form of adaptation that prevents the organism from pursu-
ing a fruitless or dangerous action (Nesse, 2000), motivational deficits in depression are 
predominantly seen as hindering and unwelcome. Moreover, to some extent motivational 
factors have been shown to play a role in cognitive deficits of depressed individuals (e.g., 
Abramson, Alloy, & Rosoff, 1981).  
On the other hand, based on one of the most prevalent symptoms of depression, 
namely negative affect, and on research concerning mood influences on motivational in-
tensity (Brehm & Self, 1989; Gendolla, 2000), the assumption that depression is not 
necessarily associated with motivational deficits cannot be denied. The present series of 
experiments therefore aims to investigate effects of dysphoria—as a mild form of depres-
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sion mainly characterized by negative affect (Kendall, Hollon, Beck, Hammen, & Ingram, 
1987)—on one specific aspect of motivation, namely motivational intensity, that is, the 
magnitude of effort expenditure at a certain point in time. This research program dealing 
with the phenomenology of depression is chiefly based on two theories: motivational in-
tensity theory by Jack Brehm (Brehm & Self, 1989) and the mood-behavior-model (MBM) 
by Guido Gendolla (Gendolla, 2000). Moreover, it relies on Rex Wright’s elaboration of 
the construct of effort mobilization—that is, the mobilization of energy resources to carry 
out instrumental behavior—in terms of cardiovascular response (R. A. Wright, 1996). In 
the following parts, we present the theoretical background about depression and dyspho-
ria with a focus on motivation, about motivational intensity theory and the MBM, as well 
as about cardiovascular measures. Afterwards, we describe the methodology and results 
of four experiments. Finally, we integrate the findings of these studies and discuss them 
with respect to the main research question about motivational issues in depression or 
dysphoria and related topics. 
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2. Depression and Motivation 
2.1 Definitions, Classification, and Theories of Depression 
2.1.1 Definitions 
We begin the theoretical part with some relevant definitions. The concept of hu-
man motivation can be described by several basic dimensions. Generally, one distin-
guishes four such dimensions, namely the initiation, the direction, the intensity, and the 
persistence of behavior (Geen, 1995; Vallerand & Thill, 1993). This means that human 
motivation can vary on those dimensions across individuals but also across situations: 
People may differ in the behavioral choices they make, the vigor or intensity of their 
actions, and the tenacity or persistence with which they pursue their goals. As we pre-
sent in greater detail in the following chapters, the empirical part of the present research 
concentrates on the intensity aspect of motivation as described in motivational intensity 
theory (Brehm & Self, 1989).  
Furthermore, a brief definition of the terms affect, emotion, mood, and depression 
is warranted. Following a common definition, we use affect as the higher-order term for 
subjective experiences with positive or negative valence that comprises moods and emo-
tions (Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Scott & Ingram, 1998). Emotions are regarded as short-
lived, object-related periods involving specific autonomic adjustments that prepare the 
organism for action (Cacioppo, Klein, Berntson, & Hatfield, 1993; Frijda, 1993; Levenson, 
Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). By contrast, moods are regarded as long-lasting states that are 
not object-related. They can be experienced without conscience of their origin and they 
may be the residual of an emotion (Frijda, 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). Moreover, 
moods do not have a direct motivational function and do not directly implicate autonomic 
responses related to energy mobilization (Gendolla, 2000). In general, depression is re-
garded as a disorder that refers rather to mood than to emotion (Scott & Ingram, 1998). 
However, some researchers describe depression in emotion terms, for instance as a 
combination of sadness and disgust (see Power, 1999).  
Following the sections on classification and theoretical approaches of depression, 
we present theories and research that deal with the relation of depression to all dimen-
sions of human motivation. As the theoretical distinction of motivation from other con-
cepts, especially cognition and emotion, does not always hold up in real human behavior, 
these sections partly touch on cognitive aspects of depression, too.  
2.1.2 Classification of Depression and Dysphoria 
In this section, we briefly delineate the different forms and categories of mood 
disorders, together with the terminology we use in the present research when we refer to 
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depression and dysphoria. Among the mood disorders, one distinguishes depressive 
(“unipolar”) from bipolar disorders, which means disorders characterized only by depres-
sive episodes versus those also involving manic or mixed episodes. The fourth edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders by the American Psychiatric 
Association (DSM-IV; APA, 1994; and DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000) distinguishes furthermore 
among the depressive disorders the most known major depressive disorder (MDD) from 
dysthymic disorder and from depressive disorders not otherwise specified. MDD is 
characterized by at least five symptoms over a period of at least 2 weeks, amongst them 
depressed mood or loss of interest or pleasure. Other symptoms of a major depressive 
episode can be changes in appetite or weight, sleep, and psychomotor activity; de-
creased energy; feelings of worthlessness or guilt; difficulties in thinking, concentration, 
or decision making; or recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal ideation, plans, or at-
tempts. MDD may take the form of an isolated episode or of recurrent episodes.  
In contrast, dysthymic disorder is considered to persist for at least 2 years during 
which depressed mood and other symptoms (not meeting the criteria for a major depres-
sive episode) are present at least half of the time. Finally, the category of depressive 
disorders not otherwise specified includes, amongst other things, minor depressive disor-
der (characterized by fewer symptoms than MDD for a period of at least 2 weeks), re-
current brief depressive disorder (brief depressive episodes occurring at least once a 
month over 1 year), and premenstrual dysphoric disorder (associated with most of the 
menstrual cycles over 1 year). Large, community-based surveys underscore that depres-
sive symptoms are stable in the sense that they persist over time, even if people change 
from one diagnostic subtype to another (Angst & Merikangas, 1997; Judd et al., 1997). 
These studies underline furthermore that not classified, subthreshold forms of depression 
as well as minor depression and recurrent brief depression are not only important from 
the point of view of their prevalence rates but also as strong predictors for a major de-
pressive episode.  
The term dysphoria does not correspond to a special diagnostic class of the DSM-
IV. Rather, it is variably used in the clinical-psychopathological literature. On the one 
hand, dysphoria is described as an unhappy, tense, and irritated mood that also involves 
a component of anger and aggression (Berner, Musalek, & Walter, 1987; Musalek, 
Griengl, Hobl, Sachs, & Zoghlami, 2000; Starcevic, 2007). In this sense, dysphoria is 
even considered as a third dimension apart from depressed and elated mood. On the 
other hand, the term dysphoria is often used to refer to nonclinical, “analogue” samples 
that have elevated scores on depression scales. This use, which goes mainly back to an 
article by Kendall et al. (1987), is the prevalent use in recent scientific articles investi-
gating various aspects of depression. In the empirical part of this thesis, we are using the 
term dysphoria in this latter sense to denominate the nonclinical participants in our 
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studies who reported elevated scores on depression scales. Likewise, in the theoretical 
part, where we report findings about depression and dysphoria, we use these terms in 
the same way. This means that the term depression is used for research with clinical 
samples and the term dysphoria for research with nonclinical samples.  
2.1.3 Depression as a Categorical or Dimensional Variable? 
Directly related to the use of the term dysphoria is a controversial issue with im-
portant impact on the present research program, namely the question whether depres-
sion and dysphoria are considered as categorical or dimensional constructs. The answer 
to this question strongly determines how and with which samples depression research is 
conducted. Exponents of the categorical perspective—which is also the perspective of the 
DSM-IV—argue that clinical depression, as for instance MDD, is marked by qualitatively 
distinct features (e.g., somatic symptoms) compared to subclinically depressed mood. 
According to this perspective, depression research can only reveal valid results if it com-
pares groups of patients with healthy controls (e.g., Gotlib, 1984; Santor & Coyne, 
2001).  
By contrast, exponents of the dimensional approach refer to the continuum of 
normal and abnormal processes with “healthy” personality at the one end and psycho-
pathology at the other end (e.g., A. M. Ruscio & Ruscio, 2002; J. Ruscio & Ruscio, 2000; 
Watson, Gamez, & Simms, 2005). Following this perspective, research with community 
or student samples (i.e., analogue samples) can reveal results as valid and interesting as 
research with clinical samples. Moreover, some researchers argue that especially student 
samples provide several advantages compared to clinical samples: the typical age of de-
pression onset in young adulthood, the homogeneity of a student sample, the presence 
of relatively manifold environmental stressors, and the relative absence of other (psycho-
) pathologies in student samples (Vredenburg, Flett, & Krames, 1993).  
In 1995, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology published a discussion of 
the state of the art in depression research. This debate mainly emphasized the advan-
tages of clinical samples (e.g., their better external validity). For assessment, multiple 
measures and especially structured interviews are regarded as more conclusive than self-
report measures. When self-report measures are to be used, it is recommended to 
assess depression twice in order to insure that the scores remain stable and to exclude 
cases of comorbid anxiety (Kendall & Flannery-Schroeder, 1995; Tennen, Hall, & Affleck, 
1995a, 1995b). Concerning the issue of comorbid anxiety, it is argued that this repre-
sents a problem only in cases when the dependent variable reacts to this confounding 
variable but not to depression. It is not regarded as problematic when the confounding 
variable acts not at all or in the same way as depression (Weary, Edwards, & Jacobson, 
1995).  
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Recently, with the advancements in statistical modeling (i.e., the taxometric 
approach), researchers largely agree that the dimensional perspective is better supported 
by the existing empirical evidence than the categorical view—at least on the manifest 
measurement level (Hankin, Fraley, Lahey, & Waldman, 2005; J. Ruscio & Ruscio, 2000; 
Solomon, Haaga, & Arnow, 2001). Beach and Amir (2003) qualify this conclusion and 
note that the continuity hypothesis applies mainly for distress-related aspects but not for 
somatic symptoms of depression. Most researchers favoring the dimensional perspective 
argue for the use of the full range of depressive manifestation when investigating ana-
logue or clinical samples (MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002; A. M. Ruscio & 
Ruscio, 2002). They argue that splitting the full rage of depression scores in two or more 
groups by using the median, quartiles, or meaningful cut-off scores has the disadvantage 
of losing information and statistical power. Nevertheless, some of the authors acknowl-
edge that the comparison of groups is still the prevailing procedure and is appropriate in 
certain cases.  
The present research program is guided by the assumption that psychopathology 
in general and depression in particular are better understood by the dimensional 
approach. Moreover, we think that research with analogue, subclinical samples can give 
important insights in the psychological mechanisms of depression. In order to underscore 
that we use student samples for this research and that our focus is on negative affect, 
we refer to the quasi-experimental groups as “dysphoric” versus “nondysphoric”, as 
mentioned above. Despite the recommendation to investigate the full range of depression 
scores, we favor the extreme-groups approach, mainly for practical reasons in testing the 
theoretical model, which we describe in detail in chapter 4.  
2.1.4 Further Epidemiological Data 
To complement the information given in the introduction, we briefly present in this 
section some further epidemiological data about depression in general. We have already 
mentioned that individuals suffering from depression encounter serious difficulties with 
respect to daily demands either at home or at work. In a large community-based survey 
in the United States, people who had had a depressive episode over the last year 
reported that they had been unable to pursue their daily activities on 35.2 days on aver-
age (Kessler et al., 2003). Moreover, it is important to note that depression is a recurrent 
disorder. After a first depressive episode, only 30% of the patients remain largely symp-
tom free. The great majority, however, experience residual symptoms, relapse of symp-
toms, or a chronic course. Because of this, complete symptom remission as well as pre-
vention of relapse and recurrence are major challenges in the treatment of depression 
(Bondolfi, 2004). Another serious problem in depression is increased mortality in general 
and from suicide in particular. Estimates for risk of suicide differ with respect to its com-
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putation. Recent reviews suggest that an appropriate estimate for the lifetime risk of sui-
cide lies between 2.2% and 4.0% for affective disorder outpatients and inpatients, 
respectively, and 8.6% for suicidal inpatients, compared to 0.5% for the general popula-
tion (Bostwick & Pankratz, 2000). 
Furthermore, it is important to note that depression is often accompanied by other 
disorders, especially substance use disorder (24.0%), impulse control disorder (30.0%), 
and anxiety disorders (59.2%). Typically, comorbid anxiety disorders have an earlier age 
of onset, that is, they precede the onset of depression (Kessler et al., 2003). Finally, it is 
a well documented finding that women have, from puberty on, prevalence rates for 
depression that are about twice as high as those for men. None of the various potential 
biological, social, and psychological factors alone has proven to be the single cause for 
this gender difference. However, there seems to be an interplay between the fact that 
women encounter more stressful experiences in their lives and the fact that women tend 
to respond to these experiences in a more depression-facilitating way (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1987, 2001; Nolen-Hoeksema, Larson, & Grayson, 1999). 
2.1.5 Theories of Depression 
There are various psychological and biological approaches that deal with the 
development and maintenance of depression and that imply different treatments. Recent 
research acts on the assumption of an interplay between psychological, social, and bio-
logical factors, with different factors being more or less involved in different forms of 
mood disorders.  
Amongst the psychological approaches, the psychoanalytical theories of depres-
sion do not receive much attention as they are not well corroborated. These psychoana-
lytical approaches emphasize that a depressed person’s self-esteem is dependent on 
other individuals and that the loss of a loved person or object leads to ambivalent feel-
ings and—in case of unsuccessful mourning work—to self-contempt and depression 
(Freud, 1917). In contrast, behavioral theories like those dealing with loss of reinforce-
ment (e.g., Ferster, 1973; Lewinsohn, 1974) focus on personal and environmental fac-
tors leading to the experience and expectation of a low rate of positive reinforcement. 
These factors comprise personality dispositions involving negative interpretations about 
the self, few social skills that could give rise to positive reinforcement, as well as an 
environment that offers few positive reinforcements. A low rate of positive reinforcement, 
in turn, is considered to favor the development and maintenance of depression. Similar 
to the behavioral approaches, interpersonal theories emphasize risk factors like deficient 
social skills, interpersonal inhibition including aversive interaction, and excessive inter-
personal dependency (Joiner, 2002). Consequently, such at-risk individuals do not have a 
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supportive social network and satisfying marital and parental relationships. This lack of 
social support is considered to reduce the resources for coping with negative life events.  
Amongst the psychological approaches, the cognitive and the attributional theories 
of depression have received by far the most attention and confirmation. As a common 
assumption, those approaches postulate a cognitive vulnerability for depression due to 
negative cognitive styles that promote negative interpretations of life events. More pre-
cisely, Beck (1967, 1976, 1987) emphasizes cognitive biases and the negative cognitive 
triad consisting of a negative view of the self, the world, and the future. He reasons that, 
in a given situation, negative cognitive schemata containing dysfunctional attitudes are 
activated and lead to false inferences and thinking errors. Those negative cognitions are 
thought to play an important role in the development and maintenance of depression and 
are the starting point for cognitive therapy. Similarly, the differential activation hypothe-
sis (Teasdale, 1988) describes the vicious cycle of negative cognitive patterns, but 
underlines furthermore that such negative cognitions activated during a depressive epi-
sode are particularly diagnostic for the further course.  
The helplessness-hopelessness theories of depression were originally based on 
learning experiments with animals showing that the experience of uncontrollable aversive 
events leads to helplessness and passiveness even in following controllable situations 
(Seligman, 1974). A reformulation of the original theory emphasizes the depressive 
attributional style that relates aversive events to internal, stable, and global causes 
(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978). The most recent version underlines further-
more a hopeless person’s conviction that aversive outcomes will occur, whereas desired 
outcomes will not occur, and that it is impossible to change this situation (Abramson, 
Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; see also Abramson et al., 2002).  
It is beyond controversy that depression has a somatic component. Amongst the 
biological approaches, especially genetic, neurochemical, neuroendocrinological, as well 
as chronobiological factors are thought to play a role. On the basis of family studies, the 
genetic component particularly of severe forms of depression is well documented. This 
genetic vulnerability is even more important in bipolar disorders than in unipolar depres-
sion and involves also a higher susceptibility to environmental stressors (Wallace, 
Schneider, & McGuffin, 2002). With respect to the neuroendocrinological system, there 
are two models involving both the hypothalamus and the pituitary gland (see Davison & 
Neale, 1998). The more prominent explanation emphasizes the increased activity of the 
hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal axis in depression leading to high levels of cortisol. The 
other explanation focuses on the relation between (subclinical) thyroid hypofunction and 
depression. However, the most important biological approaches are based on findings 
about the effects of certain antidepressant drugs (see Davison & Neale, 1998). The 
monoaminergic hypothesis postulates that depressive symptoms are associated with 
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reductions in monoamine neurotransmission, particularly serotonin and noradrenalin. 
This hypothesis has been reformulated with a focus on postsynaptic receptors. It states 
that the low concentration of monoaminergic neurotransmitters leads to a high density of 
postsynaptic receptors and to changes in their responsiveness. This reformulation better 
accounts for the commonly observed delay in the effects of antidepressant drugs. More-
over, recent research on the neurobiology of depression focuses on the involvement of 
the hippocampus, the frontal cortex, and the mesolimbic dopamine system (Nestler & 
Carlezon, 2006). Finally, there are also chronobiological factors involved in depression. 
Among those factors are alterations in the circadian rhythm and the sleep-awake rhythm 
as well as the typical seasonal rhythm with higher onset rates in spring and in autumn-
winter (Thase, Jindal, & Howland, 2002).  
2.2 Phenomenology of Depression 
2.2.1 Negative Affectivity  
After this introductory information about depression, we deal in the following sec-
tions with several distinctive features concerning the phenomenology of depression that 
are related to our research question. Besides the other symptoms listed in the DSM-IV 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994), a particularly prominent characteristic of 
depression and dysphoria is the general “negative affectivity”, which is also termed 
“negative emotionality” or “neuroticism”. This personality construct is phenomenologi-
cally similar to MDD and positively correlated with its affective, cognitive, and motiva-
tional symptoms but not its vegetative symptoms. Moreover, negative affectivity is con-
sidered to be a predisposition and precursor of MDD and dysphoria (Klein, Durbin, 
Shankman, & Santiago, 2002; Teasdale, 1988). Ingram and Siegle (2002) also empha-
size that “negative affect is a variable that is critical to the definition of depression and is 
also thought to play a significant role in determining the psychological and social function 
of depressed people” (p. 96).  
Moreover, as a rather broad construct, negative affectivity is phenomenologically 
underlying most other psychopathologies as well. Especially the anxiety disorders are 
characterized by negative affect. On the basis of the high comorbidity of depression and 
anxiety (chapter 2.1.4), Watson and colleagues proposed in their tripartite model a hier-
archical structure with negative affectivity as a higher order factor that is common to 
depression and anxiety (especially generalized anxiety disorder) and specific factors that 
differentiate between the two: anhedonia and low positive affectivity in depression versus 
anxious hyperarousal in the anxiety disorders (Clark & Watson, 1991; Mineka, Watson, & 
Clark, 1998). This hypothesis, which also aimed to explain the high overlap between the 
two classes of disorders, proved to be empirically sound in clinical and nonclinical 
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samples (Brown, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1998; Watson et al., 2005; Weinstock & Whisman, 
2006). 
2.2.2 Cognitive and Neuropsychological Impairments 
Another characteristic of depression pertains to the fact that depressed individuals 
often show impairments or deficits with respect to cognitive and neuropsychological 
functions. Research on those deficits has mainly focused on memory functions but also 
on executive functions and attention. In a meta-analysis of the memory literature, Burt, 
Zembar, and Niederehe (1995) find a strong association between depression and 
impaired memory functions, depending on the type of task (e.g., recall vs. recognition) 
and stage of information processing but also on patient characteristics and age. More-
over, in a quantitative review of the clinical literature, Christensen, Griffiths, MacKinnon, 
and Jacomb (1997) report cumulative evidence for depressed individuals’ impaired 
performance on a large spectrum of psychometric tests. This review suggests that not 
only memory functions but almost all aspects of cognitive functions are affected, espe-
cially those that involve a speed component. There is also evidence that such neuro-
psychological impairments recover to a certain degree, but residual deficits are likely to 
persist even after remission of depression (Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2001; Elliott, 
1998).  
With respect to memory functions, it seems that controlled and effortful, respec-
tively, processes are more impaired than automatic processes (Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, 
& Dykman, 1993; Hertel, 1998; Jermann, Van der Linden, Adam, Ceschi, & Perroud, 
2005). Furthermore, depressed individuals tend to have an overgeneral memory, particu-
larly for episodic, autobiographical material (Healy & Williams, 1999). In the domain of 
attention, it has been shown that depressed or dysphoric individuals have problems with 
thought suppression and concentration on task-relevant aspects (Elliott, 1998; Gotlib, 
Roberts, & Gilboa, 1996; Hertel & Gerstle, 2003). Likewise, working memory functioning 
and especially its central executive component are adversely affected in depression (Van 
der Linden, 2007). Finally, there is evidence for the impairment of executive functions in 
general. In particular, depressives show performance deficits when specific problem 
solving strategies are required. Executive functions, in turn, are closely associated with 
prefrontal cortical areas—that is, those areas where depressed individuals show abnor-
malities and less activity (Rogers et al., 2004).  
More detailed information about cognitive deficits in depression and dysphoria can 
be found in the reviews of the literature by Gotlib and colleagues (Gotlib et al., 1996) 
and Williams and colleagues (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). These 
reviews also point to the fact that similar results are shown for clinical and subclinical 
depression but often also for experimentally manipulated mood (Ellis & Moore, 1999). 
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Those findings underline the important role that moods—sometimes in interaction with 
dispositional affectivity—may play in the cognitive domain. Moreover, in their neuro-
psychological theory of positive affect, Ashby, Isen, and Turken (1999) postulate that 
positive affect is linked to increased dopamine levels in certain brain areas. This increase, 
in turn, is considered to improve performance in various cognitive domains, such as 
memory, problem solving, and interpersonal tasks. In a review of the literature of studies 
with induced and pathological affect, Ashby et al. report evidence for this assumption.  
Taken together, besides other rather cognitive explications, some findings also 
point to affective and motivational factors being involved in cognitive impairments or 
deficits in depression. We discuss these factors (e.g., deficient motivation to attention 
control and self-regulation or deficient motivation to action initiation and effort mobiliza-
tion) in more detail in chapter 2.3.  
2.2.3 Memory, Attention, and Judgment Biases 
Besides general cognitive deficits, there exists a vast body of literature with 
regard to cognitive biases in depression, often in comparison with anxiety (see Gotlib et 
al., 1996; Mineka & Gilboa, 1998; Scott & Ingram, 1998; Segal, 1996; Williams et al., 
1997, for reviews). Especially the mood-congruent memory bias for negative material in 
depression has been studied extensively. It is a robust finding that depressed individuals 
better recall and recognize negative stimuli (e.g., words or faces) compared to neutral 
material and compared to nondepressed controls (e.g., Gilboa & Gotlib, 1997; Gotlib, 
Kasch et al., 2004). However, this bias is more pronounced in explicit and autobiographi-
cal memory tasks than in implicit tasks and it is more pronounced in clinical than in sub-
clinical individuals. Whereas clinically depressed people generally show a negative bias 
and nondepressed people generally show a positive bias, dysphoric (i.e., subclinical) indi-
viduals are “even-handed” in the sense that they do not preferentially remember either 
negative or positive material (e.g., Gilboa, Roberts, & Gotlib, 1997).  
In the domain of attention, anxious individuals are shown to selectively pay atten-
tion to threatening stimuli. In contrast to this and in contrast to the robust memory bias 
in depression, evidence for an attention bias of depressed individuals with respect to 
negative (especially sad) material is equivocal (see Gotlib et al., 1996; Mineka & Gilboa, 
1998; Scott & Ingram, 1998; Williams et al., 1997, for reviews). Some recent studies 
suggest, however, that clinically depressed and dysphoric individuals do have a biased 
attention for negative words and faces (e.g., Gotlib, Kasch et al., 2004; Gotlib, 
Krasnoperova, Neubauer Yue, & Joormann, 2004; Koster, De Raedt, Goeleven, Franck, & 
Crombez, 2005). This bias seems to result not only from maintained attention to nega-
tive material but also from impaired disengagement from negative material, which occurs 
at later stages of the attention process (Koster et al., 2005). 
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Of particular importance for the present research program is evidence showing 
that depression and dysphoria can bias evaluations and judgments. Reviews of the 
literature by Scott and Ingram (1998), Williams et al. (1997), Mineka and Gilboa (1998), 
and MacLeod (1999) report findings showing biased evaluative judgments with respect to 
varying material in depression and induced negative affect. Depressed and negative 
affect individuals give more negative and pessimistic judgments concerning, for instance, 
pleasure of imagined activities, satisfaction with their own performance, standards they 
set for themselves, or statements they make about themselves. Furthermore, negatively 
biased attributions and higher subjective probability for negative outcomes have been 
observed as well as more pessimistic and negative judgments of contingency. This means 
that depressed individuals do not tend to overestimate contingency and control like non-
depressed individuals. These findings have led to the notion that depressed individuals 
are in fact more realistic than nondepressed individuals. Like in memory biases, dys-
phoric individuals seem to be even-handed in the sense that they are less characterized 
by the presence of a negative self-evaluation bias but rather characterized by the 
absence of the “normal” positive self-evaluation bias compared to nondysphorics (e.g., 
Gilboa et al., 1997).  
Findings like those reported above fit well in prominent cognitive theories of 
depression, notably the negative cognitive triad posited by Beck (1967) but also the 
attributional approach with negatively biased internal, global, and stable attributions 
(Abramson et al., 1989; Abramson et al., 1978). However, these biased evaluations and 
judgments are not limited to the domain of depression. Similar results for the influence 
of negative affect on risk estimates in anxious individuals have been shown for instance 
by Gasper and Clore (1998). 
2.2.4 Emotion Context Insensitivity 
Related to cognitive biases in depression is a recent hypothesis about “emotion 
context insensitivity”, that is, the inability to express and remember positive and espe-
cially negative emotions. Rottenberg and colleagues (e.g., Rottenberg, Gross, & Gotlib, 
2005; Rottenberg, Joormann, Brozovich, & Gotlib, 2005) hypothesize that depressed 
individuals are insensitive to the emotional context of a situation and do not respond to 
emotional stimuli in the same way as nondepressed individuals. Research demonstrates 
that depression indeed goes along with less sensitivity not only for positive material but 
also for negative stimuli (Rottenberg, Gross et al., 2005). Moreover, the authors show 
that this emotion context insensitivity is a predictor for worse depression outcomes 1 
year later (Rottenberg, Joormann et al., 2005).  
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In the previous sections, we have presented definitions, classifications, and theo-
ries of depression as well as affective and cognitive distinctive features of depressive 
phenomenology. The review of those distinctive features demonstrates that there exists a 
large body of research investigating cognition in depression. As we outline in the follow-
ing chapter 2.3, motivation may play a role in these cognitive impairments and deficits. 
Given this role of motivational states, we aim to investigate in our research program 
whether and under which conditions motivational deficits with respect to effort intensity 
exist in situations where dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals have to mobilize 
resources in order to cope with cognitive demands. 
2.3 Motivation and Cognition in Depression  
As previously stated, cognition may be influenced by affective and motivational 
factors, and to some extent motivation may play a role in the manifestation of neuro-
psychological and cognitive deficits in depression. Even if motivation does not account for 
all sorts of cognitive deficiencies, its role is not negligible. For example, a series of 
experiments highlights the motivational implications of negative feedback. Elliott and 
colleagues (Elliott, Sahakian, Herrod, Robbins, & Paykel, 1997; Elliott, Sahakian, McKay, 
& Herrod, 1996) report that clinically depressed individuals who failed on a first task are 
more likely to show impairments on a subsequent task. In contrast, control groups of 
other patients and healthy individuals are less affected by negative feedback. 
A controversial issue refers to the question whether cognitive impairments in 
depression or negative mood mainly emerge for difficult in comparison to easy tasks. 
Inferring effort expenditure from performance outcomes, some authors ascribe cognitive 
impairments to differences in the expenditure of cognitive effort (Ellis, Thomas, & 
Rodriguez, 1984; see also Williams et al., 1997). If tasks requiring more effort are indeed 
more affected in depression than tasks requiring less effort, this can be an indicator for a 
motivational or self-regulation deficit. However, other authors underline that the 
hypothesis stating that effortful processes are generally more affected in depression than 
automatic processes still awaits corroboration (Austin et al., 2001; Christensen et al., 
1997; Elliott, 1998). 
There are very few studies that directly address motivational deficits in depres-
sion. Moreover, some of this research is not conducted under the label of motivation. 
However, it can easily be interpreted in this sense, especially when it deals with action 
initiation or self-regulation issues. In the following sections, we present empirical findings 
that illustrate motivational influences on cognition and performance outcomes in depres-
sion and dysphoria.  
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2.3.1 Control Expectancies  
To begin with, there is some evidence for the fact that diminished control expec-
tancies of depressed individuals are influenced by motivational factors. On the basis of 
hopelessness theories of depression, Abramson et al. (1981) investigated depressed indi-
viduals’ generation of complex hypotheses and generalized expectancies in terms of less 
perceived control about outcomes. The authors report that dysphoric undergraduates 
underestimate their control possibilities when underlying complex hypotheses have to be 
self-generated but not when those hypotheses are generated for them. Thus, the authors 
conclude that a motivational and not a cognitive-associative deficit is at the origin of pes-
simistic generalized control expectancies.  
Ford and Neale (1985) come to a similar conclusion on the basis of an experiment 
with undergraduates who underwent a learned helplessness induction. In this study, 
helpless participants did not underestimate control. On the contrary, they had higher and 
more accurate control expectancies. The authors confirm the conclusion by Abramson et 
al. but additionally offer an alternative interpretation, namely that a helplessness induc-
tion might lead to higher motivation in terms of reactance as described by Wortman and 
Brehm (1975). According to this theory, reactance is the first reaction to the restriction 
of freedom, followed by resignation when efforts to reinstall control fail.  
2.3.2 Initiation and Attention Control  
The initiation of action as one of the basic dimensions of human motivation is a 
prominent example of motivational deficits in depression. Most practitioners agree that 
depressed individuals have problems in commencing and initiating actions. Likewise, 
research supports the notion that deficient action initiation may account to some extent 
for various impairments in depression (Gotlib et al., 1996). In a series of studies, Hertel 
and colleagues (e.g., Hertel, 2000; Hertel & Gerstle, 2003) show to which extent initia-
tion is deficient in depression and how this might be overcome by special task features. 
In their cognitive-initiative account, the authors conclude that memory impairments in 
depression are mainly caused by a lack of spontaneously developed initiative, and that 
diminished cognitive capacity does not play an important role. This conclusion is based 
on findings showing that depressed individuals have problems in focusing their attention 
on task-relevant features and that performance can be augmented by hints that help 
with attention control. Furthermore, a lack of initiative is more prominent in intentional 
remembering and forgetting and less important in implicit memory (Hertel, 2000; Hertel 
& Gerstle, 2003). This fits in the previously mentioned observation that in depression 
explicit memory tasks are more affected than implicit tasks and strengthens the conclu-
sions by Hertel.  
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Nitschke, Heller, Etienne, and Miller (2004) confirm Hertel’s findings with respect 
to electrocortical activity. The authors demonstrate associations between stronger 
activity in right frontal areas and better memory performance when depressed partici-
pants actually listen to a sad receipt but not when they prepare to listen to that receipt. 
In this way, Nitschke et al. show that their findings are consistent with left frontal hypo-
activity in depression because initiative is regarded as an approach-related action associ-
ated with left frontal activity. Furthermore, the authors demonstrate that the contrast 
between depressives’ worse memory performance in general and their better memory 
performance for negative material in particular depends on different stages of the infor-
mation processing. Finally, Austin et al. (2001) make an important point with respect to 
initiation deficits in test situations by stating that most experimental tasks and clinical 
tests are highly structured. Their stimulative nature may thus mask deficits in partici-
pants’ motivation, self-monitoring, or planning, which are otherwise part of the clinical 
phenomenology of depression.  
2.3.3 Rumination and Intrusion  
Another important aspect of depressive phenomenology that accounts for per-
formance deficits is depressed individuals’ proneness to ruminate—that is, to con-
tinuously focus on themselves and on their negative feelings. Several studies have dem-
onstrated that rumination about past or current concerns or tasks impairs problem solv-
ing abilities and performance. A series of studies by Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema 
(1995) demonstrates that dysphoria together with a ruminative self-focus causes partici-
pants to provide more negative interpretations of hypothetical situations, more pessi-
mistic causal attributions, lowered expectation of positive events, and less effective solu-
tions to interpersonal problems. However, when dysphoric participants are distracted, 
their responses do not differ from those of nondysphoric participants, either ruminating 
or distracting.  
In a similar series of experiments that focused on current problems of their par-
ticipants, Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, and Berg (1999) have found that dysphoric 
participants’ mood becomes more depressed after a ruminative task, whereas their mood 
becomes less depressed after a distractive task. Compared to dysphoric participants in 
the distraction condition and compared to nondysphoric participants, dysphoric partici-
pants in the rumination condition rate their problems as more severe and less solvable 
and express a lower solution implementation probability, even if their confidence in the 
solution does not differ from the other three groups. Importantly, nondysphorics’ mood 
and problem ratings are not affected by the rumination task, indicating that rumination is 
not harmful per se but particularly in combination with depressed mood.  
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In addition to impaired problem solving abilities, Hertel (1998) shows the impact 
of self-relevant tasks (i.e., tasks that have consequences for one's self-definition, self-
esteem, or personal interest, see Gendolla, 2004) on memory performance in dysphoria. 
Results demonstrate that dysphoric individuals have worse memory performance if a 
self-relevant task is presented between learning and recall or if there is uncontrolled free 
time. By contrast, dysphoric individuals do not have worse memory performance if a self- 
or task-irrelevant activity distracts them from ruminating between learning and recall. 
Similarly, rumination is considered to be partly responsible for depressives’ overgeneral 
autobiographical memory and executive dysfunction because rumination, compared to 
distraction, occupies more cognitive resources (Healy & Williams, 1999; Watkins & 
Brown, 2002).  
From the perspective of the degenerated-intention hypothesis, Kuhl and Helle 
(1986) put the emphasis on the perseveration of unrealistic intentional states in depres-
sion. The authors demonstrate that depressive participants who are experimentally 
induced to an unrealized intention show worse performance in a subsequent task and 
more intrusions of the unrealized intention, compared to participants in the condition 
without unrealized intention. Especially women are prone to respond to stressful life 
experiences with rumination—a behavior that negatively reinforces the course of depres-
sion and that is considered to play a role in women’s higher prevalence rates for depres-
sion (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1999). 
2.3.4 Self- and Affect Regulation  
The findings about depressive rumination directly lead to the domain of self- and 
affect regulation because rumination is predominantly seen in the context of self-regula-
tion problems. There exist several theoretical conceptions that relate to depression and 
dysphoria and that underline the vicious cycle of depressed mood, self-focused rumina-
tion, and negative thinking. To begin with, Pyszczynski and Greenberg (e.g., Greenberg, 
Pyszczynski, Burling, & Tibbs, 1992; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987) emphasize in their 
self-focusing theory that, after a negative event, depressed and dysphoric individuals are 
caught in a state of constant self-focus, unable to disengage. Thus, these people do not 
display the common self-serving bias of nondepressed individuals who tend to respond 
with internal attributions for successes and external attributions for failures. In a way 
similar to the studies cited in the previous sections (Hertel, 1998; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999), Pyszczynski, Hamilton, Herring, and Green-
berg (1989) corroborate their hypotheses by showing that the negative memory bias for 
self-referent events can be eliminated by distracting dysphoric participants from self-
focusing. The authors conclude that distraction from self-focusing deactivates depres-
sives’ negative self-schemas.  
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Similar to Pyszczynski and Greenberg’s assumptions, Carver and Scheier (1999) 
postulate in their self-regulation model that depressed individuals continue to be com-
mitted to a goal in spite of low expectations for attainment. Also in the domain of self-
regulation theories, self-discrepancy theory by Higgins (1998) postulates individual 
differences in self-regulation focus: Individuals with a dispositional or situational “promo-
tion focus” are guided by their ideal self and the attainment of their own hopes and 
wishes. In contrast, individuals with a “prevention focus” are guided by their ought self, 
the fulfillment of their obligations, and the avoidance of losses. Indeed, in a sample of 
undergraduates, a correlational study by Miller and Markman (2007) shows that 
hopelessness depression symptoms correlate positively with a prevention and negatively 
with a promotion focus. Moreover, in this study, promotion focus mediates the associa-
tion of hopelessness depression symptoms with poorer academic motivation and poorer 
short-term performance.  
Depressed individuals’ impaired self-regulation abilities are particularly prominent 
in negative affect regulation. Besides evidence for mood-congruency effects on memory, 
which have been described above, mood-incongruent recall for the purpose of negative 
mood regulation is a common phenomenon. Depressed individuals, however, have been 
shown to have problems regulating their negative mood by means of mood-incongruent 
(i.e., positive) autobiographical recall. A study by Josephson, Singer, and Salovey (1996) 
demonstrates that dysphoric participants are less likely to repair their current mood after 
a negative mood induction by retrieving positive memories. Nondysphoric participants, in 
contrast, successfully recall positive memories to counteract their current negative mood. 
Similar findings have been reported for individuals with low self-esteem (S. M. Smith & 
Petty, 1995) and self-focused rumination (McFarland & Buehler, 1998). Recently, Joor-
mann and Siemer (2004) have replicated the findings for dysphoric versus nondysphoric 
undergraduates. They demonstrate furthermore that, in contrast to distraction, rumina-
tive self-focus is an important factor that is responsible for deficient negative mood 
regulation in depression.  
 
In the preceding sections, we have focused on selected phenomena in depression 
and dysphoria that originally refer to cognitive issues but can be inspected from a moti-
vational point of view as well. This inspection demonstrates that sometimes motivation 
and cognition are not easily separated and that depressed or dysphoric individuals differ 
from control participants in important aspects. In the following chapters 2.4 and 2.5, in 
contrast, we directly address motivational issues and findings with reference to depres-
sion and dysphoria. These findings ultimately lead us to our research question concerning 
the presence or absence of motivational deficits in terms of effort intensity in dysphoria.  
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2.4 Motivational Systems in Depression 
2.4.1 Basic Motivational Orientations 
A prominent line of research supported by a vast body of empirical evidence is the 
postulate of different motivational systems with neurobiological and neurophysiological 
correlates. Gray (1982) proposed three motivational systems with different cortical and 
subcortical bases that determine behavior and emotion. The behavioral approach system 
(BAS)—also termed behavioral facilitation system or behavioral activation system by 
other researchers—reacts to signs of reward with the goal of approaching. In contrast, 
the behavioral inhibition system (BIS)—also termed withdrawal system—reacts to signs 
of punishment with the goal of avoiding. Furthermore, Gray postulated a fight and flight 
system responding to direct aversive stimulation. On this basis, Fowles (1994) formu-
lated a motivational theory of psychopathology and connected the motivational systems 
and their underlying physiological mechanisms to anxiety, depression, psychopathy, 
schizophrenia, and substance abuse. With respect to depression, Fowles postulated an 
interruption of the appetitive motivation (i.e., a weak BAS) together with a disinhibition 
of the BIS.  
In analogy to the BIS/BAS approach, Strauman (2002) uses the terms put for-
ward by Higgins (1998, see chapter 2.3.4) to refer to depression as a self-regulation dys-
function characterized by a hypoactivation of the promotion system in combination with a 
hyperactivation of the prevention system. Strauman furthermore underlines the role of 
the self and successive self-regulation failures in the promotion system for understanding 
the vulnerability for depression. Following the long-standing notion referring to loss of 
reinforcer effectiveness (e.g., Costello, 1972), Strauman describes depression as a loss 
of the motivation to respond to rewarding stimuli, which manifests itself on the neural, 
cognitive, and behavioral level. 
2.4.2 Evidence From Self-Report Data  
In the last 2 decades, a huge body of studies using self-report, behavioral, and 
neurophysiological measures has supported the differential activation of the BIS and BAS 
in depression. With respect to self-report measures—most often using the BIS/BAS 
scales by Carver and White (1994)—evidence is converging on the fact that depressed 
individuals consistently report higher BIS and lower BAS activation (but see also Johnson, 
Turner, & Iwata, 2003). Especially reduced approach motivation seems to be a robust 
marker of depression that persists after remission of depressive symptoms and has pre-
dictive value for depression status some months later (Kasch, Rottenberg, Arnow, & 
Gotlib, 2002). In contrast, increased inhibition motivation does not seem to persist after 
remission (Pinto-Meza et al., 2006).  
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In an earlier series of studies on the basis of “expectancy x value” theories of 
motivation, Layne and colleagues conclude that depressed individuals are characterized 
by a motivational deficit (Layne et al., 1982; Layne, Walters, & Merry, 1983). In their 
experiments that involved a forced-choice paradigm the authors demonstrate that dys-
phoric undergraduates attribute lower value to rewards and have slightly lower expec-
tancy for obtaining rewards. Following the multiplicative association of expectancy and 
value, this results in reduced reward (i.e., approach) motivation in dysphoria compared 
to nondysphoric individuals. Results with respect to punishment revealed that dysphoric 
individuals tend to evaluate punishment as less aversive and partly have higher expec-
tancy of being punished. Together, this results in lower or equal punishment (i.e., avoid-
ance) motivation in dysphoria compared to nondysphoric individuals. The authors con-
clude that depressed individuals do not care about any outcome, either positive or nega-
tive, a fact that is described by the term anhedonia.  
Research on the basis of the Pleasant Event Schedule (MacPhillamy & Lewinsohn, 
1982) points in the same direction. This scale involves the evaluation of a list of events 
referring to “obtained pleasure”, “activity level”, and “potential for reinforcement”. In a 
study with undergraduate participants who are induced into a positive, neutral, or nega-
tive mood, Carson and Adams (1980) report less positive ratings after the negative mood 
induction and more positive ratings after the positive mood induction. However, partici-
pants’ depression scores do not have an effect on the ratings on the Pleasant Event 
Schedule. MacPhillamy and Lewinsohn (1974) compare a group of clinically depressed 
patients to a group of other psychiatric patients and to a control group. The depressed 
group shows more negative ratings on all three subscales in comparison with both other 
groups, suggesting that anhedonia and insensitivity to rewarding activities are specific for 
depression. These two studies imply that depression and negative mood are associated 
with less obtained and anticipated pleasure concerning a variety of activities and thus 
with less approach motivation.  
2.4.3 Evidence From Behavioral Data  
The notion that the two basic motivational systems are differently pronounced in 
depression is supported on the behavioral level, too. A recent study investigated 
approach and avoidance goals and plans (Dickson & MacLeod, 2004). Two other studies 
dealt with responsiveness to reward and punishment (Henriques & Davidson, 2000). 
Participants in the study by Dickson and MacLeod had to generate approach and avoid-
ance goals and plans. Results reveal that adolescents with high depression scores gener-
ate fewer approach goals and plans and more avoidance plans (but not more avoidance 
goals). Furthermore, depressed participants are less specific when describing their goals 
and plans, compared to the control group.  
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Similarly, in two experiments, Henriques and colleagues (Henriques & Davidson, 
2000; Henriques, Glowacki, & Davidson, 1994) demonstrate that subclinical as well as 
clinical depression leads to reduced responsiveness to rewards. The authors analyzed 
participants’ response bias in a signal detection task under three within-subjects condi-
tions: neutral, reward, and punishment. Although depressed and nondepressed indi-
viduals’ performance does not differ with respect to the neutral condition, depressed par-
ticipants fail to adopt a more liberal response bias in the reward condition, in contrast to 
nondepressed individuals. Provided that task instructions are equally well understood in 
both groups, this means that depressed individuals are not motivated to earn money by 
simply changing their responses to the reward trials. Results under punishment condi-
tions are ambiguous and not consistent across the two studies. Further analyses suggest 
that concurrent anxiety might account for this inconsistency insofar as anxious indi-
viduals are sensitive to punishment signs, whereas purely depressed individuals are not 
motivated by monetary punishment. In summary, Henriques and colleagues successfully 
presented behavioral indices for depressives’ deficits in approach motivation that are in 
line with neurophysiological findings indicating a hypoactivation of the brain reward sys-
tem.  
2.4.4 Evidence From Neurophysiological Data  
Differences in cerebral activation between depressed and nondepressed indi-
viduals but also between people with transient negative versus positive affect have been 
shown by numerous studies. Reviewing the existent evidence, Davidson and colleagues 
(Davidson & Henriques, 2000; Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschke, & Putnam, 2002) summa-
rize depressed individuals’ abnormalities in the prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate 
cortex, the hippocampus, and the amygdale. Especially differences in the prefrontal corti-
cal areas, which are associated with the representation and maintenance of goals as well 
as with approach and withdrawal behavior, corroborate findings with respect to the two 
hypothesized motivational systems: Mainly on the basis of electroencephalography, but 
also on cerebral metabolism and blood flow, a substantial number of studies confirms 
that depression is related to a relative hypoactivation in left frontal areas, compared to 
the activation pattern found under normal conditions (Davidson & Henriques, 2000; 
Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschke et al., 2002; see also Gotlib, Ranganath, & Rosenfeld, 
1998; Harmon-Jones et al., 2002; Tomarken & Keener, 1998; Tremblay, Naranjo, 
Cardenas, Herrmann, & Busto, 2002). The findings are also in line with the model put 
forward by Davidson (1992) that relates right frontal activation to negatively valenced, 
withdrawal-related emotion and left frontal activation to positively valenced, approach-
related emotion.  
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This evidence is complemented by neurobiological studies on subcortical struc-
tures that are involved in the dopamine reward circuit and therefore in the regulation of 
reward-related behavior. Accordingly, symptoms of depression such as impaired motiva-
tion and reduced reward responsiveness are associated with alterations in mesolimbic 
reward areas (Nestler & Carlezon, 2006, see also chapter 2.1.5). In summary, data from 
self-report, behavioral, and neurophysiological studies strongly suggest that—as the term 
anhedonia implies—depression is indeed characterized by reduced approach behavior and 
partially also by increased avoidance behavior. 
2.5 Standards and Perfectionism in Depression 
To conclude the chapter on motivational issues in depression, an interesting ques-
tion pertains to the setting of (performance) standards. This question is related especially 
to the persistence and intensity dimensions of motivation and effort mobilization. As 
clinical observations often report a pronounced perfectionism in depression, the assump-
tion that depressed individuals try even harder and thus show the opposite of a motiva-
tional deficit suggests itself.  
On the basis of research about high performance goals (e.g., Ahrens, 1987) and 
low self-efficacy expectations (e.g., Kanfer & Zeiss, 1983) in depression and dysphoria, 
Cervone, Kopp, Schaumann, and Scott (1994) hypothesize that depression and negative 
affect would be characterized by a negative discrepancy between self-set standards and 
corresponding expectations to meet them. Experiments with subclinical and clinical 
samples involving self-report measures reveal that depressed and dysphoric participants 
hold higher performance standards than nondepressed and nondysphoric participants. 
Self-efficacy expectations, in contrast, do not differ between the groups. Taken together, 
these findings demonstrate a negative discrepancy between standards and expectations 
in depression (Cervone et al., 1994; Scott & Cervone, 2002; Tillema, Cervone, & Scott, 
2001).  
Moreover, one of the studies (Tillema et al., 2001) confirms that the results are 
due to an affect-as-information mechanism (Schwarz & Clore, 1983, 1996). In their 
study, Tillema et al. applied the “mood discounting” procedure introduced by Schwarz 
and Clore. This means that momentary mood is made salient to the participant, so that 
its influence on an outcome measure is diminished. Cervone, Scott, Tillema, and col-
leagues conclude furthermore that an undervaluation of potential outcomes leads to 
anticipated dissatisfaction. This, in turn, is considered to be responsible for higher per-
formance standards in depression and negative mood (Cervone et al., 1994; Scott & 
Cervone, 2002). Insofar, their considerations are consistent with other findings regarding 
undervaluation of rewards, which we have reported in chapter 2.4.2.  
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Dealing with standard setting and perfectionism has also led to the question 
whether these variables have trait or even predictive character in depression. In this 
context, Flett, Hewitt, Blankstein, and Gray (1998) underline the importance of 
perfectionistic cognitions, which explain variance in depression beyond trait perfectionism 
and which even have predictive value for depression, anxiety, and negative affectivity in 
general. The authors also emphasize that perfectionistic thinking may be interpreted as a 
preoccupation with one’s feebleness including rumination about not meeting one’s per-
fectionistic standards. On the other hand, Carver and colleagues (Carver, 1998; Carver & 
Ganellen, 1983) report findings that corroborate neither the connection of depression 
with high standards nor the predictive power of standards for high depression scores at a 
later point in time. According to these studies, it is rather the tendency to overgeneralize 
that represents a strong correlate and predictor of depression and a cognitive vulnerabil-
ity factor (see cognitive theories of depression in chapter 2.1.5).  
 
In the preceding first two chapters of the theoretical part, we have presented 
various findings concerning depression, motivation, and its relation. The great majority of 
the reviewed research literature suggests that depressed and dysphoric individuals have 
impairments or deficits with respect to motivation and self-regulation. However, as fore-
shadowed in the introduction, a series of experiments by Gendolla and colleagues (e.g., 
Gendolla & Krüsken, 2001a, 2002c) investigating the integration of the MBM (Gendolla, 
2000) and motivational intensity theory (Brehm & Self, 1989) has led us to hypothesize 
that depression and dysphoria are not necessarily associated with motivational deficits in 
terms of effort mobilization. Therefore, in the following two chapters of the theoretical 
part, we describe motivational intensity theory, the concept of effort mobilization, and 
the use of cardiovascular measures as an operationalization for the mobilization of 
energy resources. Subsequently, we present the MBM and its related research in more 
detail.  
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3. Effort Mobilization: Cardiovascular Measures and 
Motivational Intensity 
The main dependent variable of our research program is effort intensity, which 
can be defined as the mobilization of energy resources at a certain point in time in order 
to carry out behavior (Gendolla & Wright, in press). As we operationalize effort intensity 
by a person’s cardiovascular response (see R. A. Wright, 1996), we present in this chap-
ter some background about the cardiovascular system, its control by the autonomic 
nervous system, as well as the resulting cardiovascular parameters. Then, we report 
research on effort mobilization in the framework of motivational intensity theory (Brehm 
& Self, 1989). In order to underline the importance of cardiovascular parameters for the 
present research, we begin the chapter with a section on cardiovascular activity in 
depression.  
3.1 Depression and Cardiovascular Activity 
To date, a certain number of studies have already addressed the issue of cardio-
vascular activity and reactivity in depression. This research was mainly instigated by 
findings suggesting a relation between subclinical and clinical depression on the one hand 
and the development and worsening of cardiovascular diseases, as for instance coronary 
heart disease, on the other hand (e.g., Frasure-Smith & Lespérance, 2005b; Rugulies, 
2002). The prevailing view states that a dysregulation of autonomic cardiovascular bal-
ance in depression (i.e., stronger sympathetic and weaker parasympathetic activity) 
leads to stronger cardiovascular reactivity and ultimately to higher vulnerability for car-
diovascular diseases (Carney, Freeland, & Veith, 2005; Kibler & Ma, 2004; Light, 
Kothandapani, & Allen, 1998). Thus, strong cardiovascular reactivity is regarded as a 
mediator in patients suffering from cardiovascular disease and depression. But the evi-
dence for a causal relationship between depression and higher vulnerability for cardio-
vascular diseases is ambiguous and third factors are thought to play a causal role as well 
(Carney et al., 2005; Frasure-Smith & Lespérance, 2005a). Suls and Bunde (2005) 
emphasize that it is rather negative affectivity in general—as a component of depression 
but also of anxiety, hostility, and other psychopathological states—that plays a mediating 
role in the development of coronary heart disease (see also Jorgensen, Johnson, 
Kolodziej, & Schreer, 1996; Kubzansky, Davidson, & Rozanski, 2005).  
Despite the evidence for a relation between depression and cardiovascular dis-
ease, the findings concerning cardiovascular response to behavioral challenges in depres-
sion are mixed. A study with subclinically depressed women by Light et al. (1998) found 
evidence for depressives’ enhanced cardiovascular activity under baseline conditions and 
enhanced cardiovascular reactivity under physically demanding challenges (i.e., stand-
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ing) and mentally demanding challenges (i.e., speech task). The authors report higher 
systolic blood pressure (SBP) and diastolic blood pressure (DBP), shorter pre-ejection 
period (PEP), and lower heart rate variability (HRV) for depressed participants in all 
experimental periods. Furthermore, they found higher cardiac output, heart rate (HR), 
and plasma noradrenalin, but only for the speech task. These results suggest that 
depressed individuals are characterized by a generally enhanced cardiovascular activity, 
even under resting conditions. A meta-analysis on depression and cardiovascular reac-
tivity by Kibler and Ma (2004), however, revealed only weak SBP and DBP effects as well 
as moderate HR effects over the 11 studies included. The authors conclude that depres-
sion may be more strongly associated with cardiac activation than with vascular activa-
tion.  
Recently, Carroll, Phillips, Hunt, and Der (2007) reported data from a large 
community-based sample that—against the initial hypotheses—show weak negative 
associations between depression and SBP and HR reactivity. However, from our point of 
view, most of the cited studies failed to acknowledge the differential impact of task char-
acteristics as specified for instance in motivational intensity theory and its derivations 
(Brehm & Self, 1989; R. A. Wright & Kirby, 2001). For example, in the Carroll et al. 
study, cardiovascular measures from two different difficulty levels were merged to one 
index of cardiovascular reactivity. We think that the mixed findings concerning cardio-
vascular reactivity to behavioral challenges might be partly due to the fact that potential 
effects were neutralized because different task characteristics had not been considered.  
In this context, we should also note that there is recent evidence for differences in 
HRV and respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) between depressed and nondepressed indi-
viduals. Nevertheless, this evidence is mixed. From a theoretical point of view, a high 
RSA is thought to be adaptive because an active and rapid withdrawal of the “vagal 
brake” is important for an organism to face rapidly changing environmental demands 
(Porges, 1995, cited in Rottenberg, Salomon, Gross, & Gotlib, 2005). The level and reac-
tivity of RSA are thus important parameters of human self-regulation, and a high RSA is 
thought to be a buffer against psychopathology. Indeed, in most of the studies, depres-
sion has been shown to be associated with low HRV (Carney et al., 2005; Frasure-Smith 
& Lespérance, 2005a) and less vagal withdrawal in behavioral challenges (Rottenberg, 
Clift, Bolden, & Salomon, 2007). But the reverse pattern has been found as well 
(Rottenberg, Wilhelm, Gross, & Gotlib, 2002).  
3.2 The Cardiovascular System 
In the following sections, we deal in more detail with the cardiovascular system, 
its parameters, and its autonomic control. The main function of the cardiovascular sys-
tem is to maintain blood pressure, to ensure the blood flow through the tissues of the 
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body, and to supply oxygen to the various body organs. The cardiovascular system does 
so by reacting to the rapidly changing metabolic requirements and at the same time by 
trying to maintain a state of metabolic homoeostasis. In case of physical demand, blood 
flow in the skeletal muscles—but also in the heart and the skin—increases, whereas blood 
flow in other organs diminishes. Only the blood flow in the brain is relatively unaffected 
by these rapid changes that occur in association with various behavioral and psycho-
logical states (see Papillo & Shapiro, 1990).  
The cardiovascular system is functionally divided into two divisions. The pulmo-
nary circulation pumps oxygen-deficient blood in the lungs and returns oxygen-rich blood 
to the heart. In contrast, the systemic circulation pumps oxygen-rich blood to the body 
organs and returns oxygen-deficient blood to the heart. The heart itself consists of a left 
and a right pump, each consisting of two chambers—the atrium and the ventricle. The 
vasculature serves for the distribution, exchange, and collection of the pumped blood 
(see Papillo & Shapiro, 1990; Stern, Ray, & Quigley, 2001).  
The sinoatrial node located in the wall of the right atrium is responsible for the 
initiation of the rhythmic contraction of the heart and is the origin of electrophysiological 
depolarization. A heart cycle normally begins with the depolarization of the atria. Subse-
quently, the electrical activity spreads over the atrioventricular node and causes the 
ventricles to depolarize, while the atria relax (i.e., repolarize). Finally, all chambers are 
repolarized during rest period. Consequently, the main states of a heart cycle comprise 
the atrial systole during which blood flows from the atria to the ventricles, the ventricular 
systole during which ventricular pressure increases until the pressure becomes greater 
than in the aorta and causes the valves to open, and, finally, the ventricular diastole 
during which aortic and pulmonary valves are closed and the atrioventricular valves are 
not opened yet (see Brownley, Hurwitz, & Schneiderman, 2000). 
3.3 Sympathetic and Parasympathetic Influences 
The functioning of the cardiovascular system is influenced and hierarchically con-
trolled by various factors, including local control mechanisms on the cellular, metabolic, 
hormonal, and receptor level but also regulation by autonomic mechanisms and by sub-
cortical and cortical areas. Especially the sympathetic and parasympathetic branches of 
the autonomic nervous system exert a control function on the heart and the vasculature. 
The sympathetic nervous system (SNS) is always active in homeostasis but becomes 
more active during periods of stress. In general, SNS activation increases the activity of 
the target organs. The parasympathetic nervous system (PNS), in contrast, supports 
feeding, energy storage, and reproduction and exerts inhibiting influences. For example, 
the “normal” HR of approximately 105-110 beats per minute (bpm) under resting condi-
tions is restricted by vagal (i.e., parasympathetic) influences to approximately 70 bpm. 
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The PNS also exerts inhibiting influence on the SNS. Because of the opposing effects of 
the SNS and PNS, their joint activation allows for highly graded reciprocal regulation of 
organic functioning (see Brownley et al., 2000; Lovallo, 2005; Stern et al., 2001).  
With respect to the cardiovascular system, sympathetic activation generally 
causes activity: SNS activation can lead to HR increases but only to the extent that its 
influence is not masked (i.e., inhibited) by PNS activation. Moreover, SNS activation 
directly enhances the force of the contractility of the heart, that is, the force with which 
blood is ejected from the (left) ventricle into the aorta. Such increases in HR and heart 
contractility are mediated by beta-adrenergic sympathetic activation. Furthermore, the 
SNS influences the constriction of some blood vessels and the dilation of other blood ves-
sels, depending on which adrenergic postsynaptic receptor is involved (see Brownley et 
al., 2000; Levick, 2003; Lovallo, 2005).  
3.4 Cardiovascular Parameters 
The measurement of various parameters of the cardiovascular system can give an 
insight in the momentary state of the organism and allows inferring the activity of the 
autonomic nervous system. The following list of cardiac and vascular parameters is not 
exhaustive but presents parameters that are theoretically or empirically important for the 
present research (Levick, 2003; Papillo & Shapiro, 1990):  
· Total peripheral resistance (TPR) refers to the level of resistance to the blood flow 
caused by all blood vessels in the systemic circulation;  
· diastolic blood pressure (DBP) is the minimum pressure in the aorta during the dia-
stolic phase, recorded in millimeters of mercury (mmHg; normally approximately 80 
mmHg);  
· systolic blood pressure (SBP) is the maximum pressure in the aorta during ventricular 
ejection, recorded in mmHg (normally approximately 120 mmHg);  
· mean arterial pressure (MAP) is the mean pressure in the vasculature throughout a 
cardiac cycle, recorded in mmHg and approximated as MAP = 1/3 (SBP – DBP) + 
DBP;  
· pre-ejection period (PEP) corresponds to the time beginning with the onset of 
ventricular depolarization and ending with the opening of the semilunar valves;  
· heart rate (HR) is typically measured in beats per minute (bpm; at rest between 60 
and 80 bpm);  
· and, finally, respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) refers to the variability in HR associ-
ated with breathing, especially the high frequency band of the HRV spectrum 
(between 0.15 and 0.50 Hz). 
In accordance with the sympathetic and parasympathetic influences on the heart 
and the vasculature, these parameters are differently influenced by the activation of the 
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one or the other branch of the autonomic nervous system. As sympathetic activation can 
have vasodilative as well as vasoconstrictive effects in different vascular beds in depend-
ence on the receptor type involved, TPR is only unsystematically linked to sympathetic 
discharge. Consequently, DBP, which is mainly determined by TPR, is not systematically 
influenced by SNS activity. Hence it can—but does not necessarily have to—mirror SNS 
activity. In sum, DBP is not regarded as a good indicator of sympathetic activation. By 
contrast, SBP is only marginally influenced by TPR but chiefly determined by myocardial 
contractility (i.e., the force with which the heart contracts). As myocardial contractility is 
mainly influenced by innervations of the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous 
system, SNS activation directly enhances contractile force. Therefore, SBP can be consid-
ered as an indicator of sympathetic discharge. An even more direct indicator of contrac-
tile force is PEP, which is highly correlated with more direct measures of ventricular con-
tractility and especially sensitive to beta-adrenergic influences on the heart.1 As already 
outlined above, HR is expected to respond to sympathetic activation only to the extent 
that its influence is not masked by parasympathetic activity. RSA, in contrast, is widely 
accepted as an indicator of vagal (i.e., parasympathetic) autonomic control because pro-
jections of the vagal nerve contribute to RSA level and RSA fluctuation (see Levick, 2003; 
Papillo & Shapiro, 1990). 
As it is obvious from this brief description, the interplay of the different cardiac 
and vascular parameters is complex, and autonomic activity does not always influence all 
of them in the same manner. Furthermore, other non-autonomic factors may influence 
cardiovascular activity as well. Therefore, it has to be pointed out that such other factors 
as well as the specific situational context have to be considered when conclusions about 
specific physical or psychological states of the organism, as for instance arousal or effort, 
are drawn from cardiovascular parameters (see R. A. Wright, 1996). 
3.5 Active Coping and Effort Mobilization 
In psychophysiology, the cardiovascular system has received much attention as a 
system that responds to many psychological and behavioral processes and therefore may 
be an indicator of different states of the organism. Psychological states usually investi-
gated in this domain are attentional functions, arousal, stress, the social context, and so 
forth (Papillo & Shapiro, 1990). An important contribution to the understanding of indi-
viduals’ response to behavioral demands has been made by the work of Paul Obrist 
(1976, 1981). He based his analyses on the observation that, under rest as well as under 
performance conditions, the mobilization of the cardiovascular system is proportional to 
the demands for blood supply to the organs. Moreover, he put forward the notion of the 
                                                   
1 However, PEP may also be influenced by pre- and afterload, that is, ventricular filling and aortic 
diastolic pressure, respectively (see e.g., Obrist, Light, James, & Strogatz, 1987). 
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“cardiac-somatic uncoupling”. This means that the cardiovascular system reacts propor-
tionately not only to the demand of a physical task but also to the engagement in a 
mental task, even though in the latter case metabolic demand is relatively low. Further-
more, Obrist introduced the classification of tasks in dependence on the fact if they call 
for active versus passive coping. Active coping tasks are situations where the organism 
anticipates that some action or effort investment will result in successful coping, which 
means that the individual has control over behavioral outcomes. By contrast, passive 
coping tasks are situations where any action seems futile and therefore the situation and 
its consequences have to be undergone without the possibility to change anything by 
effort investment (see also Light, 1987; Papillo & Shapiro, 1990).  
Most important, Obrist and his colleagues (Obrist, 1976, 1981) provide evidence 
for the assumption that active and passive coping tasks elicit different responses on the 
cardiovascular level. Active coping involves stronger beta-adrenergic sympathetic stimu-
lation and leads to more pronounced myocardial responses. It resembles the pattern 
elicited by a flight reaction. Consequently, indicators of beta-adrenergic sympathetic acti-
vation, as for instance SBP, HR, and PEP, are more affected in an active coping situation. 
By contrast, passive coping involves less beta-adrenergic sympathetic stimulation but 
stronger vascular responses. This means that stronger increases in TPR are present as 
well as increases in DBP that equal or even exceed those of SBP changes (see also Light, 
1987; Obrist et al., 1987; Papillo & Shapiro, 1990).  
Evidence for the implications of the active/passive coping concept stems from a 
body of research investigating task engagement under different performance conditions. 
This research domain builds on the notion that active coping corresponds to effort mobili-
zation and that sympathetically mediated cardiovascular reactivity is enhanced in 
response to behavioral challenges—in anticipation (i.e., preparation) of a task as well as 
during the respective task. Such experiments usually comprise tasks within a social con-
text or not, with or without performance-contingent consequences, and with different 
levels of performance standards. These studies confirm that beta-adrenergic activity is 
heightened in active coping, as indicated by increases in SBP, HR, and cardiac output, as 
well as reductions in TPR (e.g., T. W. Smith, Ruiz, & Uchino, 2000). Sometimes, even 
DBP increases have been shown to accompany the active coping response pattern (e.g., 
T. W. Smith, Allred, Morrison, & Carlson, 1989). Moreover, when performance standards 
are impossible to meet, reduced reactivity of PEP, SBP, and pulse transit time has been 
demonstrated (e.g., Light & Obrist, 1983). 
3.6 Motivational Intensity Theory 
Even more evidence for sympathetic response to active coping tasks comes from 
the work by Rex Wright and colleagues. Wright (see R. A. Wright, 1996) has integrated 
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Obrist’s active coping approach and motivational intensity theory by Jack Brehm (Brehm 
& Self, 1989). Amongst other things, motivational intensity theory builds on the difficulty 
law of motivation by Ach (1935) stating that individuals avoid wasting energy and there-
fore mobilize resources proportionately to perceived task demand (see also Kukla, 1972). 
In contrast to other approaches postulating a proportional relationship between motiva-
tion and factors like success importance, individual needs, or self-involvement, motiva-
tional intensity theory distinguishes between the actual intensity of motivation at a given 
point in time (i.e., momentary effort mobilization) and the so-called potential motivation 
that is determined by classical variables like individuals’ needs, instrumentality of suc-
cess, or performance-contingent incentives. According to motivational intensity theory, 
potential motivation influences task engagement and effort mobilization only indirectly 
via its interaction with task difficulty.  
Another important classification in motivational intensity theory concerns the dis-
tinction between tasks with and without fixed performance standards. Under situations of 
fixed standards, motivational intensity is thought to rise proportionately with increasing 
task difficulty. This holds true until perceived task difficulty exceeds the level of potential 
motivation or until a task exceeds the person’s abilities. Under these conditions, motiva-
tional intensity is thought to be low, either because success is not possible or because 
effort mobilization is not justified by the value of success. This means that people disen-
gage and withhold effort under these two conditions. The relation between task difficulty 
and motivational intensity is depicted in chapter 4.4.2, Figure 3, Panel A. In contrast, 
when no performance standard is given and people are free to determine their extent of 
engagement, individuals are thought to strive for the highest justified performance level. 
Consequently, motivational intensity should directly vary with factors influencing poten-
tial motivation, as for instance success importance, until a maximum is reached.  
As outlined before, R. A. Wright and colleagues have provided a vast body of evi-
dence supporting the predictions of motivational intensity theory, not only with respect to 
self-report indices of task engagement but especially with respect to cardiovascular indi-
ces of effort mobilization. According to expectations on the basis of the physiological 
mechanisms described by the active coping approach, R. A. Wright and colleagues find 
SBP and HR reactivity, and seldom DBP reactivity, to correspond to the theoretical pre-
dictions of motivational intensity theory: Under the condition of fixed performance stan-
dards, effort mobilization (i.e., cardiovascular reactivity) is low for easy tasks and rises 
with difficulty; but it is low for extremely difficult tasks due to disengagement (e.g., R. A. 
Wright, 1984; R. A. Wright, Brehm, Crutcher, Evans, & Jones, 1990). Moreover, there is 
evidence for the interaction of potential motivation and fixed task difficulty. This means 
that high instrumentality, high incentive value, or strong needs can lead to high effort 
investment even if a task is relatively difficult (e.g., Storey, Wright, & Williams, 1996; R. 
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A. Wright & Gregorich, 1989; R. A. Wright, Shaw, & Jones, 1990). Concerning tasks with-
out fixed performance standards, effort mobilization directly depends on factors influ-
encing potential motivation. This means that the maximum level of justified effort is 
mobilized (e.g., R. A. Wright, Killebrew, & Pimpalapure, 2002). For an overview over this 
research program and the empirical evidence see Wright (R. A. Wright, 1996, 1998; R. A. 
Wright & Kirby, 2001).  
3.7 The Influence of Subjective Task Difficulty 
Among the work of R. A. Wright and colleagues, one specification of the predic-
tions of motivational intensity theory is of particular importance for the present research 
program. In a series of studies, R. A. Wright and colleagues investigated effort mobiliza-
tion in samples with low versus high perceived task-relevant ability (see R. A. Wright, 
1998, for an overview). The rationale for their predictions is that individuals with high 
perceived abilities should appraise a given task as easier and therefore mobilize less 
energy than individuals with low perceived abilities. Consequently, those latter individuals 
should withhold energy mobilization at a lower level of objective difficulty than high abil-
ity individuals because of subjectively too high task demand. However, at a very high 
difficulty level, ability perception should not make a difference because both groups are 
supposed to withhold effort. The resulting pattern of predictions corresponds to the one 
presented for the influence of mood in the following chapter (see chapter 4.4.2, Figure 3, 
Panel B).  
In a series of studies either manipulating perceived ability by means of per-
formance feedback or comparing natural differences in perceived ability, R. A. Wright and 
colleagues corroborate their theoretical predictions. Specifically, they find that low ability 
participants show higher SBP (and sometimes HR) reactivity than high ability participants 
for easy but not for difficult tasks (e.g., R. A. Wright & Dismukes, 1995; R. A. Wright, 
Wadley, Pharr, & Butler, 1994). Furthermore, cardiovascular reactivity is low for both 
groups under extremely difficult conditions (e.g., R. A. Wright, Murray, Storey, & 
Williams, 1997). Finally, a study by Annis, Wright, and Williams (2001) confirms the 
interaction effect of task difficulty and ability perception for PEP and stroke volume but 
surprisingly not for SBP.  
Building on the ability assumptions, R. A. Wright and colleagues have extended 
their reasoning to individual differences in trait optimism and to the depletion of per-
formance resources. The authors reason that trait optimism has an influence on ability 
perception and therefore on resource mobilization. Two experiments confirm the 
expected crossover interaction pattern, that is, higher SBP response for pessimists at low 
difficulty levels but for optimists at high difficulty levels (Kirby, Vaga, Penacerrada, & 
Wright, 2003, cited in R. A. Wright & Franklin, 2004).  
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A second line of ongoing research assumes that the depletion of performance 
resources influences ability appraisals in a related but not in a completely different 
domain. Depletion is experimentally manipulated by asking participants to perform a 
physical or mental task that is either easy (no depletion) or difficult (depletion). After-
wards, participants work on a second task that either taps into a similar or a different 
domain. Results confirm that depletion does not influence effort mobilization in a differ-
ent domain. However, in a similar domain, depleted individuals show higher SBP reactiv-
ity in the second task due to lower ability perception (R. A. Wright & Penacerrada, 2002). 
Moreover, if task difficulty of the second task is manipulated as well, it interacts with task 
difficulty of the first task: Individuals who first perform a difficult task and who are 
therefore depleted show higher cardiovascular reactivity if the second task is easy but 
not if the second task is difficult (R. A. Wright, Martin, & Bland, 2003).  
Most relevant for the present research program, Gendolla has integrated the work 
of Brehm and R. A. Wright with considerations about mood influences on behavior—the 
mood-behavior-model (MBM; Gendolla, 2000). In a series of experiments that are pre-
sented in greater detail in the following chapter 4, Gendolla and colleagues corroborated 
their assumption that mood influences behavior-related evaluations and judgments, 
which leads to the same pattern of effort mobilization as has been shown for ability per-
ception (see Richter, Gendolla, & Krüsken, 2006, for an overview). The extensions of 
motivational intensity theory presented in this section are of great importance for the 
present research on depression effects because depression is not only characterized by a 
persistent negative mood but also by lower self-esteem together with lower evaluations 
of one’s own abilities (e.g., Power, 1999). Therefore, the findings about the influence of 
manipulated transient moods by Gendolla and colleagues build the basis for our core 
hypothesis, namely that depression and dysphoria are not necessarily associated with a 
motivational deficit in resource mobilization but that it depends on task context and task 
difficulty whether depression leads to low or high effort mobilization.  
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4. The Mood-Behavior-Model and Related Research 
Mood, Motivation, and Performance: An Integrative 
Theory, Research, and Applications2 
An integrative theory about mood and motivation—the mood-behavior-model (MBM; 
Gendolla, 2000)—is presented and the results of related studies on mood and motiva-
tional intensity are discussed. A series of experiments with implications for motivation in 
organizational and educational settings assessed motivational intensity as cardiovascular 
reactivity in the context of task performance. The results support the theoretical predic-
tions and demonstrate that (1) moods do not per se have an effort mobilizing function, 
(2) moods are pragmatically used as information for demand appraisals, (3) mood con-
gruent demand appraisals determine effort-related cardiovascular response, (4) per-
formance-contingent incentive determines the level of maximally justified effort, (5) 
effort is linked to achievement. The findings specify and extend other approaches to the 
role of affect in motivation and have direct implications for clinical psychology, work psy-
chology, and health psychology. 
 
Individuals’ affective experiences are a central variable in the person system 
mediating between external stimuli and people’s behavioral reactions (Mischel & Shoda, 
1995). This applies, of course, also to organizational and educational settings: On the 
one hand, work settings directly influence the moods and emotions people experience 
(Kelly & Barsade, 2001). On the other hand, moods and emotions have multiple effects 
on performance and organizational behavior (see Baron, 1993; Forgas & George, 2001; 
George & Brief, 1992; Isen & Baron, 1991, for reviews). Furthermore, moods’ motiva-
tional effects can play significant roles in psychological problems and the development of 
physical disease (Gendolla & Brinkmann, 2005; Gendolla & Richter, 2005b). 
In the last decade, an abundance of research has identified manifold influences of 
affective states on motivation and task performance. Although most of this research was 
not conducted in applied settings, there are numerous insights of direct relevance for 
work motivation. In an attempt to contribute to this understanding, the present chapter 
focuses on one special type of affective experience—mood states—and on one special 
aspect of motivation—motivational intensity, which corresponds to effort mobilization or 
                                                   
2 Gendolla, G. H. E., Brinkmann, K., & Richter, M. (2007). Mood, motivation, and performance: An 
integrative theory, research, and applications. In A. M. Lane (Ed.), Mood and human performance: 
Conceptual, measurement, and applied issues (p. 35-62). Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science 
Publishers. 
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task engagement. After presenting an integrative theoretical framework about mood and 
motivation, we will discuss research on mood and motivational intensity. Finally, we will 
outline implications for applied issues, such as work motivation, clinical psychology, and 
health psychology. 
4.1 Affect and Motivation 
Emotions have the motivational function to guide behavior. Specific emotions, 
such as anger, fear, or interest control goal priorities and involve action tendencies, such 
as anger-aggression, fear-flight, or interest-exploration. Thus, emotions facilitate a fast 
and effective adaptation of the organism to the environment (Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 
2001; C. A. Smith & Lazarus, 1990). Emotions’ motivational function becomes, for 
instance, visible in their effects on autonomic nervous system activity (see Cacioppo, 
Berntson, Larsen, Poehlmann, & Ito, 2000, for a review). Autonomic adjustments as a 
component of specific emotions reflect the fast and short-lived mobilization of body 
resources to prepare the organism for action.  
The motivational implications of moods are less clear than those of emotions. 
Moods are defined as relatively long lasting affective states that are experienced without 
concurrent awareness of their elicitors. That is, moods are “feeling states themselves” 
(Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Frijda, 1993; Wyer, Clore, & Isbell, 1999). Whereas 
individuals typically know the incidents and stimuli that elicit specific and short-lived 
emotions (e.g., happy or sad about...), they are usually not aware of the origins of their 
moods (e.g., feeling good or bad) (e.g., Wilson, Laser, & Stone, 1982). Given that moods 
have been conceptualized as always-present frames of mind (Morris, 1989), it appears 
likely that they should also influence motivation and performance. A recent integrative 
theory about the role of mood in the motivation process aims to explain how this takes 
place. 
4.2 The Mood-Behavior-Model (MBM) 
According to the mood-behavior-model (MBM; Gendolla, 2000), transient mood 
states can have highly context dependent, though predictable, effects on behavior 
(Richter et al., 2006). Unlike specific emotions, moods per se do neither have stable 
effects on goal priorities nor on the intensity or persistence of behavior—the three 
aspects of behavior that are determined in the motivation process (Geen, 1995). Moods 
can, however, influence motivation and behavior through two processes—directive and 
informational mood impacts. The strength of each process depends on variables that 
refer to the context in which moods are experienced, as summarized in five basic postu-
lates presented in Figure 1. 
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The Mood-Behavior-Model (MBM) 
 
(1) Moods have—in contrast to emotions—no stable or specific motivational implica-
tions or function. Moods are experienced without simultaneous awareness of their 
causes. Consequently, moods do not urge the organism to act in a specific way toward 
objects or incidents that elicited the moods. 
(2) Moods influence behavior by their informational and directive impacts. The 
informational impact refers to congruency effects on behavior-related judgments and 
appraisals. The directive mood impact refers to the pursuit of a hedonic motive, and thus  
behavioral preferences are affected.  
(3) The informational and directive mood impacts can influence behavior 
independently. Either of these impacts is sufficient to mediate mood states to behavior, 
but both can occur simultaneously as well. In addition, both mood impacts can be so 
weak that neither has a significant influence. 
(4) The strength of the informational mood impact is a function of the effective 
informational weight of mood and the extent of mood-primed associations. Mood is par-
ticularly diagnostic for evaluative judgments, and mood-primed associations are espe-
cially likely to be activated in specific mood states, when moods are residuals of specific 
emotions. 
(5) The strength of the directive mood impact is jointly determined by the strength of 
the hedonic motive and the magnitude of behaviors’ instrumentality for motive satisfac-
tion. The strength of the hedonic motive is, in turn, determined by mood intensity, mood 
salience, and situational context. The magnitude of behaviors’ instrumentality for motive 
satisfaction is determined by the hedonic tone of behavior itself, the hedonic tone of 
behavioral outcomes, and mood valence. 
Figure 1 
The five basic postulates of the mood-behavior-model (MBM; Gendolla, 2000) 
4.2.1 Directive Mood Impact 
The directive mood impact influences the direction of behavior in compliance with 
a hedonic motive and turns out in preferences for affect regulative behaviors. However, if 
and how strongly the directive mood impact works depends on context variables: The 
MBM predicts that the strength of a person’s hedonic motive—that is, the need to feel 
good—increases with both mood intensity and mood salience and that it decreases with 
situational circumstances that prohibit pleasant feelings (like visiting a funeral). Only if 
the hedonic motive is strong, a person will prefer behaviors that are instrumental for 
hedonic affect regulation in that they promise positive feelings as a result of pleasant 
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associations of a behavior itself (i.e., intrinsic pleasure) or pleasant consequences of 
behaviors in terms of hedonic reward (i.e., extrinsic pleasure). 
The directive mood impact on behavior is particularly visible in decision-making—a 
major aspect of human behavior and organizational work. Besides having an influence on 
judgments of expectancy and value in the decision process (Isen, 2000), moods can also 
influence behavioral decisions because these are often oriented to their hedonic conse-
quences (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Loewenstein, 1996). Referring to the role of mood 
valence (i.e., feeling good or bad) in the latter process, the actual state of research is not 
conclusive. On the one hand, there is evidence for the assumption that negative mood is 
particularly powerful in instigating affect regulative behaviors in terms of mood repair 
(e.g., Schaller & Cialdini, 1990). On the other hand, positive mood is a major trigger of 
affect regulation in terms of mood maintenance (e.g., Wegener & Petty, 1994). This 
equivocal evidence suggests that mood valence cannot be the critical variable that 
strengthens a person’s hedonic motive. Rather, the MBM postulates that mood intensity 
is the crucial variable that strengthens a person’s hedonic motive and thus triggers the 
interest in mood repair or mood maintenance. Thus, both intense negative and positive 
moods lead to preferences for behaviors that promise positive affective experiences 
(e.g., Handley & Lassiter, 2002). Consequently, the MBM predicts that especially people 
in an intense mood—either negative or positive—who are aware of their current feeling 
state (e.g., McFarland & Buehler, 1998) are highly interested in hedonic affect regulation 
in terms of mood repair and mood maintenance when the experience of well-being is not 
forbidden in the person’s actual context.  
An example for the directive mood impact on behavior may be a manager who 
needs to make some investment decisions at the stock market. If this person is in an 
intense negative or positive mood, the MBM suggests that he or she will experience a 
strong hedonic motive and thus prefer stock options that promise fast and high gains and 
thus positive affective experiences. In a less intense mood, the manager should experi-
ence a weaker hedonic motive. Thus, he or she should be less interested in stock market 
operations that seem to promise fast and high gain and consequently positive affect. 
Likewise, a personnel manager in an intense good or bad mood who has to choose 
among applicants for opened positions may orient his decisions on applicants’ charm and 
the pleasantness of their physical appearance rather than on their mere qualification. 
However, the MBM also predicts that the strength of this manager’s hedonic motive 
would be significantly lower if it is clearly inappropriate to feel good in the organizational 
setting. Under this condition, decisions should be less influenced by concerns of hedonic 
affect regulation (see Parrott, 1993). 
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4.2.2 Informational Mood Impact 
The informational mood impact influences behavior-related judgments and 
appraisals and takes effect on the persistence and the intensity of behavior. Informa-
tional mood impact refers to the answers people find when they ask themselves implicit 
questions once they are confronted with a demand. Examples are “Can I cope with this 
demand?”, “Have I already achieved enough?“, “How much effort do I have to mobi-
lize?”, or “How difficult is the task?”. The MBM posits that moods can influence these 
appraisals in terms of mood congruency effects (e.g., Erez & Isen, 2002; Kavanagh & 
Bower, 1985; Lane, Whyte, Terry, & Nevill, 2005; J. C. Wright & Mischel, 1982). The 
result is that people are more optimistic in a positive mood than in negative mood (e.g., 
Efklides & Petkaki, 2005). 
Imagine a person who comes to work in a bad mood. Imagine further this person 
has a desk full of work, which he or she needs to complete as soon as possible. According 
to the MBM, the person’s mood will not have much visible impact on behavioral decisions, 
like preferences for pleasant activities. Sufficient commitment provided, there are actu-
ally not many choice options regarding what to do today. Consequently, the directive 
mood impact is rather weak. But the MBM posits that the employee’s mood state will 
have a systematic influence on his or her performance. At least, the mood state will 
influence work persistence in that it can determine the point in the work process at which 
the employee will believe that enough is done. According to studies by Martin, Ward, 
Achee, and Wyer (1993), this point is reached later in a bad mood than in a good mood, 
because negative mood can signal a lack of approach to the working goal. And the mood 
state will influence how vigorously the work is done—as will be shown in more detail 
below. The MBM suggests that these mood effects on persistence and engagement occur 
because people will use their momentary mood state as information for evaluating if 
enough has been accomplished or how much engagement is necessary to complete the 
work. 
In more detailed terms, the MBM posits that informational mood impact on per-
sistence and effort mobilization occurs because people use their mood as a piece of 
information and integrate it with all other available information into an evaluative judg-
ment (e.g., Abele & Gendolla, 1999; Abele & Petzold, 1994). In the present context, 
evaluative behavior-related judgments are critical. The result is that people who face a 
challenge judge task difficulty, subjective ability, required effort, and the likelihood of 
success lower in a negative mood than in a positive mood, resulting in lower subjective 
demand in a positive mood than in a negative mood (e.g., Gendolla, Abele, & Krüsken, 
2001). The MBM also considers that moods may activate associations, like remembering 
pleasant events in a good mood and unpleasant events in a bad mood. These associa-
tions can also contribute to mood congruency effects because people are expected to use 
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all available information for making judgments. However, such “mood as priming” effects 
are only predicted for mood states that are residuals of specific emotions (Niedenthal, 
Halberstadt, & Setterlund, 1997). But concerning evaluative judgments, like demand 
appraisals, the effective weight of mood as a piece of diagnostic information is higher 
than that of remembered events. We agree with Clore et al. (1994), that mood congru-
ency effects on evaluative judgments are the most reliable and best replicated finding in 
affect-cognition research, because the valence of an experienced mood provides direct 
information for answering an evaluative question.3 
It is of note that the MBM differs from other accounts of mood-cognition linkages 
like, for example, the affect-infusion-model (AIM; Forgas, 1995). The AIM posits that 
mood is either used as diagnostic information (heuristic processing) or makes memory 
associations accessible (substantial processing). By contrast, the MBM does not make 
processing style assumptions and predicts that mood is always more or less informative 
for evaluative judgments and that it can activate knowledge when mood is the residual of 
a specific emotion. As we have shown in the studies to be discussed below, the extent of 
engagement in information processing (processing style, respectively) is an effect rather 
than a determinant of informational mood impact. Other differences between the MBM 
and leading approaches concerning the role of mood in information processing and 
behavior are discussed elsewhere (Gendolla, 2000). 
4.3 Mood and Motivational Intensity 
According to the MBM, moods can influence motivational intensity through the 
following process: Moods provide information for demand appraisals. Consequently, the 
extent of subjective demand is higher in a negative mood than in a positive mood when 
people are confronted with a challenge. Moods can then systematically influence effort 
intensity, because subjective demand directly determines engagement as long as it is 
possible and worthwhile to perform a task (Brehm & Self, 1989). However, given that 
moods themselves are not conceptualized as motivational states, it is of note that these 
mood effects should not occur before moods are experienced in a context that directly 
calls for effort. Thus, moods should only influence the mobilization of effort when people 
are confronted with a challenge and make the necessary appraisals of its extent of 
demand. In this context, people can use their moods as information for demand apprais-
als, which in turn determine the level of engagement. Furthermore, the MBM predicts 
that moods are only one piece of information people use for appraising task demand. 
When more information about the extent of demand is provided—for example, in terms 
                                                   
3 It is of course also possible that moods activate memories for emotional events that in turn elicit 
mood states. But even in this case, the resulting mood state rather than the memory itself is used 
as a piece of information for an evaluative judgment. 
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of a given performance standard—people use and integrate it simultaneously into the 
final judgment.  
The deeper reason for this “pragmatic” use of all available diagnostic information 
to evaluate the level of subjective demand is the effort conservation principle (Ach, 
1935; Hull, 1943; Tolman, 1932). That is, people try to avoid wasting resources. There-
fore, they try to mobilize only as much effort as necessary for goal attainment (Brehm & 
Self, 1989) and try to use all available diagnostic information for demand appraisals. 
4.3.1 Measuring Engagement 
The psychological literature is full of attempts to measure motivational intensity or 
effort mobilization. Examples are self-reports, persistence, or achievement. Unfortu-
nately, each of these measures is ambiguous and thus problematic as motivational inten-
sity index (see Gendolla, 2004, for a discussion). A pioneering research program of 
psychophysiologist Paul Obrist has offered an alternative way to assess motivational 
intensity in terms of cardiovascular reactivity in the performance context (e.g., Obrist, 
1981). Accordingly, the changes in the activity of the heart and the vasculature in the 
performance context can reliably reflect task engagement. It is of note that these cardio-
vascular changes are independent of metabolic demand and thus apply to both physical 
and cognitive tasks. Among the possible indices of cardiovascular arousal, one index—
systolic blood pressure (SBP; i.e., the pressure in the vasculature on the peak of a pulse 
wave)—is especially responsive to the extent of task demand (see Gendolla, 2004; 
Gendolla & Wright, 2005; Obrist, 1981; R. A. Wright, 1996; R. A. Wright & Franklin, 
2004; R. A. Wright & Kirby, 2001, for overviews). Other indices, like diastolic blood pres-
sure (DBP; e.g., Storey et al., 1996) and heart rate (HR; e.g., Gellatly & Meyer, 1992) 
are less sensitive.4 
4.4 Empirical Evidence 
A number of experimental studies in our laboratory have investigated the impact 
of mood states on motivational intensity quantified as cardiovascular response. Specifi-
cally, these studies examined engagement under three performance conditions that are 
                                                   
4 SBP is the pressure in the vasculature on the peak of a pulse wave. It depends on the 
contractility of the heart muscle, which is systematically related to beta-adrenergic sympathetic 
discharge to the heart and the flow resistance in the vasculature (Brownley et al., 2000). DBP 
describes the pressure between two pulse waves. It depends on vascular resistance, which is 
unsystematically related to sympathetic arousal—sympathetic arousal leads to dilatation in some 
vascular beds and to vasoconstriction in others. HR is independently affected by both sympathetic 
and parasympathetic arousal and should only respond to effort mobilization when the actual 
sympathetic impact is stronger (Berntson, Cacioppo, & Quigley, 1993; Obrist, 1981). 
Consequently, SBP is the most reliable measure of effort mobilization among these cardiovascular 
indices. SBP, DBP, and HR can, however, respond simultaneously during task performance (e.g., 
Bongard & Hodapp, 1997; Gendolla & Richter, 2005a; Lovallo et al., 1985; T. W. Smith et al., 
1989). 
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of direct relevance for work motivation: These are performance settings without clear 
performance standards, performance settings with a clear performance standard, and 
settings in which reward is contingent versus non-contingent upon performance. 
Typically, an experiment in this program of research consisted of three parts: (1) 
A habituation period to assess participants’ cardiovascular baseline values, (2) a mood 
manipulation in which positive versus negative moods were induced, and (3) a task per-
formance period with one of the three performance settings mentioned above. In the 
performance period, participants worked on a cognitive task. That is, performance was 
mentally rather than metabolically demanding and thus reflected the mobilization of 
mental effort (see Hockey, 1997). Cardiovascular indices were assessed during habitua-
tion, the mood inductions, and task performance. According to the psychophysiological 
understanding about the determination of cardiovascular reactivity during task per-
formance, our primary effort-related measure was SBP reactivity relative to the baseline 
values assessed during habituation (see Obrist, 1981; R. A. Wright, 1996).  
4.4.1 Tasks Without Performance Standard 
The MBM posits for tasks that are performed without a clear performance standard 
that people will use their moods as task-relevant information to evaluate the extent of 
demand and that the magnitude of subjective demand will in turn determine engagement 
because the demand-effort relationship is proportional (Ach, 1935; Brehm & Self, 1989). 
Given that moods usually produce congruency effects when people use them as diagnos-
tic information for evaluative judgments like demand appraisals, the predicted result is 
higher engagement in a negative mood than in a positive mood—as long as the diagnos-
tic value of mood is not called into question.  
Gendolla and Krüsken (2002a) tested these predictions in an experiment. After 
habituation and assessment of cardiovascular baseline values, participants watched 
depressing versus elating video excerpts to induce positive versus negative moods. After 
completion of filler questions and a mood manipulation check, participants received 
instructions for a learning task. The task was to correctly memorize in 5 min as many 
items of a list of 20 letter series (e.g., Q P T Z) as they could and to write them down 
afterwards (“do-your-best”). In addition to mood, the diagnostic value of mood as task-
relevant information was manipulated. Therefore, half the participants read a short note 
under the task instructions that provided a cue for the mood manipulation: In the “cue” 
conditions participants read that previous research would suggest that the video excerpts 
they had seen may have long lasting effects on people’s feeling states. This hint to the 
possibility that the moods may have been manipulated was expected to reduce the diag-
nostic weight participants assigned to their feelings as task-relevant information. Conse-
quently, no significant mood effect on task engagement was anticipated in the cue condi-
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tion. The other half of the participants performed in a “no-cue” condition. Here, nothing 
was mentioned with regard to the previously presented video excerpts. Thus, participants 
in this condition were expected to use their moods as diagnostic information for their 
demand appraisals and to mobilize more effort in a negative mood than in a positive 
mood.  
The results were as expected. Mood had no effects on the cardiovascular 
responses assessed during the mood inductions, although the mood inductions were 
highly effective according to the manipulation check. However, in all experimental condi-
tions, the cardiovascular values remained on the baseline levels during the film presen-
tations, supporting the MBM notion that moods do not per se mobilize effort. But the 
reactivity of SBP during performance on the learning task—that is, when mood was 
experienced in a setting that directly called for effort mobilization—exactly described the 
predicted pattern. As depicted in Figure 2, SBP increased significantly higher in a nega-
tive mood than in a positive mood when no cue for the mood manipulation was provided. 
In further support of the predictions, this mood effect diminished in the cue-condition.  
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Figure 2 
Systolic blood pressure (SBP) reactivity in the experiment by Gendolla and Krüsken (2002a). Copy-
right: American Psychological Association. 
Achievement effects corresponded to those of systolic reactivity during task per-
formance. As presented in Table 1, participants in the no-cue condition memorized sig-
nificantly more items in a negative mood than in a positive mood. By contrast, no reliable 
mood effect emerged in the cue condition. Thus, achievement effects resembled those of 
effort intensity and the relatively high engagement in the negative-mood/no-cue condi-
tion had the merit of better performance. This association between effort and achieve-
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ment was also visible in a significant, positive correlation between SBP reactivity during 
task performance and the total number of remembered letter series. 
Table 1  
Mean Number of Recalled Letter Series in Study 1 by Gendolla and Krüsken (2002a). 
        
  Negative Mood   Positive Mood 
No-cue 8.65  6.71 
Cue 6.65   8.12 
    
Note: n = 17 in each cell. 
A follow-up experiment administered a letter cancellation task for the performance 
period and replicated the effort-related findings of the first study. Additionally, the follow-
up study involved a second mood manipulation check after task performance and found 
that the cue manipulation had no effect on mood intensity—mood remained stable in all 
experimental conditions. This is an important finding because it makes an alternative 
explanation implausible, according to which the mood zero-effect in the cue-condition 
emerged because the cue manipulation neutralized participants’ moods. Furthermore, the 
follow-up experiment found a mood congruency effect on ratings of subjective task diffi-
culty in the no-cue condition but not in the cue condition. This finding further demon-
strates that mood influenced task engagement because it had a congruency effect on 
demand appraisals.  
In summary, the studies by Gendolla and Krüsken (2002a) have demonstrated 
that moods per se have no effects on effort mobilization but that they lead to higher 
engagement in a negative mood than in a positive mood when people use their moods as 
diagnostic information for demand appraisals. The results of further studies on the effects 
of mood under performance conditions without performance standards even allow gener-
alizing these findings. Experiments that used different mood induction techniques (music, 
autobiographical recollection, video excerpts) and different types of mental demand 
revealed identical results: In line with the predictions, effort-related SBP reactivity was 
stronger in a negative mood than in a positive mood during performance on a letter can-
cellation task (Gendolla et al., 2001; Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002c, Study 2) or a verbal 
creativity task that was additionally manipulated in terms of task valence (Gendolla & 
Krüsken, 2001b). Thus, the informational mood impact on task engagement as 
conceptualized in the MBM is a robust effect. 
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4.4.2 Tasks With Performance Standards 
In order to predict mood effects on motivational intensity when a performance 
standard is provided, it is necessary to note that the MBM posits that people use their 
moods as task-relevant information in a pragmatic way. As outlined earlier, this means 
that people use all available diagnostic information to evaluate the level of task demand 
that in turn determines effort intensity due to the conversation of resources principle. 
Thus, mood is one piece of diagnostic information that is integrated, according to Ander-
son’s (1981) averaging rule, into a judgment together with all other available information 
(Abele & Gendolla, 1999; Abele, Gendolla, & Petzold, 1998; Abele & Petzold, 1994). It 
follows that people in a positive or negative mood who are confronted with a task and 
receive information about a performance standard should consider both of the available 
diagnostic pieces of information—their mood state and the performance standard—to 
appraise the extent of demand. The resulting actual engagement is predictable through 
an application of the MBM reasoning on informational mood impact to Brehm’s motiva-
tional intensity theory (e.g., Brehm & Self, 1989), as illustrated in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3 
The relationship between subjective task difficulty and effort intensity (Panel A) and the role of 
mood in this process (Panel B). Figure adapted from Gendolla and Krüsken (2001b). Copyright: 
Society for Psychophysiologic Research. 
Panel A of Figure 3 shows the general relationship between task difficulty and 
effort intensity. Effort is mobilized proportionally to the magnitude of subjective task dif-
ficulty up to the level of maximally justified effort. Once this point is accomplished, no 
more effort will be mobilized. The same happens on task difficulty levels that clearly 
exceed a person’s ability, making success impossible. Panel B of Figure 3 shows the 
informational impact of mood in this process: (1) Individuals in a negative mood will 
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mobilize more effort than individuals in a positive mood when the task is easy. This is 
because subjective task demand is higher in a negative mood than in a positive mood. 
(2) If a task is difficult, individuals in a negative mood will mobilize only little effort 
because they already perceive task demand as too high for them, resulting in disen-
gagement. Individuals in a positive mood will, by contrast, mobilize high effort because 
they perceive task demand as high but not yet too high. (3) If a task is extremely diffi-
cult so that success is obviously impossible, mood will play no significant role and only 
little effort reflecting disengagement will be mobilized. This is predicted because the 
diagnostic weight of the information that task difficulty is extreme is so high that the 
effective weight of mood as a piece of diagnostic information becomes very low, accord-
ing to the mood-and-information-integration perspective applied to the MBM.  
An experiment by Gendolla and Krüsken (2001a) tested these predictions. After 
habituation and assessment of cardiovascular baseline values, we induced positive versus 
negative moods by exposing participants to either elating or depressing music. After a 
short distraction task and assessment of the mood manipulation check, participants 
received instructions for a letter cancellation task—the so called “d2 task” (Brickenkamp, 
1981). The task materials consisted of rows with random sequences of the letters d, p, 
and q. Placed above or below each letter were one, two, or no apostrophes. Participants 
received instructions to mark all ds that carried two apostrophes (e.g., d’’, d,,). To get an 
impression of the task, participants performed one practice line of 47 letters. Thereafter, 
all participants received the feedback that they had needed 25 s to complete the line 
(which was about the actual performance time). For the upcoming 5-min performance 
period, half of the participants were then informed that they would have to complete 
each line within 20 s (difficult condition), whereas the other half was told that they would 
have 30 s per line (easy condition). That is, participants in the difficult condition had to 
work 20% faster than during practice while those in the easy condition could work 20% 
slower.  
The results showed no mood effects on cardiovascular reactivity during the mood 
inductions, although the mood manipulation was highly effective according to the 
manipulation check. However, participants remained on their cardiovascular baseline lev-
els and showed even slight decreases in systolic reactivity, lending further support to the 
MBM notion that moods do not per se mobilize effort. Effects on SBP and DBP reactivity 
during task performance are depicted in Figure 4. 
 
Theoretical Part: Mood-Behavior-Model 
 
49
easy difficult easy difficult
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
-2
-4
S
B
P
 re
ac
tiv
ity
 (m
m
H
g)
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
-2
-4
D
B
P
 reactivity (m
m
H
g)
positve mood
negative mood
SBP DBP
Task Performance
 
Figure 4 
Reactivity of systolic blood pressure (SBP) and diastolic blood pressure (DBP) in the experiment by 
Gendolla and Krüsken (2001b). Copyright: Society for Psychophysiologic Research. 
As anticipated, cardiovascular reactivity was significantly stronger in a negative 
mood than in a positive mood when the task was easy. Conversely, reactivity was signifi-
cantly stronger in a positive mood than in a negative mood when the task was difficult. 
That is, mood state and performance standard had the anticipated joint effect on effort-
related cardiovascular response. 
Achievement was quantified as the number of correctly marked target symbols. As 
presented in Table 2, mood had no impact on this measure in the easy condition. Pre-
sumably, the performance standard was so low that modest engagement was sufficient 
for success. However, in the difficult condition, where the standard was high and where 
relatively intense effort was thus necessary for performing well, the achievement pattern 
corresponded to the pattern of effort-related cardiovascular response: Participants in the 
positive mood condition, where relatively high effort was mobilized, marked significantly 
more target letters correctly than participants in the negative mood condition, where only 
low effort was mobilized.  
Participants in another experiment by Gendolla and Krüsken (2002c, Study 1) 
were first induced into positive versus negative moods through autobiographical recollec-
tion of happy versus sad life events and then performed a learning task. A number of 
letter series had to be memorized in 5 min. Specifically, participants tried to memorize 
four series in an easy condition, seven series in a difficult condition, and 20 series in an 
extremely difficult, actually impossible condition. The results exactly showed the pattern 
of SBP reactivity predicted in Figure 3: Systolic reactivity was stronger in a negative 
mood than in a positive mood when the task was easy, whereas it was stronger in a 
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positive mood than in a negative mood when the task was difficult. Most relevant, mood 
had no significant impact in the extremely difficult condition—SBP reactivity was low in 
both mood states. This extends the findings of the above-discussed experiment by Gen-
dolla and Krüsken (2001a) because it demonstrates that mood loses, as predicted, its 
impact on motivational intensity when a performance standard provides the clear infor-
mation that success is impossible. Furthermore, achievement was positively correlated 
with SBP reactivity in this study and systolic reactivity did not differ between the condi-
tions during the effective mood inductions. 
Table 2 
Mean Number of Correctly Marked Target Letters in the Experiment by Gendolla and 
Krüsken (2001a). 
        
  Negative Mood   Positive Mood 
Easy 456.43  454.07 
Difficult 490.64   529.50 
    
Note: n = 14 in each cell. 
4.4.3 Effects of Performance-Contingent Reward 
So far, the experimental evidence suggests that people use their moods as task-
relevant information to evaluate the extent of subjective demand that determines the 
intensity of effort and that the use of moods as information follows pragmatic principles 
in that people consider mood and other diagnostic information, like performance stan-
dards, simultaneously. However, it remained open whether performance-contingent 
reward has an impact on this process. This is an important question because other 
researchers have claimed that performance-contingent reward directly determines the 
intensity of motivation (e.g., Eisenberger, 1992; Fowles, 1983). Given that reward has 
not been manipulated in the studies from our laboratory discussed so far it might be pos-
sible that the informational mood impact on effort mobilization only works when reward 
is relatively unclear or non-contingent upon success, but that reward directly determines 
engagement when it is clear and performance-contingent. Two recent experiments by 
Gendolla and Krüsken (2002b) addressed these questions. Again, predictions were 
derived from an application of the MBM reasoning on informational mood impact to 
Brehm’s motivational intensity theory (e.g., Brehm & Self, 1989).  
Brehm’s theory distinguishes the level of maximally justified effort, defined as the 
level of potential motivation, from actual effort, which is motivational intensity. The level 
of potential motivation is determined by the importance of success: Relatively important 
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outcomes justify more engagement than relatively unimportant outcomes. Up to the level 
of potential motivation, motivational intensity is proportional to the extent of subjective 
demand in accordance with the difficulty law of motivation (Ach, 1935). That is, following 
the principle of resource conservation, the organism does not mobilize more effort than 
necessary and disengages if success necessitates more engagement than justified by 
performance-contingent reward. Thus, performance-contingent reward for accomplishing 
a goal (only) indirectly influences motivational intensity by setting the level of maximally 
justified effort. 
What are the predictions for performance conditions where reward is contingent 
versus non-contingent upon success? In terms of Brehm’s theory, these two performance 
conditions differ only with regard to the level of maximally justified effort: An attractive 
performance-contingent reward makes success relatively important. Thus, performance-
contingent reward justifies more effort than non-contingent reward. However, a person’s 
actual engagement depends, up to the level of potential motivation, on the level of sub-
jective demand, which is systematically influenced by the informational mood impact on 
demand appraisals. Consequently, effort should not differ between contingent and non-
contingent conditions when a task is easy or when a difficulty task is performed in a 
positive mood because the extent of subjective demand is identical in both contingency 
conditions. But for succeeding on a difficult task in a negative mood, task engagement 
should be highly increased when success promises valuable consequences. The reason 
for this effect is that the very high effort that is perceived as necessary in this condition 
then becomes justified. Consequently, performance-contingent incentive can eliminate 
the above-presented motivational deficit of people in a negative mood who face a difficult 
task. 
An experiment by Gendolla and Krüsken (2002b, Study 1) tested these predic-
tions. Cardiovascular assessments were made during habituation, during the mood 
inductions through exposure to depressing versus elating video excerpts, and while par-
ticipants performed an easy or difficult memory task. The task was to memorize either 
four (easy) or seven (difficult) series of four randomized letters in 5 min. Reward contin-
gency was manipulated as follows: Half the participants (non-contingent reward) were 
told that a relaxation period with exposure to pleasant music would follow the per-
formance period, irrespective of achievement. The other half (reward contingent) was 
told that the relaxation period would follow the performance period only if they suc-
ceeded on the memory task. Results are depicted in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5 
Systolic blood pressure (SBP) reactivity in the experiment by Gendolla and Krüsken (2002b). Copy-
right: American Psychological Association. 
When reward was non-contingent upon success, SBP responses were in a pattern 
consistent with the view that negative mood participants tried harder than positive mood 
participants under easy conditions but withheld effort under difficult conditions. As antici-
pated, the same pattern occurred in all but one condition when reward was contingent 
upon performance: The exception was that the motivational deficit of participants in the 
negative-mood/difficult condition disappeared, as predicted, when reward was contingent 
upon success. The subjectively necessary very high effort in this condition was only 
mobilized when it was justified by performance-contingent reward. Furthermore, 
achievement on the memory task was positively correlated with SBP reactivity during 
task performance, and demand appraisals assessed prior to performance showed that 
mood and performance standard had the anticipated additive effect on the extent of 
subjectively experienced demand. A follow-up experiment that promised non-contingent 
exposure to unpleasant materials versus performance-contingent exposure to pleasant 
materials replicated these findings. Given that the performance contingent incentive in 
these studies allowed hedonic affect regulation, the findings also support the MBM notion 
that informational and directive mood impact can occur simultaneously. Effort intensity 
was determined by the informational mood impact during the attempt to regulate the 
actual affective state by means of instrumental behavior that lead to hedonically pleasant 
consequences of success. 
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4.5 Conclusions and Implications 
After outlining the predictions of the MBM (Gendolla, 2000) for the role of mood in 
motivation, the here discussed studies have focused on mood effects on motivational 
intensity. As predicted by the MBM, the empirical evidence demonstrates that moods can 
influence task engagement and performance through their informational impact. With 
reference to the question whether moods have stable motivational implications—which 
has been suggested by other researchers (e.g., Morris, 1992; Schwarz, 1990)—it is of 
note that none of the present studies has found mood effects on cardiovascular reactivity 
before task performance, although the mood states were successfully manipulated 
according to the manipulation checks and although mood had the predicted effects during 
task performance. That is, mood had no effects on effort mobilization until it was experi-
enced in a setting that directly called for the mobilization of resources and in which it 
would be used as task-relevant information.  
4.5.1 Basic Findings and Relations to Other Approaches 
As conceptualized in the MBM as informational impact, participants used their 
moods as diagnostic information for demand appraisals, which in turn determined task 
engagement (Ach, 1935; Brehm & Self, 1989). When participants performed tasks with-
out performance standards, mood was used as the only source of information for demand 
appraisals (e.g., Gendolla et al., 2001; Gendolla & Krüsken, 2001b, 2002c, Study 2). 
Consequently, more effort was mobilized in a negative mood than in a positive mood. As 
predicted, this effect diminished when the diagnostic value of mood as task-relevant 
information was called into question (Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002a). It is of note that this 
latter finding makes it implausible that the reported mood effects occurred because mood 
influenced mental capacity (e.g., Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988), which could have made cogni-
tive tasks objectively more difficult (low capacity) in a negative mood than in a positive 
mood (high capacity). Likewise, the present findings are hard to explain with a mood-as-
priming process (Bower, 1991; Forgas, 1995) in which mood congruency effects occur 
because moods activate related concepts in memory. According to both approaches, the 
present findings are only explicable by a mood decay effect of the cue manipulation—but 
this effect did not occur.  
As further predicted by the MBM, participants pragmatically used two available 
sources of information—mood and performance standard—to evaluate the extent of 
demand when they faced tasks with a fixed performance standard. Engagement was then 
proportional to the magnitude of experienced difficulty, resulting in low effort when an 
easy task was performed in a positive mood (low subjective difficulty) and when a diffi-
cult task was performed in a negative mood (disengagement). Engagement was high 
when an easy task was performed in a negative mood and when a difficulty task was 
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performed in a positive mood (high subjective difficulty in both cases). When task diffi-
culty was extremely high, so that success was clearly impossible, mood had no signifi-
cant impact and effort was low in general (disengagement; Gendolla & Krüsken, 2001a, 
2002c, Study 1). It is of note that these findings contradict the view that moods can only 
be used as information according to an “all-or-nothing” principle as Schwarz and Clore 
(1988) have proposed. Obviously, our participants considered their moods and other 
diagnostic information simultaneously. 
Most interestingly, the motivational deficit of people facing a difficult task in a 
negative mood disappeared when reward for successful performance was contingent 
upon performance (Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002b). However, rather than determining effort 
intensity directly, as suggested by some researchers (e.g., Eisenberger, 1992; Fowles, 
1983), performance-contingent reward had this effect by increasing only the magnitude 
of maximally justified effort. These findings fit Brehm’s motivational intensity theory 
(Brehm & Self, 1989) and contribute to the whole body of evidence for its applicability to 
effort mobilization in various settings (see Gendolla, 2004; Gendolla & Wright, 2005; R. 
A. Wright, 1996, 1998; R. A. Wright & Franklin, 2004; R. A. Wright & Kirby, 2001, for 
reviews). 
It is noteworthy that also other researchers have considered informational effects 
of affective states on cardiovascular response. Blascovich and Berry-Mendes (2000) have 
posited that so called “affective cues” (e.g., sounds, smells, objects etc.) can determine 
whether tasks are appraised as “challenge” or “threat.” Challenge is then claimed to 
coincide with a strong cardiac response, whereas threat should coincide with a moderate 
cardiac and a strong vascular response. Beside numerous other problems of this frame-
work and research that has already been discussed elsewhere (see R. A. Wright & Kirby, 
2003), it is unclear how challenge and threat appraisals affect DBP, SBP, and mean arte-
rial pressure (MAP) since these indices are determined differently (Brownley et al., 2000; 
Obrist, 1981). Furthermore, Blascovich and Berry-Mendes make no predictions on the 
impact of manipulated performance standards and thus cannot precisely predict the 
magnitude of cardiovascular response when people perform tasks of different difficulty 
levels. Also, neither the role of mood states nor the impact of performance-contingent 
consequences is considered in their approach. Thus, it is unclear how Blascovich and 
Berry-Mendes’ analysis could refer to the present findings. 
4.5.2 Implications for Work Motivation in Organizational Settings 
The here discussed studies on mood and effort mobilization investigated university 
student samples rather than employees and administered standardized cognitive tasks 
rather than real life work challenges. Nevertheless, the findings have clear and direct 
implications for work motivation and performance. In work settings, people have to cope 
Theoretical Part: Mood-Behavior-Model 
 
55
with demands that are related to memory, attention, and verbal creativity, like the par-
ticipants in the present experiments. Likewise, organizational performance conditions 
either provide clear performance standards or they do not (Locke & Latham, 1990), and 
reward in work settings is either contingent or non-contingent upon performance. Fur-
thermore, studies by Krüsken (2002) have found that naturally occurring mood states 
have the same effects on the intensity of motivation as experimentally manipulated 
mood states. This suggests that the present findings apply to organizational and educa-
tional settings because the basic organizational performance conditions correspond to 
those of our laboratory research.  
The major suggestion of the present research is that organizations should take 
care about their employees’ moods. Moods are not only a key variable for work climate 
(e.g., George & Brief, 1992) but also for work motivation and performance as the here 
presented studies suggest (see also Grawitch & Munz, 2005). Likewise, it is necessary to 
care about work climate and work conditions because they will have consequences on 
workers’ mood states. Mood states can in turn systematically influence work motivation 
and thus performance and efficiency. However, it should also be considered that in the 
present studies the achievement gain through high effort was not very high, although 
significant. One has to keep in mind that the relationship between effort and achieve-
ment is complex and that it depends on several moderator variables such as inter-indi-
vidual ability differences and the type of task (see Eysenck, 1982). Effort refers to the 
mobilization of resources in order to carry out instrumental behavior, whereas achieve-
ment (only) describes the outcome of behavior—which depends on more factors than 
only engagement. Consequently, associations between effort and achievement can but 
do not need to occur (Gendolla, 2004).  
However, in the studies discussed above, engagement explained about 4-9% of 
the variance in achievement. This may be an important share that can decide about suc-
cess or failure. But in the light of the potential health costs of chronically high work moti-
vation, it might be worth considering that conditions, which elicit moderate effort inten-
sity, could also be sufficient for maintaining good performance. 
4.5.3 Implications for Ergonomics and Mental Workload 
A central variable of interest in ergonomics is “mental workload.” Conceptualized 
as a multidimensional construct, it is assumed to reflect an individual’s level of atten-
tional and mental engagement in a task (Wickens, 1984). In the last decades a vast bulk 
of techniques, among them behavioral, subjective, and physiological measures (Baldwin, 
2003; O'Donnell & Eggemeier, 1986; Wierwille & Eggemeier, 1993), has been developed 
and applied for the assessment of mental workload. If one considers only the mental 
effort component of the mental workload construct, implications of our integrative 
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approach are obvious. So far, most applied research in the area of ergonomics assessing 
mental effort has been primarily based on the rather simple assumption that mental 
effort will increase proportionally with the complexity or the difficulty of the task (e.g., 
Veltman & Gaillard, 1998). Correspondingly, mental effort is often used as indicator of 
task difficulty.  
The presented studies from our laboratory and other empirical evidence based on 
motivational intensity theory suggest that this view might be oversimplified. First, 
according to motivational intensity theory (Brehm & Self, 1989) and the supporting 
empirical evidence (R. A. Wright & Kirby, 2001), mental effort is not only determined by 
task difficulty but by the importance of success as well. Correspondingly, success impor-
tance determines the maximal level of mental effort one is willing to invest in the task. 
That is, mental effort indicators of mental workload might be biased by participants’ 
potential motivation to work hard. A measure indicating low mental workload might actu-
ally imply an easy task or a task for which the necessary engagement was not justified 
by the participant’s potential motivation. Furthermore, applied research often does not 
consider the influence of affective states. According to the here discussed MBM, moods 
can have an influence on mental effort via mood-congruency effects on appraisals of task 
difficulty. Again, mental effort measures of mental workload can be ambiguous. For 
instance, a mental effort measure indicating low mental workload might result from an 
indeed easy task, from a difficult task that was appraised as easy by an individual in a 
positive mood, or from a moderately difficult task that was appraised as too difficult by 
an individual in a negative mood. 
In summary, the integrative approach developed in this chapter offers some 
insights in problems involved in the assessment of mental workload by means of mental 
effort and the use of mental effort as indicator of task complexity and difficulty. Since not 
only the willing to invest energy in the task has an influence on these measures, but 
affective states as well, the assessment of mental workload via measures of mental effort 
should always take the affective and motivational state of the individual into considera-
tion. 
4.5.4 Implications for Health Psychology: The Development of 
Cardiovascular Disease 
There is clear and replicated evidence that the extent of cardiovascular reactivity 
during effortful coping with demands predicts the risk of hypertension and cardiovascular 
disease (see Blascovich & Katkin, 1993). The stronger the cardiovascular system reacts 
to a mental demand, the higher is the likeability of developing hypertension and a car-
diovascular disease. A longitudinal study by Light, Dolan, Davis, and Sherwood (1992), 
for example, found that especially the magnitude of SBP reactivity during performance on 
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a mental demand predicted baseline blood pressure and the magnitude of cardiovascular 
reactivity to stressors 15 years later. The stronger the SBP responses were during earlier 
effortful coping, the higher was the probability of developing hypertension. Furthermore, 
there is clear evidence that personality characteristics that are related to negative affec-
tive experiences are correlated with the vulnerability to cardiovascular disease (Rugulies, 
2002; Steptoe, Cropley, & Joekes, 2000). Examples are hostility (T. W. Smith, 1992) and 
neuroticism (Byrne, 1992). According to an analysis by Gendolla and Richter (2005b), 
the here discussed laboratory findings from our laboratory may contribute to an explana-
tion of how this can happen. Accordingly, people who experience negative affect evaluate 
the extent of subjective demand higher when they face mental challenges. Consequently, 
they mobilize more effort than people who experience positive affect as long as they 
believe that it is possible and worthwhile to attain a goal. This is particularly important 
for work settings in which people are chronically confronted with mental demands. If 
people who chronically experience negative affect also chronically face such demands, 
they are especially vulnerable for the development of cardiovascular disease. This sug-
gests that work settings that promote high cardiovascular reactivity over a long work 
period—like working without a clear performance standard in a negative mood—are 
harmful and provide a health risk (Gendolla & Richter, 2005b).  
From this perspective, work and educational settings should facilitate the experi-
ence of positive rather than negative moods during work. This is relatively easy to be 
realized by pleasant illumination, pleasant odors, ergonomically well structured work 
places (see Gendolla, 2000), and any variables that are known for long as being related 
to high work satisfaction (see Locke, 1976). Positive mood during work may prevent the 
development of cardiovascular disease. This is especially relevant because the achieve-
ment deficit due to mobilizing only moderate effort for routine tasks seems to be rela-
tively small. Positive mood is, however, not beneficial when people have to attain high 
performance standards. Consequently, both performance standards and mood have to be 
considered in order to prevent health risks, qualifying other approaches that have pro-
posed that positive affect has mainly or even only health benefits (e.g., Fredrickson, 
2001; Ryff & Singer, 1998; Salovey, Rothman, Detweiler, & Steward, 2000). 
Nevertheless, negative mood during work seems to bear multiple risks: The car-
diovascular system reacts strongly during performance on easy tasks and tasks without 
performance standards. When reward is contingent upon performance, which is fre-
quently the case in work settings, very strong reactivity is facilitated. Creating work set-
tings that facilitate effective but non-harmful performance is thus a major challenge for 
effective leadership, ergonomics, and organizational behavior. 
  Theoretical Part: Mood-Behavior-Model 
 
58
4.5.5 Implications for Clinical Psychology: Mood, Depression, and 
Motivation 
As outlined above, an important aspect for organizations and for the construction 
of work settings is the mental health of their employees. In this context, it is important 
to note that not only diagnosed clinical pathologies but also minor subsyndromal symp-
toms may have an impact on employees’ work, the working atmosphere, and organiza-
tional structures. In this section, we highlight implications of our integrative approach for 
depressed mood and depression, respectively. However, there is also evidence for the 
implications of the MBM with regard to other individual difference variables like, for 
example, dispositional anxiety or low self-esteem. Research on depression is particularly 
important because depression is considered by the World Health Organization as the 
most burdensome disease in the world in terms of total disability-adjusted life years 
among people in the middle years of life (Kessler, 2002). The prevalence rates for 
depression are high and still rising, not only for clinically diagnosed depression (e.g., 
major depressive disorder) but also for subsyndromal depressive symptoms (e.g., minor 
depression), which means that many students’ and employees’ working life may be 
affected at some time and in some way by a depressive episode.  
An integrative approach of mood and motivation regarding depression and dys-
phoria lends itself because a persistent negative mood is considered as one of the two 
core symptoms of major depressive disorder (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 
1994). Thus, it allows the investigation of the role of naturally occurring negative mood. 
In addition, research among clinically depressed individuals as well as subclinical popula-
tions supports the notion that depression is associated with emotional, cognitive, func-
tional, and motivational deficits (e.g., Heckhausen, 1991). The motivational deficit—
defined as an inability to initiate actions, to mobilize efforts, and to persist on these 
actions—has been demonstrated in research from different perspectives (see for example 
Abramson et al., 1981; Fowles, 1993; Henriques & Davidson, 2000; Layne et al., 1982; 
Tomarken & Keener, 1998). Thus, considering that moods can influence behavior, as for 
instance action initiation and effort mobilization, our integrative approach may help 
explaining and investigating depressed individuals’ motivational deficit.  
Evidence for an informational impact of naturally occurring mood stems, for 
example, from studies by Lyubomirsky et al. (1999). Dysphoric individuals rated the 
likelihood of solving a personal problem and implementing their solution significantly 
lower than nondysphorics. The authors concluded that dysphoric rumination might inter-
fere with efforts to take steps to problem solving. In terms of the MBM, this means that 
dysphoric individuals have a motivational deficit due to their more negative evaluation of 
the actual situation on the basis of their negative mood. Evidence for the conceptualiza-
tion of a directive mood impact of naturally occurring mood is provided by a body of 
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research showing that depression and other negative affect dispositions coincide with a 
weak directive mood impact in terms of deficits in self-regulation of affective experi-
ences. As Josephson et al. (1996) reported, depressed individuals are not able to self-
regulate their negative affect by activating positive memories (“mood-incongruent 
recall”). Moreover, Gilboa and Gotlib (1997) showed that previously dysphoric individuals 
better remembered negative stimuli and stayed longer in negative affect after a negative 
mood induction than never-dysphoric individuals. Further evidence for individual differ-
ences in self-regulation stems from research showing that depressives are unable to 
withdraw from a “depressive self-focusing style” (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987): 
Depressives tended to reflect on themselves after failure but not after success, whereas 
nondepressives showed the inverse pattern.  
Moreover, in the extensive literature about depressives’ undervaluation of 
rewards, there is evidence for both informational and directive mood impact. Costello 
(1972) suggested that depression decreases the effectiveness of reward insofar as 
depressed individuals showed a lack of responsiveness to pleasurable stimuli. Henriques 
and colleagues have explained this with decreased activity in the left anterior cortex, 
which is considered to produce an underactivation of the reward-based system (e.g., 
Henriques & Davidson, 2000). Moreover, Tillema et al. (2001) found that a dysphoric 
individuals’ actual negative mood state elicited the undervaluation of a perceived out-
come. These findings regarding the undervaluation of rewards by depressives show on 
the one hand that a depressed individuals’ actual mood state may influence the evalua-
tion of a perceived outcome, which is explicable in terms of an informational mood 
impact on self-regulation. On the other hand, this leads to low perceived instrumentality 
of potential affect-regulative acts and thus reduces the strength of directive mood 
impact. This interpretation is consistent with the MBM postulate that informational and 
directive mood impacts can occur simultaneously. 
In support of our approach, recent research from our laboratory has investigated 
and shown the influence of vulnerability for depression on cardiovascular reactivity 
(Brinkmann & Gendolla, 2005). Students with high depression scores were compared to a 
control group while being confronted with a cognitive task without fixed performance 
standard. The results showed that depressed students—who were at the time of the 
experiment also in a more negative mood—showed stronger SBP reactivity than the con-
trol group. Thus, depressed individuals mobilized more mental effort, indicating higher 
motivational intensity at the time of task performance. Interestingly, the high effort of 
depressives’ was accompanied by poorer performance. That is, depressives’ mobilized 
relatively high effort without the merits of better performance. 
Besides this evidence for the relations between depression and motivation and the 
implications for the MBM, there has been a body of recent research showing that depres-
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sion is among the risk factors for development and worsening of coronary heart disease 
(Frasure-Smith & Lespérance, 2005a; Rugulies, 2002; Wulsin & Singal, 2003). One of the 
most prominent explications states that dysregulation of the autonomic nervous system 
may explain why depressed patients are at increased risk for coronary heart disease. The 
altered autonomic nervous system activity found in depressed patients is seen as an indi-
cator of increased sympathetic nervous system activity (Carney et al., 2005). As outlined 
above, a stable disposition to stronger cardiovascular reactivity can be considered as a 
risk factor for cardiovascular disease. Moreover, there is evidence that also other nega-
tive psychological states like hopelessness, pessimism, rumination, anxiety, and anger 
are linked in varying degrees to cardiovascular diseases (Kubzansky et al., 2005). One 
may speculate whether, among other factors, also affective states play an important role 
in the linkage between depression and coronary heart disease.  
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1. Overview Over the Studies and Hypotheses 
As outlined in the first chapters of the theoretical part, evidence about motiva-
tional deficits in depression and dysphoria is existent but not always conclusive. More-
over, motivation is a broad concept, so that the notion of motivational deficits in depres-
sion has to be qualified by taking into account the different dimensions of motivation, 
namely the initiation, direction, persistence, and intensity of behavior (Geen, 1995; 
Vallerand & Thill, 1993). Some of the research dealing with motivational issues in depres-
sion takes this into account and focuses on one specific aspect—as for instance the cog-
nitive-initiative account by Hertel (2000) that refers to the initiation of actions. Clinical 
observations of depressives’ deficient motivation are mainly concerned with the initiation 
of actions, too.  
Motivational intensity theory (Brehm & Self, 1989) and its related research offer a 
different approach for the investigation of motivation: They allow formulating and testing 
hypotheses about the intensity of resources mobilized by individuals who are engaged in 
instrumental challenges. Moreover, the integration of the MBM (Gendolla, 2000) and 
motivational intensity theory offers clear predictions about mood’s influence on the mobi-
lization of resources. As outlined in chapter 4 of the theoretical part, a series of experi-
ments has tested hypotheses with respect to experimentally manipulated, transient mood 
states. These studies have shown convincing evidence for the postulated process of an 
informational mood impact on effort mobilization.  
On the basis of the assumption that one of the core symptoms of depression and 
dysphoria is a persistent negative mood (DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 
1994; Mineka et al., 1998; Scott & Ingram, 1998), the link between dysphoria and effort 
mobilization via an informational mood impact seems plausible. Therefore, we designed 
four quasi-experiments to test the following hypotheses:  
1) Dysphoria is characterized by a negative mood that persists even if the trait measure 
of dysphoria precedes the state measure of momentary mood by some weeks.  
2) There is evidence that dysphoric individuals’ cardiovascular activity is enhanced under 
resting conditions (Light et al., 1998). On the other hand, the MBM (Gendolla, 2000) 
predicts that cardiovascular baseline activity should not differ with regard to mood. As 
we build our assumptions on the MBM, we expect cardiovascular baseline activity not 
to differ in our young and relatively homogeneous samples.  
3) The MBM predicts furthermore that dysphoria is associated with a more pessimistic 
evaluation of task demand. Therefore, we hypothesize that, in contrast to baseline 
activity, dysphoric individuals show higher effort mobilization under conditions of 
unfixed task difficulty compared to nondysphoric individuals.  
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4) Under conditions of fixed task difficulty, dysphoria is also associated with a more 
pessimistic evaluation of task demand. However, these appraisals should interact with 
the objective difficulty of the given task. For the comparison of an easy and a moder-
ately difficult task, we expect a crossover interaction pattern with high effort in the 
easy-dysphoric and the difficult-nondysphoric groups. In contrast, participants in the 
easy-nondysphoric group should mobilize less effort and participants in the difficult-
dysphoric group should disengage because of subjectively too high task demand.  
5) In a design with fixed task difficulty, the extent of subjective task demand depends 
on both, objective task difficulty and dysphoria. Therefore, subjective demand 
appraisals should linearly increase from the easy-nondysphoric to the difficult-
nondysphoric and easy-dysphoric groups. They should be the highest for the difficult-
dysphoric group.  
6) Cognitive performance is likely to be impaired in dysphoria (e.g., Burt et al., 1995; 
Christensen et al., 1997). However, previous research has found moderately positive 
correlations between performance and effort (see Gendolla et al., 2001; Gendolla & 
Krüsken, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c), suggesting a more differentiated pattern of per-
formance in dependence on effort and other factors. Moreover, the mental tasks used 
in this research program are chosen rather because of simplicity and minimal physical 
demand than because of their sensitivity to detect cognitive impairments. Therefore, 
we do not formulate specific hypotheses with respect to performance effects.  
In the theoretical part, the conceptualization of depression as a dimensional ver-
sus a categorical construct has been discussed (chapter 2.1.3). Depending on this con-
ceptualization, the selection of students with high depression scores as analogues for 
patients with clinical depression is controversial (see Kendall & Flannery-Schroeder, 
1995; Tennen et al., 1995a; Weary et al., 1995). However, recent findings favor the 
dimensional perspective (Hankin et al., 2005; J. Ruscio & Ruscio, 2000; Solomon et al., 
2001). Moreover, depending on the respective research focus, student participants with 
subclinical symptoms can provide a valuable contribution to the understanding of depres-
sion (Vredenburg et al., 1993). As our research program mainly focuses on the influence 
of negative affect—and not on the influence of somatic symptoms—we chose samples of 
undergraduate students for our studies. Then, we selected those students with depres-
sion scores located in the lower and upper third or quartile of the distributions. We refer 
to these participants as either “dysphoric” or “nondysphoric” to give consideration to the 
subclinical character and to avoid any confusion with clinical depression.  
Each of the four studies tested Hypotheses 1 and 2 as basic conditions for the 
subsequent assumptions. Studies 1 and 2 were conceptually identical and tested 
Hypothesis 3 with respect to two different kinds of tasks without fixed performance stan-
dard. Studies 3 and 4 were conceptually identical and tested Hypothesis 4 with respect to 
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two different kinds of tasks on two fixed performance levels—easy and moderately diffi-
cult. Moreover, the latter two studies assessed participants’ subjective demand appraisals 
to test Hypothesis 5. Performance was analyzed exploratively in each of the studies.  
As in the studies by R. A. Wright and colleagues (see R. A. Wright, 1996, 1998; R. 
A. Wright & Kirby, 2001, for reviews) and by Gendolla and colleagues (see Gendolla & 
Brinkmann, 2005; Richter et al., 2006, for reviews), we operationalized motivational 
intensity—our primary dependent variable—as the change in cardiovascular activity from 
a baseline level to task performance. Our physiological devices allowed measuring SBP, 
DBP, and HR. According to Obrist’s (1981) active coping approach and its integration 
with motivational intensity theory (Brehm & Self, 1989) by R. A. Wright (1996), beta-
adrenergic sympathetic influences on the myocardium are proportional to effort or task 
engagement. Therefore, we expected that especially SBP reactivity would display our 
hypotheses concerning resource mobilization.  
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2. Studies 1 and 2 
Dysphoria and Mobilization of Mental Effort: Effects on 
Cardiovascular Reactivity5 
Two studies examined the influence of dysphoria on motivational intensity in a student 
sample. Participants worked on a memory task (Study 1) or a mental concentration task 
(Study 2) without fixed performance standard (“do your best”). Based on their scores on 
the Center for Epidemiologic Studies – Depression Scale (Radloff, 1977), dysphoric and 
nondysphoric students were compared with regard to their effort-related cardiovascular 
reactivity during task performance. As predicted on the basis of the mood-behavior-
model (Gendolla, 2000) and motivational intensity theory (Brehm & Self, 1989), dys-
phoric participants showed stronger cardiovascular reactivity while working on the cogni-
tive tasks than nondysphoric participants. In Study 1, nondysphoric participants per-
formed better on the memory task than dysphoric participants. Theoretical implications 
are discussed. 
 
People suffering from depression or dysphoria are said not only to experience long 
lasting negative mood and to have emotional, functional, and cognitive deficits but also 
to lack motivation (Heckhausen, 1991). A motivational deficit in depression has been 
considered under different perspectives—amongst others with respect to behavioral 
approach and inhibition systems (Gray, 1982), self-regulation (e.g., Strauman, 2002), 
motivational influences on cognitive deficits (e.g., Hertel, 2000), and mood-congruent 
negative cognitions (e.g., Scott & Ingram, 1998).  
Our research addresses the question whether dysphoria and depression are asso-
ciated with motivational deficits with regard to the intensity of motivation. Specifically, 
we are interested in the mobilization of mental effort during performance of instrumental 
tasks as an indicator of the intensity of motivation at a certain point in time. Based on 
the notion that dysphoria is largely characterized by a depressed mood, we posit that 
moods play an important role in determining how dysphoric individuals react to 
behavioral challenges when they need to self-regulate the mobilization of resources for 
performance. Based on the research reported above, the mood-behavior-model (MBM; 
Gendolla, 2000), and motivational intensity theory (Brehm & Self, 1989), we develop and 
test predictions for the impact of dysphoria on motivational intensity. Effort mobilization 
                                                   
5 Brinkmann, K., & Gendolla, G. H. E. (2007). Dysphoria and mobilization of mental effort: Effects 
on cardiovascular reactivity. Motivation and Emotion, 31, 71-82. 
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is quantified as the reactivity of the cardiovascular system, especially the reactivity of 
systolic blood pressure (Gendolla & Brinkmann, 2005; R. A. Wright, 1996).  
2.1 Dysphoria, Motivation, and Self-Regulation 
Before describing theory and hypotheses in detail, we highlight some findings in 
depression and dysphoria research—stemming from clinical patient as well as subclinical 
community or student samples—which address motivational and self-regulation proc-
esses. First, there is evidence based on behavioral, self-report, and neurophysiological 
measures that depression is associated with weak approach motivation, as indicated by a 
relative hypoactivation of the left frontal cortex and lower responsiveness to rewards 
(e.g., Davidson, Pizzagalli, & Nitschke, 2002; Fowles, 1994; Gotlib et al., 1998; 
Henriques & Davidson, 2000; Kasch et al., 2002; Tomarken & Keener, 1998). Findings 
with respect to a hyperactivation of behavioral inhibition in depression or dysphoria are 
existent but less consistent (e.g., Dickson & MacLeod, 2004; Kasch et al., 2002; Pinto-
Meza et al., 2006).  
In light of this evidence, Strauman (2002) postulated an incorporation of the self 
into the brain-behavior system in order to better describe and understand human 
approach and avoidance motivation. Accordingly, depressive individuals suffer from 
impairments of self-regulation resulting in affective and motivational deficits. The impor-
tance of self-regulation has also been stressed by others who point to the fact that the 
cognitive deficits commonly observed in depressive individuals and patients (see Burt et 
al., 1995; Rogers et al., 2004, for reviews) might partially be caused by motivational 
deficits. There is, for instance, evidence that aspects of self-regulation problems, such as 
rumination (Hertel, 1998; Watkins & Brown, 2002), unrealistic intentions (Kuhl & Helle, 
1986), and deficits in attention control and initiative (Hertel, 2000), play an important 
role in the association between depression or dysphoria and cognitive deficits. Likewise, 
Abramson et al. (1981) concluded that depressed individuals suffer from a motivational 
rather than from a cognitive-associative deficit.  
Furthermore, studies on the mood-congruent memory bias in depression and dys-
phoria point at reduced self- and affect-regulation abilities. Josephson et al. (1996) found 
that depressed individuals were not able to self-regulate their negative affect by activat-
ing positive memories (mood-incongruent recall). Likewise, Gilboa and Gotlib (1997) 
showed that previously dysphoric individuals better recalled negative stimuli and stayed 
longer in a negative mood after a negative mood induction than did never-dysphoric indi-
viduals. Greenberg and Pyszczynski emphasized the role of the depressive self-focusing 
style as a mediator for attributions after success or failure that leads to a self-serving 
bias in nondepressed but not in depressed individuals (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1992; 
Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1987).  
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Finally, there is evidence that depression and dysphoria can—besides other nega-
tive cognitive biases—influence judgments and evaluations (e.g., Scott & Ingram, 1998). 
Lyubomirsky et al. (1999) reported that dysphoric individuals rated the probability of 
solving a personal problem lower than did nondysphoric individuals. The authors con-
cluded that dysphoric rumination depletes energy and motivation and interferes with 
efforts to problem solving.  
2.2 Mood and Effort Mobilization 
A number of recent studies on the effects of transient mood states on the mobili-
zation of mental effort have supported the predictions of the MBM (Gendolla, 2000). This 
model posits that moods per se do not have motivational implications but that they influ-
ence behavior in the context of behavioral challenges, such as instrumental tasks. One of 
the two processes proposed to influence behavior is the informational mood impact, 
which states that moods influence the intensity and persistence of behavior. This impact 
presumes that moods may influence behavior via mood-congruency effects on behavior-
related judgments and evaluations. Accordingly, people in a negative mood tend to 
appraise a given task as more difficult and their own capacities as lower than do people 
in a positive mood. Gendolla and colleagues have found clear support for these assump-
tions (see Gendolla & Brinkmann, 2005; Richter et al., 2006, for reviews).  
The authors manipulated their participants’ mood and subsequently asked them to 
do their best (i.e., to self-regulate resources for performance) on a mental task for which 
no performance standard was provided.6 By this means, they could show that partici-
pants in a negative mood actually mobilized more effort than participants in a positive 
mood as indicated by stronger systolic blood pressure reactivity of negative mood par-
ticipants (e.g., Gendolla et al., 2001; Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002c, Experiment 2). The 
replicated finding from studies administrating different mood induction procedures and 
different types of cognitive demands was that cardiovascular activity did not differ 
between positive and negative mood groups before and after the mood induction. It was 
only at the time of task performance that negative mood led to stronger cardiovascular 
reactivity than positive mood. This effect did not occur because of different importance 
attributed to the task but because of subjectively higher task demand in a negative mood 
(e.g., Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002b, 2002c). Similar results have been found by R. A. 
Wright and colleagues in samples with high versus low perceived ability (e.g., R. A. 
Wright & Dill, 1993; R. A. Wright et al., 1997). The mood effect on difficulty appraisals 
                                                   
6 Motivational intensity theory distinguishes between tasks with and without fixed performance 
standards, that is, with or without a certain performance level to attain. Tasks without fixed 
performance standards are labeled “unfixed” difficulty tasks; the difficulty level can be determined 
by the participants themselves who are simply asked to do their best (Brehm & Self, 1989). 
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and systolic blood pressure reactivity during performance diminished when the significant 
value of mood as information was reduced (Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002a). 
These studies also support the notion that the intensity of motivation can be relia-
bly operationalized by cardiovascular reactivity as proposed by R. A. Wright’s integration 
of motivational intensity theory (Brehm & Self, 1989) and Obrist’s (1981) active coping 
approach (see R. A. Wright, 1996; R. A. Wright & Kirby, 2001, for reviews). The active 
coping approach builds on evidence that beta-adrenergic influences exerted by the sym-
pathetic nervous system on the cardiovascular system are proportional to effort and task 
engagement (Obrist, 1981). Therefore, assessing the reactivity to a behavioral challenge 
of cardiovascular indices reflecting beta-adrenergic sympathetic activation provides an 
effective means of operationalizing task engagement. This line of research has mainly 
focused on systolic blood pressure (SBP), diastolic blood pressure (DBP), and heart rate 
(HR; R. A. Wright, 1996; R. A. Wright & Kirby, 2001), even though other more direct 
measures as for instance pre-ejection period are also conceivable.  
However, especially SBP has been proven to be a reliable index of effort mobiliza-
tion, which makes sense with respect to sympathetic and parasympathetic influences on 
the heart: SBP mainly varies with the contractility strength of the heart muscle. Myocar-
dial contractility is known to directly increase with sympathetic discharge, which is 
related to activation. Consequently, an increase in SBP activity is regarded as a reliable 
indicator of increased task engagement. In contrast, DBP is predominantly determined by 
the overall flow resistance of the blood vessels in the body. Total peripheral resistance, 
however, is not systematically influenced by sympathetic activation, and therefore DBP 
reactivity constitutes a less reliable index of effort mobilization. Finally, HR is independ-
ently determined by both sympathetic (i.e., HR accelerating) and parasympathetic (i.e., 
HR decelerating) influences. An increase in HR can therefore represent both sympathetic 
activation and parasympathetic withdrawal. Consequently, HR can be considered an indi-
cator of sympathetic activation to the extent that its influence is not masked by para-
sympathetic activity. In summary, SBP is a reliable and sensitive indicator of effort mobi-
lization, even though increases in sympathetic activation may also result in simultaneous 
elevations of SBP, DBP, and HR (see Brownley et al., 2000; Obrist, 1981; Papillo & 
Shapiro, 1990; T. W. Smith et al., 1989, for more details).  
2.3 The Present Studies 
The present studies tested the central hypothesis that dysphoric individuals would 
show stronger cardiovascular reactivity—especially SBP—while performing a cognitive 
task without fixed performance standard than nondysphoric individuals. The main 
advantage of operationalizing motivational intensity as cardiovascular reactivity is that it 
is less susceptible to social presentation biases than self-report measures and less influ-
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enced by individual capacity and performance strategies than performance measures. 
Therefore, no directed hypotheses were formulated with regard to performance on the 
cognitive tasks. On the one hand, performance has been shown to be positively related 
to effort mobilization (e.g., Gendolla et al., 2001; Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002a, 2002b, 
2002c). But on the other hand, there is evidence that depressed and dysphoric 
individuals perform worse in cognitive tasks than normal controls (e.g., Burt et al., 1995; 
Rogers et al., 2004). Thus, in the present context of dysphoria effects on motivational 
intensity, performance was assessed exploratively.  
We chose student samples with extreme scores on a self-report depression scale 
for our studies. We did not expect that students with high scores were suffering from 
manifest clinical depression but assumed that they would be dysphoric, show subclinical 
symptoms, and have higher vulnerability for depression. Therefore, we also assessed 
participants’ current mood state. Moreover, there are good reasons to choose a student 
sample for depression research because of many environmental stressors, high preva-
lence of depressive symptoms, and lower probability of other (psycho-)pathologies and 
concurrent treatments in such a sample, as well as the homogeneity of the group 
(Vredenburg et al., 1993). Results concerning gender differences in student samples with 
respect to depressive symptoms are mixed: The usual gender differences between 
women and men in both clinical and subclinical populations are not consistently found in 
student samples (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987, 2001). Thus, we decided to include only 
women in our sample with the objective of reducing variability in group assignment due 
to gender biases in the self-report of depressive symptoms. Finally, we chose cognitive 
tasks that demanded a minimum of motor movement from the participants to ensure 
that cardiovascular changes could be attributed to the mobilization of mental resources 
rather than to metabolic movement effects.  
2.4 Study 1 
This study compared two groups of university students (dysphoric vs. non-
dysphoric) with regard to their cardiovascular reactivity during performance of a memory 
task. We expected performance-related cardiovascular reactivity—especially SBP—to be 
more pronounced in dysphoric than in nondysphoric participants.  
2.4.1 Method 
Participants 
One-hundred forty-seven students in an introductory psychology course partici-
pated in questionnaire sessions in exchange for course credit. Out of this sample, 35 
women (mean age 23 years) who scored in the lower or the upper quartile of the Center 
for Epidemiologic Studies – Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977) were randomly 
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selected for participation in an ostensibly unrelated experiment via a personal code that 
guaranteed anonymity. Seventeen participants were situated in the upper quartile of the 
CES-D (M = 33.47, SE = 2.15) and therefore referred to as dysphoric. Eighteen partici-
pants were located in the lower quartile of the CES-D (M = 6.61, SE = 0.66) and there-
fore referred to as nondysphoric.  
Physiological Apparatus 
Cardiovascular measures were obtained noninvasively with a computer-aided, 
multichannel monitor (Par Electronics Physioport III) that uses oscillometry to determine 
SBP (millimeters of mercury [mmHg]), DBP (millimeters of mercury [mmHg]), and HR 
(beats per minute [bpm]). A blood pressure cuff (Boso) was placed over the brachial 
arteria above the elbow of participants’ nondominant arm and inflated automatically 
every 2 min during 2 measurement periods—habituation (baseline) and task per-
formance. Each single measure took less than 1 min. Obtained values were stored on a 
computer disk so that both experimenter and participants were ignorant of all physiologi-
cal values measured during the experiment.  
Self-Report Data 
In order to survey depressive symptomatology, the French version of the CES-D 
(Fuhrer & Rouillon, 1989) was administered in the mentioned questionnaire sessions 
about 2 weeks prior to the experiment. The CES-D is a short self-report scale especially 
developed for use in community samples and consists of 20 items asking for frequency of 
depressive symptom experience on a scale from 0 (never, very seldom) to 3 (frequently, 
always). Radloff (1977) proposed a cut-off score of 16 to distinguish depressed from 
nondepressed individuals, whereas Fuhrer and Rouillon (1989) favored cut-off scores of 
17 and 23 for men and women, respectively. The CES-D has proven its excellent validity 
in depression research and is reported to have better scale discriminability than the Beck 
Depression Inventory (see Santor, Zuroff, Ramsay, Cervantes, & Palacios, 1995). It also 
showed high internal consistency (α = .96).7 
At the beginning of the experimental session, we administered the positive (i.e., 
“happy”, “joyful”, “contented”, “cheerful”) and negative (i.e., “sad”, “frustrated”, 
“depressed”, “dissatisfied”) hedonic tone scales of the UWIST mood adjective checklist 
(Matthews, Jones, & Chamberlain, 1990) in order to assess participants’ momentary 
mood state. Participants indicated the extent to which each adjective reflected their 
momentary feeling state on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much).  
                                                   
7 We also included the BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) in the initial questionnaire session. 
Participants’ scores on the BDI-II were highly correlated with their CES-D scores, r(35) = .96, p < 
.001. Group assignment did not change when considering the BDI-II instead of the CES-D for the 
selection process. 
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Procedure 
The study was conducted with the help of the psychological software E-Prime 
(version 1.1, Psychology Software Tools) by an experimenter who was hired and unaware 
of both the hypotheses and participants’ depression status. The experimental session 
took about 30 min and was described as an investigation of physiological activity during 
periods of relaxation and demand. Participants, who attended the session individually, 
were greeted and seated in front of a computer. After signed consent was obtained, the 
experimenter attached the blood pressure cuff and gave instructions for computer use. 
Then she left the room and monitored the experiment from an outside control room. 
Computer-generated beeps informed her about the beginning of each experimental 
period without the need for seeing the participants and their entries on the computer. 
The experiment started with general instructions and assessment of biographical data 
and participants’ momentary mood state with the UWIST scale.  
For the following habituation period, the experimenter reentered the room, 
handed a magazine to the participant, and informed her that she was allowed to read for 
a period of about 9 min while cardiovascular measures would be taken. Then the experi-
menter left the room and started the blood pressure monitor. After assessment of the 
five cardiovascular baseline values, the experimenter reentered the room, took the 
magazine, and instructed the participant to continue working on the computer.  
The experiment continued with instructions concerning the memory task. Partici-
pants were instructed to memorize within 5 min as many letter series (e.g., EPQZ) as 
possible out of a list of 15 senseless letter series and to note the recalled series after-
wards. That means that we simply asked them to do their best instead of providing them 
with a fixed performance standard (i.e., a fixed number of letter series to memorize). A 
preview of the list of letter series was then presented for 1 s on the computer screen to 
give participants an impression of the task. Then the 5 min performance period started. 
Meanwhile, the 15 letter series were simultaneously presented on the computer screen, 
and 3 cardiovascular measures were taken 15 s, 135 s, and 255 s after task onset. After 
having noted the letter series they could recall, participants learned that the experiment 
was over. The experimenter reentered the room, removed the blood pressure cuff, and 
thanked the participant. Finally, participants were carefully debriefed, interviewed with 
regard to suspicion, and received their course credit.  
2.4.2 Results 
Self-Reported Mood 
We calculated mood scores by summing the scores of the positive (α = .93) and 
the negative (α = .88) hedonic tone adjectives of the UWIST scale. Additionally, we also 
formed a global mood score by summing the positive and the reverse-scored negative 
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adjectives of the UWIST scale (α = .88). Results revealed highly significant differences 
between the two dysphoria groups with regard to their momentary mood state at the 
beginning of the experiment: Mood scores of dysphoric participants on the positive 
adjectives (M = 16.29, SE = 1.11) were significantly lower than those of nondysphoric 
participants (M = 20.72, SE = 1.17), t(33) = 2.73, p < .01. The reverse was found for 
the mood scores on the negative adjectives (dysphoric M = 11.12, SE = 1.31 vs. 
nondysphoric M = 4.67, SE = 0.29), t(17.57)8 = 4.79, p < .001. Finally, dysphoric 
participants (M = 37.18, SE = 1.95) had lower scores on the global mood score than 
nondysphoric participants (M = 48.06, SE = 1.25), t(33) = 4.75, p < .001. Accordingly, 
as expected, dysphoric students were in a more negative and a less positive mood when 
arriving at the laboratory. 
Table 3  
Means and Standard Errors of Cardiovascular Baselines in Study 1 
            
 Dysphoric  Nondysphoric 
Cardiovascular baselines M SE   M SE 
SBP 112.82 1.88  112.33 1.32 
DBP 74.35 0.84  72.92 0.37 
HR 76.79 2.57   75.31 2.21 
      
Note. N = 17 (dysphoric) and N = 18 (nondysphoric). SBP and DBP are indicated in millimeters of 
mercury (mmHg), HR is indicated in beats per minute (bpm). 
Cardiovascular Baselines 
Cardiovascular baseline scores for SBP, DBP, and HR were created by averaging 
the last two values obtained during habituation (αs = .91 for SBP baseline, .79 for DBP 
baseline, and .96 for HR baseline).9 Means and standard errors are presented in Table 3. 
According to independent-samples t-tests, there were no significant differences between 
dysphoric and nondysphoric participants with regard to their cardiovascular baseline 
measures; SBP and HR: ts < 1, ps > .50; DBP: t(33) = 1.60, p > .13. 
                                                   
8 Degrees of freedom are adjusted because of inequality of variances. 
9 The reason for this is that repeated measures ANOVAs revealed a decline of cardiovascular values 
over the first measures, whereas the last two measures remained stable (ps > .30). This decline is 
a common finding and due to habituation to the experimental setting and the fact being seated for 
a while. 
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Cardiovascular Reactivity 
We calculated change (delta) scores for each participant by subtracting the base-
line values from the arithmetic means obtained during task performance (see Llabre, 
Spitzer, Saab, Ironson, & Schneiderman, 1991). A preliminary analysis revealed that DBP 
and HR delta scores were not correlated with the respective baseline values, rs < .21, ps 
> .23. In contrast, SBP delta scores were significantly correlated with systolic baseline 
values, r(35) = -.38, p < .03. Therefore, we adjusted systolic change scores with respect 
to SBP baseline values in order to prevent carry-over effects and biases due to the law of 
initial values (see Llabre et al., 1991).  
SBP. We first submitted the baseline-adjusted reactivity scores (delta) to an inde-
pendent-samples t-test. Results revealed that albeit dysphoric participants (M = 5.92, SE 
= 1.49) showed stronger SBP reactivity than nondysphoric participants (M = 3.64, SE = 
1.07), the difference did not reach significance, t(33) = 1.25, p = .11.10 Subsequently, 
we analyzed the single reactivity scores for each measurement time (delta 1, delta 2, 
and delta 3). This procedure is reasonable because of the above mentioned self-regula-
tion difficulties in depression that might implicate difficulties in maintaining self-regula-
tion (and effort mobilization) over a certain period. Therefore, we submitted the single 
baseline-adjusted reactivity scores to a 2 (dysphoria) x 3 (time) mixed model ANOVA to 
test whether systolic reactivity changed over time. This analysis revealed no main effect 
of time, F(2, 64) = 1.64, p = .20, but a significant dysphoria x time interaction, F(2, 64) 
= 3.69, p = .03, indicating that dysphorics’ reactivity declined over time while non-
dysphorics’ reactivity remained relatively stable (see Figure 6). To further highlight this 
effect, we compared dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals with regard to each single 
baseline-adjusted reactivity score. As depicted in Figure 6, dysphorics generally showed 
stronger SBP reactivity than nondysphorics. However, only the difference on the first 
reactivity measure delta 1 was reliable (dysphoric M = 7.31, SE = 1.64 vs. nondysphoric 
M = 3.59, SE = 1.15), t(33) = 1.88, p = .03.10 
DBP and HR. There were no differences between dysphoric and nondysphoric par-
ticipants with regard to their DBP and HR overall reactivity scores (delta), as indicated by 
independent-samples t-tests, ts < 1, ps > .17.10 We then calculated single reactivity 
scores for DBP and HR as we did for SBP and submitted them to 2 (dysphoria) x 3 (time) 
mixed model ANOVAs. Results revealed neither main effects of time nor dysphoria x time 
interactions, Fs < 2.15, ps > .13. Therefore, we did not further compare the DBP and HR 
single reactivity scores.  
 
 
                                                   
10 Given our directed a priori hypothesis we conducted one-tailed t-tests for comparisons between 
dysphoric and nondysphoric groups with regard to their cardiovascular reactivity. 
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Figure 6  
Cell means and standard errors of systolic blood pressure reactivity for measurement times 1, 2, 
and 3 in Study 1. Cell means of systolic reactivity scores are baseline-adjusted. 
Task Performance 
In order to investigate participants’ task performance, we analyzed the total num-
ber of recalled letter series, the number of correctly recalled letter series, and the ratio of 
correctly to totally recalled letter series with independent-samples t-tests. Data of 3 par-
ticipants were excluded because they differed more than two standard deviations from 
the respective group mean, so that there were 16 participants per group. With regard to 
the number of correctly recalled letter series (nondysphoric M = 6.56, SE = 0.56 vs. dys-
phoric M = 4.63, SE = 0.42), t(30) = 2.79, p < .01, as well as the ratio of correctly to 
totally recalled letter series (nondysphoric M = 0.82, SE = 0.04 vs. dysphoric M = 0.68, 
SE = 0.05), t(30) = 2.16, p < .04, nondysphoric students significantly outperformed 
dysphoric students. Results regarding the total number of recalled letter series also 
revealed that nondysphoric students tended to show better performance than dysphoric 
students (nondysphoric M = 7.94, SE = 0.45 vs. dysphoric M = 6.81, SE = 0.37), t(30) = 
1.93, p = .06. The three performance indices were not substantially correlated with the 
baseline-adjusted SBP reactivity scores (delta, delta 1, 2, and 3), -.28 < r < -.05, ps > 
.12.  
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2.4.3 Discussion 
The present results confirmed our central prediction that dysphoric participants 
would show stronger systolic reactivity when faced with a mental challenge without fixed 
performance standard than nondysphoric participants. As expected and in accordance 
with the MBM (Gendolla, 2000) statement that mood states per se do not have motiva-
tional implications, we found no differences in cardiovascular baseline measures between 
dysphoric and nondysphoric participants. As outlined earlier, systolic reactivity was our 
primary index for measuring effort intensity because SBP, which largely depends on 
myocardial contractility, is systematically influenced by sympathetic discharge to the 
heart (Brownley et al., 2000; Obrist, 1981; R. A. Wright, 1996).  
Results actually revealed that dysphoric participants showed stronger SBP reactiv-
ity—reflecting the mobilization of more mental effort—than nondysphoric participants. 
Nevertheless, this difference proved to be significant only for the first of the three meas-
ures taken during task performance. For the other two measures as well as for the over-
all reactivity index results pointed into the same direction. In addition, there was a 
decline of SBP reactivity over time in the dysphoric group. One could conceive different 
explications for this finding. For instance, given self-regulation difficulties in depression, it 
could be that our dysphoric participants mobilized much effort in the beginning but failed 
to maintain this level of effort over the 5-min period. As Tillema et al. (2001) pointed 
out, depressed individuals tend to set higher performance standards than nondepressed 
individuals. Possibly, participants in the dysphoric group had very high standards and 
reduced effort mobilization as they realized that they could not meet them.  
Interestingly, performance quantified as the number of totally and correctly 
recalled letter series as well as the ratio between them described the opposite pattern of 
SBP reactivity during task performance. According to our results, nondysphoric partici-
pants clearly outperformed dysphoric participants. This is in accordance with results 
showing that depressed and dysphoric individuals tend to have cognitive deficits (e.g., 
Burt et al., 1995; Rogers et al., 2004). Finally, this study revealed highly significant 
differences between the dysphoric and nondysphoric groups with regard to their 
momentary mood state. As anticipated, participants who were classified as dysphoric on 
the basis of the CES-D 2 weeks prior to the experimental session reported being in a 
more negative mood than nondysphorics at the beginning of the experiment.  
2.5 Study 2 
This study was designed to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1. First, we 
replaced the memory task by a mental concentration task in order to address different 
cognitive processes and thus to facilitate generalization of our findings. In addition, fol-
lowing recommendations by Ingram and Siegle (2002) how to enhance the meaning of 
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findings from research with subclinical populations, we assessed self-reported dysphoria 
twice in order to ensure that the scores were stable. Only participants whose CES-D 
scores were located in the lower or upper third of the distribution at both the first (ques-
tionnaire session) and the second (experimental session) measurement time were 
retained for analyses. Moreover, we assessed participants’ momentary mood state not 
before but after task performance. This was supposed to prevent participants from rely-
ing too much on their momentary mood state by being forced to think about it, and thus 
to show that our findings are independent of being concerned with one’s momentary 
mood state. With some exceptions, we used the same materials and methods as in Study 
1. In order to have an even better temporal resolution, cardiovascular values were taken 
every min.  
2.5.1 Method 
Participants 
One-hundred seventy-one students in an introductory psychology course partici-
pated in questionnaire sessions in exchange for course credit. Out of this sample, we 
randomly selected women who scored in the lower or upper third of the CES-D for par-
ticipation in an ostensibly unrelated experiment. As mentioned above, only data of par-
ticipants whose scores remained within the limits set by the initial distribution (i.e., CES-
D score ≤ 10 and ≥ 20, respectively) after the second assessment time were included in 
the analyses. Thus, data of 25 women (mean age 21 years) were retained and divided 
into 2 groups. Fourteen participants were referred to as dysphoric (CES-D [t1]: M = 
26.93, SE = 0.96; CES-D [t2]: M = 25.43, SE = 1.08). Eleven participants were referred 
to as nondysphoric (CES-D [t1]: M = 5.64, SE = 0.97; CES-D [t2]: M = 4.73, SE = 
0.99). The CES-D scales showed high internal consistency (αs = .93 at t1 and .94 at 
t2).11 
Procedure 
This study was conducted by means of the psychological software Inquisit (version 
2.0, Millisecond Software) by an experimenter who was hired and unaware of both the 
hypotheses and participants’ depression status. The procedure was identical to Study 1 
with the exception of the type of cognitive task, the moment of mood assessment, and 
the second questionnaire. We administered a computerized task that was adapted from 
the “d2 mental concentration test” (Brickenkamp, 1981). Participants learned that differ-
ent symbols would appear on the computer screen and that they had to decide for each 
stimulus whether it was the letter d accompanied by exactly two apostrophes, or not 
(i.e., the letter d with more or less than two apostrophes or the letter p with one, two, 
                                                   
11 As in Study 1, scores of the BDI-II and the CES-D were highly correlated at both assessment 
times, rs > .83, ps < .001. 
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three, or four apostrophes) by pressing a “yes” or a “no” key. They were advised to work 
as quickly but also as precisely as possible. That means that we did not provide them 
with a fixed performance standard (e.g., a fixed presentation time of each stimulus) but 
simply asked them to do their best. It has also to be acknowledged that for this task 
participants had to move, that is, to press a button, in comparison with the quiet sitting 
in Study 1. Movement artifacts, however, were avoided by attaching the blood pressure 
cuff to the non-dominant arm. Before participants started the 5-min performance period, 
they performed 8 test trials to familiarize with the task. Then they worked for 5 min on 
this task while 5 cardiovascular measures were taken, starting 15 sec after task onset. 
Subsequently, participants’ momentary mood state was assessed with the UWIST scale. 
Finally, participants completed an ostensibly unrelated questionnaire (CES-D, BDI-II), 
were carefully debriefed, probed for suspicion, and received their course credit.  
2.5.2 Results 
Self-Reported Mood 
As in Study 1, we calculated three scores based on the positive and negative 
hedonic tone adjectives of the UWIST scale (αs = .95 for the positive, .87 for the nega-
tive, and .93 for the global score). Results revealed that there were significant differ-
ences between dysphoric and nondysphoric participants with regard to their momentary 
mood state immediately after having worked on the cognitive task: Dysphorics (M = 
16.57, SE = 1.08) had lower positive scores than nondysphorics (M = 21.09, SE = 1.16), 
t(23) = 2.83, p < .01. Furthermore, dysphorics (M = 12.21, SE = 1.31) showed higher 
negative scores than nondyshporics (M = 6.18, SE = 0.69), t(19.18)8 = 4.07, p < .001. 
Finally, they also differed significantly on the global sum score (dysphoric M = 36.36, SE 
= 2.29 vs. nondysphoric M = 46.91, SE = 1.53), t(21.60)8 = 3.83, p < .001.  
Cardiovascular Baselines 
SBP and DBP baseline scores were created by averaging the last three of the eight 
values obtained during habituation period (αs = .97 for SBP baselines and .96 for DBP 
baselines).12 HR baselines were determined by the last of the eight measures.13 Means 
and standard errors are presented in Table 4. According to independent-samples t-tests, 
there were no significant differences between the dysphoric and nondysphoric groups 
with regard to cardiovascular baseline measures (ts < 1.33, ps > .20). 
                                                   
12 The reason for this is that repeated measures ANOVAs revealed a decline of cardiovascular 
values over the first measures, whereas the last three measures remained stable (ps > .16). 
13 The last three measures of HR baselines were stable (p > .50) but the internal consistency was 
insufficient (α = .44). Therefore, we used only the last of the eight measures as HR baseline. In 
addition, because of problems with the measurement equipment, there were some missing HR 
data, so that HR analyses are based on the data of 19 participants. 
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Table 4 
Means and Standard Errors of Cardiovascular Baselines in Study 2 
            
 Dysphoric  Nondysphoric 
Cardiovascular baselines M SE   M SE 
SBP 100.73 2.12  103.95 2.55 
DBP 64.33 1.47  67.51 2.27 
HR 73.18 0.52   72.25 0.41 
      
Note. N = 14 (dysphoric) and N = 11 (nondysphoric). SBP and DBP are indicated in millimeters of 
mercury (mmHg), HR is indicated in beats per minute (bpm).  
Cardiovascular Reactivity 
As in Study 1, we calculated for each participant both an overall change score 
(delta) and single change scores for each cardiovascular measure taken during task per-
formance (delta 1, delta 2, delta 3, delta 4, and delta 5) (see Llabre et al., 1991). The 
latter scores were calculated for the sake of comparability of results between Studies 1 
and 2. There were no significant correlations between SBP and DBP reactivity scores and 
their respective baseline scores, -.18 < r < -.15, ps > .40. In contrast, HR baseline 
scores were significantly correlated with HR reactivity scores, r(18)= -.58, p < .01. 
Therefore, we adjusted HR change scores with respect to HR baseline scores (see Llabre 
et al., 1991).  
SBP. We first compared dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals with regard to 
their overall reactivity score (delta). As expected and depicted in the left panel of Figure 
7, dysphoric participants (M = 8.72, SE = 2.00) showed stronger systolic reactivity than 
nondysphoric participants (M = 4.20, SE = 1.39), t(23) = 1.76, p < .05.10 We then sub-
mitted the single reactivity scores to a 2 (dysphoria) x 5 (time) mixed model ANOVA. In 
contrast to Study 1, there was no significant change over time neither for the total of the 
participants nor for either group, Fs < 1.89, ps > .11. Therefore, we did not further com-
pare the single reactivity scores.  
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Figure 7  
Cell means and standard errors of overall systolic blood pressure reactivity (left panel) and heart 
rate reactivity (right panel) in Study 2. Cell means of heart rate reactivity scores are baseline-
adjusted.  
DBP. Comparison of the overall reactivity scores (delta) revealed that dysphoric 
participants (M = 6.19, SE = 1.11) tended to have stronger DBP reactivity than non-
dysphoric participants (M = 3.70, SE = 0.97), t(23) = 1.63, p < .06.10 We then submit-
ted the single reactivity scores to a 2 (dysphoria) x 5 (time) mixed model ANOVA. It 
revealed a significant decline in DBP reactivity over time in general, F(4, 92) = 3.98, p < 
.01, but there was no dysphoria x time interaction, F(4, 92) = 1.38, p > .24. Hence we 
did not further compare the single reactivity scores.  
HR. We first submitted the baseline-adjusted reactivity scores (delta) to an inde-
pendent-samples t-test. Results revealed that dysphoric participants (M = 1.22, SE = 
0.74) showed stronger HR reactivity than nondysphoric participants (M = -0.56, SE = 
0.42), t(17) = 1.90, p < .0410 (see right panel of Figure 7). Next, we submitted the 
single baseline-adjusted reactivity scores to a 2 (dysphoria) x 5 (time) mixed model 
ANOVA. There was neither an effect for the time factor nor a dysphoria x time interac-
tion, Fs < 1.62, ps > .18. Therefore, we did not further compare the single reactivity 
scores.  
Task Performance 
We registered the following indices of participants’ task performance: total num-
ber of stimuli a participant had performed, number of stimuli a participant had correctly 
identified, and the ratio between those indices. Moreover, we assessed the average 
response latency (in ms). Data of 2 participants were excluded form the analyses 
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because they differed more than two standard deviations from the respective group 
means. We then submitted the indices to independent-samples t-tests. Results revealed 
that there were no reliable differences, ts < 1, ps > .40 (average number of stimuli per-
formed: M = 371.65, SE = 8.18; average number of correctly identified stimuli: M = 
364.04, SE = 7.94; average ratio of correctly to totally performed stimuli: M = 0.98, SE 
= 0.003; average response latency: M = 779.37, SE = 19.16). The four performance 
indices were not correlated with SBP reactivity (delta), -.02 < r < .11, ps > .50.  
2.5.3 Discussion 
The present study replicated and extended the findings of Study 1. Again, the 
dysphoria groups did not differ with regard to their cardiovascular baseline values. But 
when they were confronted with a cognitive challenge that called for self-regulation, dys-
phoric participants showed significantly stronger systolic reactivity as well as marginally 
stronger diastolic reactivity than nondysphoric participants. Moreover, even if HR reactiv-
ity was generally rather low, dysphoric students showed significantly stronger HR reac-
tivity than nondysphoric students. These findings hold true for the overall reactivity 
scores.  
Unlike Study 1, there was no decline in systolic reactivity during performance in 
Study 2, neither for dysphoric nor for nondysphoric participants. One may argue that 
differences in task characteristics were responsible for dysphorics’ decline of SBP reactiv-
ity during performance of the memory task in Study 1 as opposed to the mental concen-
tration task in the present study. The d2 task continuously presented new stimuli on the 
screen, asking for a reaction and thus creating a new situation for each trial. Conse-
quently, it might have been easier to maintain self-regulation during work on the d2 task 
because this task was more strongly controlled by the “outside”—that is, the computer 
program that successively presented stimuli. In contrast, the screen with the 15 letter 
series in the memory task of Study 1 did not change over the 5-min performance period 
and thus the situation rested more or less the same. 
With regard to task performance, the differences between both dysphoria groups 
in the present study were not reliable. As for the pattern of cardiovascular reactivity, we 
think that task characteristics were responsible for the differences in performance results 
between Studies 1 and 2. As we argued above, the memory task in Study 1 required 
more self-regulation skills than the concentration task in Study 2. In consideration of 
research stating that depressed and dysphoric individuals have self-regulation deficits 
(e.g., Strauman, 2002; Tomarken & Keener, 1998) and need specific task characteristics 
in order to control their directed attention (e.g., Hertel, 2000), it is reasonable to assume 
that the d2 task in the present study provided dysphoric participants with the required 
hints so that they performed on the same level as nondysphoric participants. 
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Finally, the mood assessment showed, in accordance with the results of Study 1, 
that individuals with low and high self-reported dysphoria differed highly significantly 
with regard to their momentary feeling state, even if the CES-D and the UWIST scales 
were assessed with a time lag of several weeks. Moreover, because mood was assessed 
after task performance at the end of the experimental session, the results of Study 2 
demonstrate that the effects of dysphoria on cardiovascular reactivity and performance 
are not due to a high salience of one’s own feelings that might have been elicited by prior 
mood assessment. 
2.6 General discussion 
The main goal of our two studies was to test our prediction based on the MBM 
(Gendolla, 2000) that dysphoric individuals would show stronger effort-related cardio-
vascular reactivity than nondysphoric individuals when faced with a cognitive task with-
out fixed performance standard. The results largely support our predictions. As expected, 
both studies found highly significant differences between dysphoric and nondysphoric 
participants’ momentary mood states—regardless if mood had been assessed before or 
after completion of the mental task. Undoubtedly, even students selected via a self-
report depression scale several weeks before the experimental session differed clearly 
with regard to their naturally occurring momentary mood.  
More important, Study 1 provided first evidence for our central hypothesis insofar 
as the dysphoric group showed significantly stronger systolic reactivity at the beginning 
of the memory task, demonstrating that dysphoric participants actually mobilized more 
mental effort. Study 2 confirmed our hypothesis for the overall reactivity scores not only 
for SBP but also for HR and marginally for DBP. Even if among these indices SBP is the 
most reliable and sensitive effort-related cardiovascular reactivity parameter, there is 
evidence that SBP, DBP, and HR can also respond simultaneously in active coping 
(Brownley et al., 2000; Obrist, 1981; Papillo & Shapiro, 1990; T. W. Smith et al., 1989). 
Accordingly, dysphoric students mobilized more mental effort during the mental concen-
tration task than did nondysphoric students. The fact that this impact of dysphoria on 
cardiovascular reactivity holds true for two different types of cognitive tasks—a memory 
and a concentration task—makes us confident that the findings can be generalized.  
The present results question the notion that depressed and dysphoric individuals 
have a motivational deficit with respect to intensity of motivation. According to our find-
ings, motivational intensity is higher in dysphoric than in nondysphoric individuals for 
tasks without fixed performance standard. Correspondingly, our results replicate and 
extend the findings by Gendolla and colleagues (see Gendolla & Brinkmann, 2005, for a 
review), in that not only experimentally manipulated, transient mood states but also 
longer lasting affective dispositions that are related to the experience of certain moods 
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can have an impact on effort mobilization. Most important, this effect is not attributable 
to individual differences regarding cardiovascular baseline values because both dysphoria 
groups did not differ from one another on these measures.  
Furthermore, the results of the present studies are compatible with research in 
depression and cardiovascular disease. Accordingly, depression and other negative affect 
dispositions are among the risk factors for the development and worsening of cardio-
vascular disease (e.g., Frasure-Smith & Lespérance, 2005a; Rugulies, 2002; Suls & 
Bunde, 2005). Our studies demonstrate that dysphoric individuals tend to mobilize more 
resources in terms of SBP reactivity when they are asked to do their best. A tendency to 
strong cardiovascular reactivity is in turn associated with and considered as a risk factor 
for the development of hypertension and cardiovascular disease (e.g., Kibler & Ma, 2004; 
Light et al., 1992). One may argue that, among other factors, also affective states play 
an important role in the linkage between depression and coronary heart disease—for 
instance because of stronger sympathetic activation induced by subjectively higher task 
demand in a (dispositionally) more negative mood (see Gendolla & Richter, 2005b).  
Interestingly, the stronger resource mobilization of dysphorics was not related to 
performance gains. In Study 1, nondysphoric participants clearly performed better than 
dysphoric participants. In Study 2, where cardiovascular reactivity differences between 
both dysphoria groups were more obvious, no performance differences emerged. It 
seems that the cognitive deficit found in clinically and subclinically depressed individuals 
(e.g., Burt et al., 1995; Rogers et al., 2004) partly appears also in our dysphoric sample. 
In contrast to Gendolla and colleagues (e.g., Gendolla et al., 2001; Gendolla & Krüsken, 
2002a, 2002b, 2002c) who found positive associations between SBP reactivity and per-
formance when mood was experimentally manipulated, the dysphoric participants in our 
studies did not profit from mobilizing more resources. One can think of several interpre-
tations for this finding.  
On the one hand, given the mentioned cognitive deficits in depression and dys-
phoria, it may be that these individuals generally have to mobilize more resources in 
order to reach the same results than normal controls (see Hockey, 1997; R. A. Wright, 
1998). In this light, the dysphoric participants in Study 2 successfully compensated their 
slight disadvantage by mobilizing more effort, which resulted in a performance that was 
comparable with those of nondysphorics. However, when dysphoric participants did not 
maintain effort—as it seems to be the case in Study 1—they attained worse outcomes. 
On the other hand, given that pronounced cognitive impairments are unlikely to occur in 
a student sample, the worse performance of dysphoric participants in Study 1 may also 
reflect their difficulties in self-regulation and attention control (e.g., Hertel, 2000; Kuhl & 
Helle, 1986; Strauman, 2002). This explication seems plausible when one considers the 
different task characteristics of the cognitive tasks used in these studies and fits well the 
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above mentioned evidence for motivational deficits being partly responsible for cognitive 
deficits. One could argue that cognitive deficits especially emerge in connection with a 
motivational deficit—what may explain the performance differences in Study 1 that did 
not emerge in Study 2. 
The relatively weak association between performance and SBP reactivity in both 
studies is not surprising. There is evidence that in some circumstances effort may 
increase performance; previous research regarding the informational mood impact on 
effort mobilization, for instance, has found positive associations between performance 
and SBP reactivity (e.g., Gendolla et al., 2001; Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002a, 2002b, 
2002c). Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to equate the two because performance on a 
task is an outcome determined by effort, ability, and strategy use, and different tasks are 
differentially influenced by these factors (Locke & Latham, 1990).  
Finally, some open questions and shortcomings concerning the present research 
should be mentioned. First, it is an important issue to investigate the mechanisms that 
are responsible for the stronger cardiovascular reactivity of dysphoric individuals in self-
regulation. According to the MBM (Gendolla, 2000), behavior-related judgments and 
evaluations should mediate between depressed mood and effort mobilization. As outlined 
above, dysphoria has been shown to have an effect on subjective evaluations and ratings 
(e.g., Scott & Ingram, 1998). Alternatively, dysphoria might have influenced people’s 
performance standards on this unfixed difficulty task, which led to stronger effort mobili-
zation (see e.g., Sherry, Hewitt, Flett, & Harvey, 2003; Tillema et al., 2001, for research 
on perfectionistic standards in depression). Even if we are confident—based on prior 
research on experimentally manipulated mood (Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002b, 2002c)—that 
dysphoria affected the subjective difficulty of the task, future research should address 
these possible mediations between depressed mood and effort mobilization. Second, the 
issue regarding the here reported disconnection between effort and performance needs 
to be further addressed. Finally, one shortcoming of our studies is their relatively small 
sample size and their limitation to women. Future research may benefit from extending 
the studies to a broader population recruited from the community with more severe 
depressive symptomatology.  
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3. Studies 3 and 4 
Does Depression Interfere With Effort Mobilization? 
Effects of Dysphoria and Task Difficulty on 
Cardiovascular Response14 
On the basis of predictions of the mood-behavior-model (Gendolla, 2000) and motiva-
tional intensity theory (Brehm & Self, 1989) two studies critically tested the common 
assumption that dysphoria is associated with a motivational deficit. Dysphoric and 
nondysphoric undergraduates performed a cognitive task that was either easy or difficult. 
Effort intensity (i.e., resource mobilization) was assessed as performance-related cardio-
vascular reactivity. In support of our predictions and in contrast to the popular view of a 
general motivational deficit, both studies found a crossover interaction between dyspho-
ria and task difficulty: In the difficult condition, nondysphoric participants indeed showed 
stronger systolic blood pressure reactivity than dysphorics. But in the easy condition, 
dysphoric participants showed stronger systolic reactivity than nondysphorics. The find-
ings are discussed with respect to motivational deficits in depression and possible under-
lying mechanisms. 
 
Dysphoria and depression are said to affect motivation (e.g., Heckhausen, 
1991)—a lack in motivation is even a diagnostic criterion of major depressive disorder as 
defined in the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994). Thus, it is not surprising 
that researchers have already investigated various aspects of the depression-motivation 
link—amongst others effects on behavioral approach and inhibition (Gray, 1982), self-
regulation (e.g., Strauman, 2002), and action-relevant information processing (e.g., 
Hertel, 2000; Scott & Ingram, 1998). However, little is known about dysphoria effects on 
effort intensity—the mobilization of resources for attaining goals.  
On the basis of the assumption that a central characteristic of dysphoria is a per-
sisting negative mood (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994; see also Mineka 
et al., 1998) and on predictions of the mood-behavior-model (MBM; Gendolla, 2000) and 
motivational intensity theory (Brehm & Self, 1989), we conducted research that has 
shown that dysphoria directly influences resource mobilization in terms of cardiovascular 
reactivity for cognitive tasks. But in contrast to the popular view that dysphoria is associ-
ated with a general motivational deficit, dysphoric individuals mobilized more effort than 
                                                   
14 Brinkmann, K., & Gendolla, G. H. E. (2008). Does depression interfere with effort mobilization? 
Effects of dysphoria and task difficulty on cardiovascular response. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 94, 146-157. 
Experimental Part: Studies 3 and 4 
 
85
nondysphorics under “do-your-best” instructions (Brinkmann & Gendolla, 2007). This 
suggests that there is in fact no general motivational deficit but that dysphorics rather 
mobilize more effort than nondysphorics.  
However, given that those studies used tasks without fixed performance stan-
dards, it remained open if this effect was a general one or if it was restricted to the spe-
cific performance condition asking to “do one’s best.” To come to clearer conclusions, we 
investigated dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals’ resource mobilization during the 
performance of tasks with fixed difficulty levels. On the basis of the MBM (Gendolla, 
2000) and previous research on mood effects on effort mobilization (see Gendolla & 
Brinkmann, 2005; Richter et al., 2006, for reviews), we guided our studies by the idea 
that dysphoric individuals would mobilize less effort only in the context of difficult tasks 
but that dysphorics would mobilize even more effort than nondysphorics in the context of 
easy tasks. As in our previous studies, effort mobilization was quantified as the reactivity 
of the cardiovascular system during task performance (Gendolla & Brinkmann, 2005; R. 
A. Wright, 1996). 
3.1 Dysphoria, Self-Regulation, and Motivation 
Several researchers have stressed that self-regulation and motivation play 
important roles in the development, manifestation, and change of depression and dys-
phoria. Amongst others, a number of the identified cognitive deficits of depressed indi-
viduals (see e.g., Burt et al., 1995; Rogers et al., 2004, for reviews) might in fact be 
caused by motivational deficits (e.g., Abramson et al., 1981). Likewise, there is evidence 
that aspects of self-regulation problems, such as rumination (Hertel, 2000; Watkins & 
Brown, 2002), maintenance of unrealistic intentions (Kuhl & Helle, 1986), and deficits in 
attention control (Hertel, 2000; Hertel & Gerstle, 2003), play an important role in the 
relation of depression or dysphoria and cognitive malfunctioning. In addition, the motiva-
tional implications of negative feedback have a detrimental effect on subsequent per-
formance. This effect has been shown to be especially pronounced in depression, com-
pared to control as well as other clinical groups (Elliott et al., 1997).  
With respect to the concept of approach and avoidance motivation, Strauman 
(2002) emphasized that depression is a disorder of self-regulation, which leads to affec-
tive and motivational deficits. In further support of their diminished approach motivation, 
depressed individuals have been shown to be less responsive to rewards (e.g., Henriques 
& Davidson, 2000) and have been characterized by a relative hypoactivation of the left 
prefrontal cortex—an area involved in approach-related behaviors (e.g., Davidson, 
Pizzagalli, Nitschke et al., 2002). Thus, it seems to be clear that dysphoria and depres-
sion are associated with impairments of a number of motivational and self-regulation 
functions. Whether depression is also linked to impairments in the mobilization of energy 
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resources is less clear. Carroll et al. (2007) found weak negative associations between 
depression and cardiovascular reactivity. However, from our perspective, a shortcoming 
of this study is the fact that task characteristics were not considered.  
3.2 Effort Intensity and Cardiovascular Reactivity 
Motivational intensity theory (Brehm & Self, 1989) has elaborated the “difficulty 
law of motivation” (Ach, 1935). Motivational intensity theory states that individuals mobi-
lize resources proportionately to experienced task difficulty as long as success is possible 
and worthwhile. Consequently, fewer resources should be mobilized for an easy task than 
for a difficult task when the maximally justified effort is high. Disengagement occurs 
when task difficulty exceeds a person’s ability or when the necessary effort is not justi-
fied by the value of success.  
R. A. Wright (1996) has integrated motivational intensity theory with Obrist’s 
(1981) active coping approach to cardiovascular arousal. Research instigated on the 
basis of this perspective has consistently found that resource mobilization can be reliably 
quantified by cardiovascular reactivity—changes in the activity of the cardiovascular sys-
tem—in the context of task performance (see R. A. Wright & Kirby, 2001, for a review). 
Most significantly, performance-related changes in systolic blood pressure (SBP) follow 
the effort pattern predicted by motivational intensity theory, taking into consideration 
varying degrees of task difficulty and value of success (e.g., Bongard, 1995; Gendolla & 
Krüsken, 2002b; Light et al., 1992; Richter & Gendolla, 2006; T. W. Smith, Nealey, 
Kircher, & Limon, 1997). Evidence for diastolic blood pressure (DBP) and heart rate (HR) 
also exists but is less consistent (e.g., Storey et al., 1996). The high sensitivity of SBP to 
respond to resource mobilization is not surprising because SBP is systematically influ-
enced by the sympathetic nervous system via myocardial contractility. By contrast, DBP 
mainly depends on flow resistance in the vasculature, which is only unsystematically 
influenced by sympathetic discharge. HR is influenced by both the sympathetic and the 
parasympathetic branches of the autonomic nervous system and should thus respond to 
resource mobilization only to the extent that sympathetic influences dominate (see 
Brownley et al., 2000; Obrist, 1981; Papillo & Shapiro, 1990).  
3.3 Dysphoria, Mood, and Effort Intensity 
To come to clear predictions about dysphoria effects on effort intensity, we 
elaborate on the fact that an enduring negative mood is one of the core characteristics of 
depression (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Mineka et al., 1998) and 
that both mood states and depression can influence judgments in a mood congruent way 
(see Scott & Ingram, 1998; Wyer et al., 1999, for reviews). The result is that more nega-
tive and pessimistic judgments are made in a negative mood or by depressed individuals 
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and more positive and optimistic judgments are made in a positive mood or by non-
depressed individuals.  
According to the MBM (Gendolla, 2000), such mood congruency effects also occur 
on task-related appraisals during task performance, such as judgments of demand, diffi-
culty, or ability. This results in higher perceived task demand in a negative mood than in 
a positive mood (e.g., Cunningham, 1988; Kavanagh & Bower, 1985; J. C. Wright & 
Mischel, 1982) and influences resource mobilization in compliance with the difficulty law 
of motivation (Ach, 1935). With reference to the effects of transient mood states, there is 
clear, replicated evidence that effort-related cardiovascular reactivity is stronger in a 
negative mood than in a positive mood when participants are asked to do their best and 
have to self-regulate the necessary resources (e.g., Gendolla et al., 2001; Gendolla & 
Krüsken, 2002c; Silvestrini & Gendolla, 2007).  
Demand appraisals assessed immediately before performance—the best possible 
approximation for demand appraisals during performance—have been shown to mediate 
the effect of mood on cardiovascular response (Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002c). This sup-
ports the idea of an informational mood impact (i.e., that momentary mood functions as 
information for perceived task demand). Furthermore, the mood effects on both demand 
appraisals and cardiovascular reactivity disappear when mood’s informative value is 
called into question (Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002a).  
When individuals face challenges with fixed performance standards, mood effects 
on effort-related cardiovascular response are moderated by task difficulty. This happens 
because people avoid wasting energy and consequently consider all available task-rele-
vant information simultaneously in a pragmatic way when they make demand appraisals. 
Consequently, for an easy task, a negative mood leads to higher effort (relatively high 
subjective demand) than a positive mood (relatively low demand). By contrast, for a dif-
ficult task, a positive mood leads to higher effort (high, but still possible demand), but a 
negative mood leads to lower effort (disengagement because of too high demand; 
Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002b). Research within the same paradigm has shown, further-
more, that ability perception (R. A. Wright & Dill, 1993; R. A. Wright et al., 1997) and 
dispositional optimism (Kirby et al., 2003, cited in R. A. Wright & Franklin, 2004)—
another dispositional variable that is associated with mood differences (Scheier & Carver, 
1992)—combine with task difficulty to determine effort-related cardiovascular reactivity. 
Whether depression and dysphoria have the same effects is an open question. 
From the perspective that depression and dysphoria are, among other symptoms, 
characterized by a persistent negative mood, we posit that dysphoria influences the 
mobilization of resources via an informational mood impact, as specified in the MBM 
(Gendolla, 2000). Consequently, we do not assume that dysphoria is associated with a 
general deficit in effort intensity. Rather, compared to nondysphorics, dysphoric individu-
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als should mobilize even more resources for an easy task but fewer resources for a diffi-
cult task. This effect should occur because of higher subjective demand during per-
formance of an easy task and the experience of too high demand during performance of 
a difficult task in dysphoria. 
3.4 The Present Studies 
In two quasi-experimental studies, we confronted dysphoric and nondysphoric 
individuals with tasks of fixed low versus high difficulty levels. If dysphoria is associated 
with a general motivational deficit, then dysphorics should mobilize fewer resources than 
nondysphorics on both difficulty levels. However, if our reasoning that the motivational 
effects of dysphoria are the result of an informational mood impact is correct, then task 
difficulty should moderate dysphoria effects on effort intensity. This should occur because 
the level of subjectively experienced demand during task performance depends on the 
joint effect of the two accessible types of information—mood and performance standard 
(e.g., Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002b). The resulting pattern of effort intensity is depicted in 
Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8 
Theoretical predictions for the joint impact of dysphoria and fixed task difficulty on effort intensity. 
Adapted from “Mood, Task Demand, and Effort-Related Cardiovascular Response,” by G. H. E. 
Gendolla and J. Krüsken (2002c), Cognition and Emotion, 16, p. 580. Copyright 2002 by Taylor & 
Francis. 
Specifically, we predict a crossover interaction effect of dysphoria and task diffi-
culty on effort-related cardiovascular response. In the context of an easy task, dysphoric 
individuals should show stronger cardiovascular reactivity, especially SBP (see above), 
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than nondysphoric individuals do. In the context of a difficult (but still possible) task, 
nondysphoric individuals should show stronger SBP reactivity than the dysphoric group. 
In order to be able to generalize our predicted crossover interaction pattern, we con-
ducted two studies, each with a different type of cognitive challenge—a memory task and 
a mental concentration task. 
3.5 Study 1: Mental Concentration Task 
Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (dysphoric vs. 
nondysphoric) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between-persons design, respecting the 
restriction of approximately equal cell distributions for dysphoric and nondysphoric par-
ticipants as well as for men and women. Cardiovascular activity was assessed during a 
habituation period and during performance of the mental concentration task. 
3.5.1 Method 
Participants 
One-hundred eighty-seven university students from an introductory psychology 
course participated in questionnaire sessions containing various personality question-
naires. By means of their scores on the Center for Epidemiologic Studies—Depression 
Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1977), a self-report depression scale, we randomly selected stu-
dents who scored in the lower and the upper quartile of the distributions of men and 
women (i.e., ≤ 6 or ≥ 20 for men and ≤ 13 or ≥ 20 for women) and invited them via an 
anonymous code to participate in an ostensibly unrelated experiment in exchange for 
course credit. The CES-D was assessed a second time in the context of the experimental 
session, and only students whose scores stayed within the limits set by the initial distri-
bution were retained (see Ingram & Siegle, 2002; Weary et al., 1995). Therefore, a total 
of 53 participants (45 women, 8 men; average age 20 years) constituted our final 
sample. Twenty-six individuals (4 men and 22 women) scored in the lower quartile of the 
CES-D (Time 1 [t1]: M = 6.38, SE = 0.54; Time 2 [t2]: M = 6.31, SE = 0.73) and were 
therefore referred to as nondysphoric. The remaining 27 students (4 men and 23 
women) scored in the upper quartile of the CES-D (t1: M = 30.41, SE = 1.27; t2: M = 
30.00, SE = 1.62) and were therefore referred to as dysphoric.  
Physiological Apparatus 
Blood pressure measures were obtained noninvasively with a computer-aided 
monitor (Par Electronics Physioport III-S, Berlin, Germany) that uses oscillometry to 
determine SBP (in millimeters of mercury) and DBP (in millimeters of mercury). A blood 
pressure cuff (Boso, Bosch + Sohn, Jungingen, Germany) was placed over the brachial 
arteria above the elbow of participants’ nondominant arm and inflated automatically in 1-
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min intervals during two measurement periods—habituation (baseline) and task per-
formance.  
Inter-beat intervals (IBIs) were assessed noninvasively using an electrocardio-
gram (ECG; Psylab System, Contact Precision Instruments, London, England) that con-
tinuously monitored the electrical activity of the heart muscle. Two Ag/AgCl 16 mm elec-
trodes (Red Dot, 3M, Neuss, Germany) were placed on each participant: (a) one on the 
musculature between the neck and the distal end of the right collarbone, and (b) one on 
the left lateral abdomen below the lower rib cage (Lead II). Data were filtered using a 10 
Hz high pass and a 40 Hz low pass filter and sampled at 500 Hz. The ECG signal was 
transferred to an internal R-wave detector (Psylab System, Contact Precision Instru-
ments, London, England) that calculated IBIs.  
The beginning and end of the two measurement periods (habituation, task per-
formance) were synchronized via Transistor-Transistor Logic signals sent by the experi-
mental software (Inquisit 2.0, Millisecond Software, Seattle, WA) through a parallel port. 
The ECG signal was assessed continuously; blood pressure measures were taken in 1-
min intervals starting 15 s after the beginning of each measurement period. All obtained 
values were stored on computer disk so that both experimenter and participants were 
ignorant of all physiological values measured over the course of the experiment.  
Self-Report Data 
Dysphoria was assessed with two short self-report scales that have proven their 
applicability in depression research. They were administered about 4 weeks prior to the 
experiment and a second time directly after the experimental session. The French version 
of the CES-D (Fuhrer & Rouillon, 1989) consists of 20 items asking for frequency of 
depressive symptom experience on scales from 0 (never, very seldom) to 3 (frequently, 
always) and has been developed for community samples. In addition to the CES-D, we 
administered the French version of the revised Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck 
et al., 1996)—a 21-item scale initially developed for clinical samples but frequently used 
in student samples as well. It asks for intensity of depressive experience during the past 
2 weeks on scales from 0 (lowest intensity) to 3 (highest intensity). At both assessment 
times, the CES-D and the BDI-II showed high internal consistency (αs > .92) and were 
highly correlated with one another, rs(53) > .84, ps < .001. 
At the beginning of the experimental session, the positive (i.e., “happy”, “joyful”, 
“contented”, “cheerful”) and the negative (i.e., “sad”, “frustrated”, depressed”, “dissatis-
fied”) hedonic tone scales of the UWIST mood adjective checklist (Matthews et al., 1990) 
assessed participants’ momentary mood. Participants indicated the extent to which each 
adjective reflected their momentary feeling state on 7-point likert scales ranging from 1 
(not at all) to 7 (very much).  
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Procedure 
The experimental session, which took about 30 min, was computerized using a 
personal computer and experimental software (Inquisit 2.0) that presented all instruc-
tions and stimuli. Participants attended individually. They were greeted by the experi-
menter—who was hired and unaware of both the hypotheses and participants’ dysphoria 
groups—and took a seat in front of a computer monitor. After participants had read 
introductory information and given signed consent, the experimenter attached the blood 
pressure cuff and the electrodes, left the room, and monitored the experiment from an 
outside control room. Participants first answered biographical questions and indicated 
their momentary feeling state on the UWIST scale. This was followed by a 9-min 
habituation period to determine cardiovascular baseline values while participants could 
read an old issue of a geographic magazine. After completion of the habituation period, 
the experimenter reentered the room, took the magazine, and asked participants to con-
tinue with the concentration task. 
Instructions explained that participants would work on a concentration task for 5 
min. Different stimuli would appear on the screen, preceded by a fixation cross (pre-
sented for 1,000 ms), and followed by a mask. As soon as the stimulus was erased by 
the mask, participants had to indicate within a 4,000-ms response time window whether 
the presented stimulus had been the letter “d” accompanied by exactly two apostrophes 
by pressing a “yes” or a “no” key on the keyboard. Distraction stimuli were the letter “d” 
with one, three, or four apostrophes and the letter “p” with one, two, three, or four 
apostrophes. Following each answer, participants received feedback before the new trial 
began. Task difficulty of this adapted version of the Brickenkamp (1981) d2 mental 
concentration task was manipulated by the presentation time of the stimuli. In the easy 
condition, stimuli were presented for 1,000 ms, but in the difficult condition, stimuli were 
presented for 160 ms—long enough to perceive the stimuli but short enough to make it 
difficult, albeit not impossible, to detect the difference, as indicated by pretests.  
Task instructions were followed by 40 training trials to familiarize participants with 
the task and to give them an impression of task difficulty. Before starting the 5-min per-
formance period, participants appraised task demand (i.e., perceived task difficulty, 
probability of success, and perceived own capacity) on 7-point scales ranging from 1 
(very easy, not probable, and low capacity, respectively) to 7 (very difficult, very prob-
able, and high capacity, respectively). Then the performance period—including the 
assessment of cardiovascular activity—started.  
After the 5 min of task performance, the experimenter reentered the room, 
removed the blood pressure cuff and the electrodes, and informed participants that the 
experimental session was over but that she would like to ask them to complete another 
short paper-pencil questionnaire (CES-D, BDI-II), ostensibly for an unrelated question-
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naire validation study. Finally, participants were thanked, carefully debriefed, and given 
their course credit.  
3.5.2 Results 
Self-Reported Mood 
We calculated two mood scores by summing the scores of the positive hedonic 
tone adjectives of the UWIST scale (α = .96) and of the negative hedonic tone adjectives 
(α = .84). Two (dysphoria) x 2 (task difficulty) between-persons analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs) revealed only the anticipated highly significant dysphoria main effects, Fs > 
21.54, ps < .001, .304 < η2 < .330, in absence of any other main or interaction effects, 
Fs < 2.06, ps > .15. As expected, dysphoric participants had higher scores on the nega-
tive items (dysphoric M = 11.78, SE = 0.87 vs. nondysphoric M = 6.19, SE = 0.70) and 
lower scores on the positive items (dysphoric M = 14.93, SE = 0.87 vs. nondysphoric M 
= 20.85, SE = 0.95) compared to nondysphoric participants. Thus, dysphoric students 
were in a more negative mood during the experimental session.15 
Demand Appraisals 
A preliminary analysis revealed that the ratings of task difficulty, capacity, and 
success probability were highly intercorrelated. Therefore, we created a perceived task 
demand index by summing the ratings of task difficulty, reverse-coded own capacity, and 
reverse-coded success probability so that a higher score reflected higher perceived task 
demand (α = .84). Participants in the difficult-dysphoric group should appraise task 
demand as highest and participants in the easy-nondysphoric group should appraise 
demand as lowest, with the easy-dysphoric and the difficult-nondysphoric groups in 
between. We subjected perceived task demand to a 2 (dysphoria) x 2 (task difficulty) 
ANOVA. However, there were neither the expected main effects nor an interaction, Fs < 
1.03, ps > .31. Cell means and standard errors were as follows: difficult-dysphoric (M = 
9.79, SE = 0.74), easy-dysphoric (M = 8.31, SE = 0.92), difficult-nondysphoric (M = 
9.07, SE = 0.61), and easy-nondysphoric (M = 9.36, SE = 1.29).  
Cardiovascular Baselines 
For the sake of comparability between the blood pressure measures and the con-
tinuously assessed IBIs, we integrated the ECG data over 1-min intervals. Then we cal-
culated cardiovascular baseline scores for SBP, DBP, and HR by averaging the last four of 
the eight measures obtained during habituation (αs were .91 for SBP, .94 for DBP, and 
                                                   
15 We also formed a global mood score of positive and reverse-coded negative items (α = .91) that 
revealed lower scores for dysphoric participants (M = 35.26, SE = 1.36) than for nondysphoric 
participants (M = 46.65, SE = 1.42), F(1, 49) = 33.57, p < .001, η2 = .404. The global score was 
correlated with the positive and negative scores, r(53) = .90 and -.87, ps < .001. The two 
subscales were also correlated, r(53) = -.57, p < .001. 
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.99 for HR).16 Means and standard errors are depicted in Table 5. According to 2 
(dysphoria) x 2 (task difficulty) ANOVAs,17 there were no differences between the experi-
mental conditions for SBP and DBP baseline values Fs < 1.14, ps > .29. An ANOVA for 
HR baseline values revealed a marginally reliable main effect of dysphoria, F(1, 44) = 
3.57, p = .07, η2 = .072, that was considered in an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), 
which is presented below. 
Table 5 
Means and Standard Errors of Cardiovascular Baselines in Study 1 
                
 M  SE 
Condition SBP DBP HR   SBP DBP HR 
Easy        
   Nondysphoric 105.55 66.66 76.54  2.85 1.52 2.18 
   Dysphoric 106.72 69.78 81.74  1.29 1.26 4.96 
Difficult        
   Nondysphoric 103.57 67.85 79.46  2.32 1.92 3.35 
   Dysphoric 106.39 68.32 89.10   2.22 1.74 4.60 
        
Note. Systolic blood pressure (SBP) and diastolic blood pressure (DBP) are shown in millimeters of 
mercury. Heart rate (HR) is shown in beats per minute. 
Cardiovascular Reactivity 
We created cardiovascular reactivity (delta) scores for each participant by sub-
tracting the baseline values from the arithmetic means obtained during task performance 
(see Llabre et al., 1991). Preliminary 2 (dysphoria) x 2 (task difficulty) ANCOVAs that 
tested for associations between the reactivity scores and the respective baseline values 
found no significant covariations, Fs < 0.71, ps >.40. Consequently, we analyzed the raw 
reactivity scores without baseline-correction.  
                                                   
16 For the sake of easier readability, we recoded the IBIs so that we will from now on refer to HR in 
beats per minute. The reason for averaging the last four baseline measures is that repeated 
measures ANOVAs revealed a decline of cardiovascular values over the first measures, but the last 
four measures remained stable (ps > .30). HR data of some participants could not be analyzed 
because of too many movement artifacts. Therefore, analyses of HR data are based on 47 and 48 
participants, respectively. 
17 Due to the small number of men in each condition, it was not possible to look at gender as a 
separate factor in this study. 
  Experimental Part: Studies 3 and 4 
 
94
SBP. Cell means are depicted in Figure 9. In confirmation of our predictions, a 2 
(dysphoria) x 2 (task difficulty) ANOVA revealed that the only significant effect was the 
expected crossover interaction between dysphoria and difficulty, F(1, 49) = 5.37, p < 
.03, η2 = .094, in absence of reliable main effects of task difficulty, F(1, 49) = 2.54, p > 
.12, and dysphoria, F(1, 49) = 1.00, p > .32. Additional cell contrasts revealed a signifi-
cant difference between the strong reactivity of dysphoric participants (M = 5.73, SE = 
1.25) and the weak reactivity of nondysphoric participants (M = 1.51, SE = 1.25) in the 
easy condition, t(49) = 2.24, p < .02 (because of our clear theory-based directional pre-
dictions, focused contrasts are reported one-tailed). In the difficult condition, reactivity of 
dysphoric participants (M = 4.81, SE = 1.33) tended to be slightly lower than that of 
nondysphoric participants (M = 6.49, SE = 1.19), t(49) = 0.98, p = .17 (one-tailed).  
 
 
Figure 9 
Cell means and standard errors of systolic blood pressure (SBP) reactivity in Study 1. 
DBP and HR. Means and standard errors are presented in Table 6. According to 2 
(dysphoria) x 2 (task difficulty) ANOVAs, there were no significant main or interaction 
effects for either reactivity measure, Fs < 1.07, ps > .30, indicating that there were no 
reliable differences in DBP and HR reactivity between the four experimental groups.  
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Table 6 
Means and Standard Errors of DBP and HR Reactivity in Study 1 
            
 M  SE 
Condition DBP HR   DBP HR 
Easy      
   Nondysphoric 3.09 1.57  0.84 1.24 
   Dysphoric 4.19 0.88  1.63 1.29 
Difficult      
   Nondysphoric 4.56 1.88  1.06 1.33 
   Dysphoric 4.73 0.05   0.89 0.89 
      
Note. Diastolic blood pressure (DBP) is displayed as changes in millimeters of mercury. Heart rate 
(HR) is displayed as changes in beats per minute. 
Task Performance 
Raw performance indices like the total number of stimuli performed or the number 
of correctly and incorrectly identified stimuli were of limited interest because these indi-
ces were mainly determined by the greater number of stimuli performed in the difficult 
condition due to shorter presentation times, Fs > 13.98, ps < .001, .224 < η2 < .869. 
We therefore calculated the ratios of correctly identified, incorrectly identified, and omit-
ted stimuli to the total number of stimuli performed. Furthermore, we registered the 
reaction times for the number of correctly and incorrectly identified stimuli as well as for 
the total number of stimuli performed.  
Reaction times were normally distributed. Data of 1 participant were excluded 
from all analyses because the response latencies differed more than three standard 
deviations from the respective group mean. Two (dysphoria) x 2 (task difficulty) ANOVAs 
revealed task difficulty main effects, Fs > 7.67, ps < .01, .139 < η2 < .259, with respect 
to the following: ratio of incorrectly identified stimuli (easy M = 0.01, SE = 0.01 vs. diffi-
cult M = 0.04, SE = 0.01), reaction times of correctly identified stimuli (easy M = 332.66 
ms, SE = 29.07 vs. difficult M = 462.12 ms, SE = 14.56), and total reaction times (easy 
M = 334.56 ms, SE = 29.11 vs. difficult M = 461.94 ms, SE = 14.90), in absence of 
other main or interaction effects, Fs < 0.84, ps > .36. There were neither main nor inter-
action effects for the ratios of correctly identified and omitted stimuli, Fs < 1.53, ps > 
.22. In summary, these results show better performance of participants in the easy task 
condition according to some indices, whereas dysphoria did not have a significant influ-
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ence. Finally, we examined the relation of performance indices and SBP reactivity. Cor-
relation coefficients ranged from r = -.24 to r = .22, ps > .22, indicating a weak ten-
dency to better performance and faster reaction times (negative relation) associated with 
more effort.  
3.5.3 Mediation Analysis 
The results of cardiovascular reactivity display the predicted crossover interaction 
of dysphoria and task difficulty. In order to investigate the underlying mechanism of this 
effect, we examined the data with regard to mediation by momentary mood and per-
ceived task demand as reported by Gendolla and Krüsken (2002c). Contrary to our 
expectation, positive and negative mood were not correlated with perceived task 
demand, -.10 < r(53) < -.07, ps > .48. Then, we examined (separately for each task 
condition) the association of mood and perceived task demand with SBP reactivity. The 
correlations were generally weak, but the relation of negative mood to greater SBP 
change in the easy condition approached significance, r(24) = .38, p < .10 (two-tailed). 
As one would expect from those weak associations, mediation analyses performed sepa-
rately for each task condition did not reveal evidence for mood and demand appraisals as 
mediators for dysphoria effects on SBP reactivity. 
3.5.4 Discussion 
The main result of this study was the predicted crossover interaction effect 
between dysphoria and task difficulty on SBP reactivity in absence of any significant main 
effects. This finding clearly shows that there was no general motivational deficit of the 
dysphoric participants with regard to resource mobilization. Rather, dysphorics mobilized 
even more resources than nondysphorics when they performed an easy version of the 
task.  
We should nevertheless note that additionally performed focused cell comparisons 
found that the lower SBP reactivity of dysphoric participants in the difficult condition was 
not significantly different from the higher reactivity of nondysphorics. This may be attrib-
uted to a suboptimal difficulty manipulation. The fact that participants’ demand apprais-
als were below the scale’s midpoint (i.e., 11) also suggests that the difficult task was 
indeed not difficult enough for all dysphoric participants to withhold effort.  
As outlined in the introduction, we reasoned that dysphoria would be associated 
with negative mood and related to a more pessimistic evaluation of task demand. Dys-
phoric and nondysphoric participants—as selected 4 weeks prior to the experimental ses-
sion—indeed differed with regard to their naturally occurring mood when they performed 
the mental concentration task. In contrast, the task demand index assessed prior to 
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performance did not corroborate our assumption. Likewise, mood was not associated 
with perceived task demand and the proposed mediating mechanism not supported.  
The finding that DBP and HR reactivity were not influenced by dysphoria or task 
difficulty can be explained by the physiological mechanisms determining DBP and HR 
activity. As noted earlier, DBP and HR are less systematically influenced by the sympa-
thetic nervous system than SBP. Therefore, DBP and HR can, but do not necessarily have 
to, show the same pattern as SBP (Brownley et al., 2000; Papillo & Shapiro, 1990). 
Finally, the analysis of task performance revealed better performance of participants in 
the easy task condition for some indices (smaller ratio of incorrectly identified stimuli as 
well as faster reaction times). Besides these rather trivial difficulty effects, no significant 
influence of dysphoria became evident.  
3.6 Study 2: Memory Task 
This study aimed to replicate and extend the findings of Study 1. In order to gen-
eralize dysphoria effects on effort intensity, we administered a memory task instead of 
the concentration task. Except for this, the same materials and procedure were used as 
in Study 1. In addition, we recruited more men for this study to have them better repre-
sented than in the previous study. Participants were again randomly assigned to the con-
ditions of a 2 (dysphoric vs. nondysphoric) x 2 (task: easy vs. difficult) between-persons 
design respecting the restriction of equal cell distributions for dysphorics and non-
dysphorics as well as for men and women.  
3.6.1 Method 
Participants 
Participants were selected out of a sample of 398 university students with various 
majors who had been recruited via announcements in introductory classes that were fol-
lowed by short questionnaire sessions to assess dysphoria by means of the CES-D. Stu-
dents scoring in the upper or lower quartile of the distributions of men and women, 
respectively, (i.e., ≤ 7 or ≥ 16 for men and ≤ 10 or ≥ 18 for women) were invited to 
participate in an ostensibly unrelated experiment via an anonymous code. For their par-
ticipation in the experimental session, respondents received 10 Swiss francs (about $8). 
As in Study 1, only participants whose scores remained within the limits set by the initial 
distribution were retained for analyses. Consequently, a total of 64 participants (41 
women, 23 men; average age 26 years) constituted our final sample. Thirty-two students 
scored in the lower quartile of the CES-D (t1: M = 5.04, SE = 0.59; t2: M = 6.09, SE = 
0.45) and were therefore referred to as nondysphoric. The remaining 32 students scored 
in the upper quartile of the CES-D (t1: M = 24.67, SE = 2.39; t2: M = 26.09, SE = 1.29) 
and were therefore referred to as dysphoric. The distribution of men and women was 
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balanced in the four cells (11 women and 5 men in the difficult-nondysphoric cell, 10 
women and 6 men in the other three cells).  
Procedure 
The experimental session was again computerized and accompanied by a hired 
experimenter who was unaware of both hypotheses and participants’ dysphoria status. 
Physiological apparatus and self-report measures (CES-D, BDI-II, and UWIST) were 
identical to Study 1. Both depression scales again showed high internal consistency (αs > 
.93) and were highly correlated with one another, r(64) = .89, p < .001. Participants 
attended the experimental session individually, were greeted, and were seated in front of 
a computer monitor. After having provided signed consent, the blood pressure cuff and 
the electrodes were attached, and participants started reading the instructions and pro-
viding the answers to the biographical questions and the UWIST scale.  
After an 8-min habituation period during which cardiovascular measures were 
taken in the same way as in the previous study, participants learned that they would 
perform a memory task for the next 5 min. They were asked to memorize a list of 
senseless letter strings, each string consisting of four letters (e.g., WPQA, CLTW) and to 
recall the entire list afterwards. The list comprised four strings in the easy condition and 
nine strings in the difficult condition. The exact number of presented strings had been 
pre-tested to adjust the difficulty level. After participants had learned about the forth-
coming task, they were presented the list they would have to memorize for 2 s. This was 
supposed to give them an impression of task difficulty. Before starting to memorize, par-
ticipants answered the same subjective demand questions as in Study 1 (i.e., perceived 
difficulty, probability, and capacity) on the same 7-point scales. Then the 5-min per-
formance period started during which cardiovascular measures were taken. Subse-
quently, the experimenter reentered the room and gave participants a sheet of paper and 
a pencil so that they could note the letter strings they recalled. Afterwards, the experi-
menter removed the blood pressure cuff and the electrodes and asked participants to 
complete an ostensibly unrelated questionnaire (CES-D, BDI-II). Finally, participants 
were thanked, carefully debriefed, and given their payment.  
3.6.2 Results 
Self-Reported Mood 
We again calculated a positive (α = .95) and a negative (α = .89) mood sum score 
and submitted them to 2 (dysphoria) x 2 (task difficulty) ANOVAs. The only significant 
results were the expected dysphoria main effects, Fs > 12.25, ps < .001, .168 < η2 < 
.222, in absence of other main or interaction effects, Fs < 1.06, ps > .30. Accordingly, 
dysphoric participants had higher negative scores (dysphoric M = 11.19, SE = 1.09 vs. 
nondysphoric M = 6.22, SE = 0.46) and lower positive scores (dysphoric M = 15.91, SE 
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= 0.84 vs. nondysphoric M = 20.31, SE = 0.92) compared to nondysphoric participants, 
indicating that dysphoric students were in a more negative mood.18 
Demand Appraisals 
As in Study 1, we calculated a perceived task demand index (α = .80) so that 
higher scores reflected higher perceived task demand. We then subjected the index to a 
2 (dysphoria) x 2 (task difficulty) ANOVA. This revealed a significant dysphoria main 
effect, F(1, 60) = 6.70, p < .02, η2 = .098, indicating that dysphoric participants 
appraised the task as more demanding than nondysphoric participants (dysphoric M = 
14.78, SE = 0.57 vs. nondysphoric M = 12.69, SE = 0.57). Neither the task main effect 
nor the interaction proved to be reliable, Fs < 0.94, ps > .33. Nevertheless, cell means 
were in the hypothesized order: difficult-dysphoric (M = 14.81, SE = 0.78), easy-dys-
phoric (M = 14.75, SE = 0.86), difficult-nondysphoric (M = 13.44, SE = 0.90), and easy-
nondysphoric (M = 11.94, SE = 0.68).  
Cardiovascular Baselines 
Again, we integrated the ECG data over 1-min intervals and calculated cardio-
vascular baseline scores for SBP, DBP, and HR by averaging the last three of the seven 
measures obtained during habituation (αs were .95 for SBP, .94 for DBP, and .99 for 
HR).19 Means and standard errors are presented in Table 7. Preliminary 2 (dysphoria) x 2 
(task difficulty) x 2 (gender) ANOVAs of the baseline values revealed a significant gender 
main effect for SBP, F(1, 56) = 21.21, p < .001, η2 = .258, due to men having higher 
SBP baseline values (M = 111.25, SE = 1.94) than women (M = 99.10, SE = 1.63)—a 
common finding (Wolf et al., 1997). On the DBP baseline values, there was a significant 
task difficulty main effect, F(1, 56) = 5.63, p < .03, η2 = .077, which was further quali-
fied by a significant difficulty x gender interaction, F(1, 56) = 4.50, p < .04, η2 = .061. 
Finally, there was a dysphoria main effect on the HR baseline values, F(1, 51) = 4.17, p 
< .05, η2 = .062, indicating higher HR baseline values for nondysphoric (M = 78.87, SE 
= 2.35) than for dysphoric (M = 70.87, SE = 2.32) participants. These findings were 
considered in ANCOVAs of the cardiovascular reactivity scores, which are presented 
below. 
                                                   
18 The global mood score (α = .92) revealed lower scores for dysphoric (M = 36.72, SE = 1.77) 
than for nondysphoric participants (M = 46.09, SE = 1.15), F(1, 60) = 19.48, p < .001, η2 = .242. 
The global score was correlated with the positive and negative scores, r(64) = .90 and -.89, ps < 
.001. The two subscales were also correlated, r(53) = -.60, p < .001. 
19 As in Study 1, we recoded the IBIs so that we refer to HR in beats per minute. The reason for 
averaging the last three baseline measures is that repeated measures ANOVAs revealed a decline 
of SBP and DBP values over the first measures, but the last four (SBP) and three (SBP and DBP) 
measures remained stable (ps > .23). There was no decline of HR values (ps > .25), but for the 
sake of comparability with SBP and DBP, we also averaged the last three baseline measures. Due 
to movement artifacts, there were HR data of only 59 participants available. 
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Errors of Cardiovascular Baselines in Study 2 
                
 M  SE 
Condition SBP DBP HR   SBP DBP HR 
Easy        
   Nondysphoric 102.90 63.84 76.47  2.64 1.46 2.49 
   Dysphoric 102.93 65.52 73.81  2.66 1.59 3.38 
Difficult        
   Nondysphoric 105.30 70.63 81.27  2.69 1.78 3.99 
   Dysphoric 102.75 65.85 67.73   3.68 2.79 3.07 
        
Note. Systolic blood pressure (SBP) and diastolic blood pressure (DBP) are shown in millimeters of 
mercury. Heart rate (HR) is shown in beats per minute. 
Cardiovascular Reactivity 
We calculated cardiovascular reactivity (delta) scores in the same way as in Study 
1. Preliminary 2 (dysphoria) x 2 (task difficulty) ANCOVAs on these reactivity scores with 
the respective baseline values as covariates revealed significant covariations for all car-
diovascular indices, Fs > 4.22, ps < .05, .061 < η2 < .109, -.34 < r < -.22. Because of 
this and because of the above mentioned differences in cardiovascular baseline values, 
we adjusted the SBP, DBP, and HR reactivity scores with regard to their respective base-
line values in order to prevent carry-over effects and biases due to the law of initial val-
ues (see Llabre et al., 1991). Preliminary 2 (dysphoria) x 2 (task difficulty) x 2 (gender) 
ANOVAs of the baseline-adjusted SBP, DBP, and HR reactivity scores did not reveal any 
main or interaction effects for gender, Fs < 2.58, ps > .11. Therefore, we did not con-
sider gender in the following analyses.  
SBP. A 2 (dysphoria) x 2 (task difficulty) ANOVA of the baseline-adjusted reactiv-
ity scores revealed only the predicted significant interaction effect, F(1, 60) = 5.17, p < 
.03, η2 = .077, in absence of significant main effects of task difficulty, F(1, 60) = 2.06, p 
> .15, or dysphoria, F(1, 60) = 0.06, p > .50. As depicted in Figure 10, SBP reactivity 
clearly reflected the predicted crossover interaction pattern. Additionally, we conducted 
planned cell contrasts that confirmed a significant difference between nondysphoric indi-
viduals (M = 8.58, SE = 1.62) and dysphoric individuals (M = 5.06, SE = 1.14) in the 
difficult condition, t(60) = 1.77, p < .05 (one-tailed). In the easy condition, the reactivity 
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of dysphoric participants (M = 6.24, SE = 1.37) tended to be higher than that of non-
dysphoric participants (M = 3.37, SE = 1.45), t(60) = 1.44, p < .08 (one-tailed).  
 
 
Figure 10 
Cell means and standard errors of baseline-adjusted systolic blood pressure (SBP) reactivity in 
Study 2. 
DBP and HR. Means and standard errors are presented in Table 8. A 2 (dysphoria) 
x 2 (task difficulty) ANOVA of the baseline-adjusted DBP reactivity scores revealed no 
significant effects, Fs(1, 60) < 1.69, ps > .19. A 2 (dysphoria) x 2 (task difficulty) 
ANOVA of the baseline-adjusted HR reactivity scores revealed a significant task difficulty 
main effect, F(1, 55) = 5.79, p < .03, η2 = .091, due to higher reactivity in the difficult 
condition (M = 6.24, SE = 0.98) than in the easy condition (M = 3.31, SE = 0.68). There 
was neither a main effect of dysphoria, F(1, 55) = 0.01, p > .50, nor an interaction 
effect, F(1, 55) = 2.57, p > .11.  
  Experimental Part: Studies 3 and 4 
 
102
Table 8 
Means and Standard Errors of Baseline-Adjusted DBP and Baseline-Adjusted HR Reactiv-
ity in Study 2 
            
 M  SE 
Condition DBP HR   DBP HR 
Easy      
   Nondysphoric 5.12 4.26  1.01 0.83 
   Dysphoric 2.59 2.47  0.98 1.02 
Difficult      
   Nondysphoric 5.03 5.12  0.93 1.43 
   Dysphoric 4.84 7.19   1.24 1.34 
      
Note. Diastolic blood pressure (DBP) is displayed as changes in millimeters of mercury. Heart rate 
(HR) is displayed as changes in beats per minute. 
Task Performance 
Raw task performance indices of the memory task (e.g., the number of correctly 
or overall recalled letter strings) were of limited interest because they were mainly 
restricted by task difficulty and thus only showed difficulty main effects, Fs(1, 60) > 
16.34, ps < .001, .213 < η2 < .642. Therefore, the primary performance indices were the 
percentages (a) of overall recalled to presented strings and (b) of correctly recalled to 
presented strings. Two (dysphoria) x 2 (task difficulty) ANOVAs of these difficulty-
adjusted indices also revealed significant task difficulty main effects, Fs > 16.20, ps < 
.001, .211 < η2 < .282, in absence of any other effects, Fs < 0.56, ps > .46. On aver-
age, participants in the easy condition overall recalled 100% of the presented strings, 
whereas participants in the difficult condition overall recalled 82% of the presented 
strings. Compared to the number of presented strings in each condition, participants in 
the easy condition correctly recalled 88%, whereas participants in the difficult condition 
correctly recalled 61%. Finally, correlations of performance indices and SBP reactivity 
ranged from r = .06 to r = .33, ps > .06, indicating again a tendency to better per-
formance associated with more effort.  
3.6.3 Mediation Analysis 
As in Study 1, we examined the associations of momentary mood, perceived task 
demand, and SBP reactivity. In contrast to Study 1 and according to expectations, posi-
tive mood correlated negatively with perceived task demand, r(64) = -.25, p < .05 (two-
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tailed), and negative mood tended to correlate positively with perceived task demand, 
r(64) = .24, p < .06 (two-tailed). However, the indirect effect (see Sobel, 1982) of 
dysphoria on perceived task demand via positive and negative mood was not reliable, zs 
< 1.02, ps > .30. Negative mood and perceived task demand tended to be associated 
with SBP reactivity in both task conditions, in the appropriate direction, though only one 
of the four correlations approached significance (greater demand appraisal with less SBP 
change in the difficult condition). Mediation analyses performed separately for each task 
condition revealed no evidence for the mediation of dysphoria effects on SBP reactivity 
by mood and demand appraisals. 
3.6.4 Discussion 
The findings of Study 2 conceptually replicate and complement those of Study 1. 
According to the self-report measures, participants who were assigned to the dysphoric 
and nondysphoric groups on the basis of their depression scores 3 weeks prior to the 
experimental session differed clearly with regard to their naturally occurring mood during 
the experiment. As it is the most relevant result of this study, the predicted crossover 
interaction pattern of dysphoria and task difficulty on SBP reactivity again became evi-
dent in absence of any significant main effects. In the difficult condition, systolic reactiv-
ity was stronger for nondysphoric than for dysphoric individuals, but in the easy condi-
tion, the pattern was reversed. Here, reactivity tended to be stronger for dysphorics than 
for nondysphorics. As in Study 1, the effects on DBP and HR reactivity did not correspond 
to those of SBP, which is, however, not surprising given their less systematic linkage to 
sympathetic arousal (Brownley et al., 2000; Papillo & Shapiro, 1990).  
Unlike Study 1, results on the perceived task demand index assessed prior to 
performance confirmed that dysphoric participants evaluated task demand higher than 
nondysphoric participants. Moreover, participants in the difficult-dysphoric group 
appraised the task the most demanding and participants in the easy-nondysphoric group 
appraised it the least demanding. This displays the expected order, even though the task 
difficulty main effect was not reliable. However, the mediation of dysphoria effects on 
effort mobilization via perceived task demand as reported by Gendolla and Krüsken 
(2002c) was not corroborated. Finally, as in the previous study, participants’ task per-
formance was not influenced by dysphoria but only by task difficulty, with participants in 
the easy condition performing better than participants in the difficult condition.  
3.7 Meta-Analysis of SBP Reactivity in Studies 1 and 2 
Both experiments found the predicted crossover interaction effect of dysphoria 
and task difficulty on SBP reactivity in absence of significant main effects. However, as 
reported above, additional cell comparisons revealed a significant difference between the 
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easy-dysphoric and easy-nondysphoric cells in Study 1 but no significant difference 
between the difficult-nondysphoric and difficult-dysphoric cells. In Study 2, dysphoria 
had a significant effect in the difficult condition but only a marginally significant effect in 
the easy condition. Therefore, we additionally tested our predictions with an analysis that 
combines the two studies using the “Stouffer” or “adding z-method” described by 
Rosenthal (1978). It has to be acknowledged, however, that the two cognitive tasks were 
not identical, and their difficulty levels were not exactly corresponding. 
The adding z-method consists of calculating cumulative z scores by (a) converting 
the one-tailed p level of each cell comparison to its associated z score, (b) summing the z 
scores, and (c) dividing the sum by the square root of the number of studies being com-
bined. The results confirmed the predicted cell differences: In the easy condition, dys-
phoric participants had higher SBP reactivity than nondysphoric participants, z = 2.57, p 
< .01 (one-tailed). In the difficult condition, nondysphoric participants showed higher 
SBP reactivity than dysphoric participants, z = 1.88, p < .04 (one-tailed).20 Together 
with the replicated significant crossover interaction in absence of significant main effects, 
this indicates that dysphoria only leads to less effort mobilization when a task is difficult. 
But dysphoria results in the mobilization of high effort when a task is easy. 
3.8 General Discussion 
According to the present results, dysphoria does not lead to a general deficit in 
resource mobilization. Rather, it depends on the task context whether dysphoria reduces 
or even boosts effort intensity. As indicated by the two studies and additionally confirmed 
by the combined analysis, SBP reactivity—our central dependent variable referring to 
resource mobilization—displayed the predicted crossover interaction effect of dysphoria 
and task difficulty in absence of significant main effects. When task difficulty was high, 
nondysphorics showed higher performance-related SBP reactivity than dysphorics, which 
is in accordance with the idea of a motivational deficit in dysphoria. But when task diffi-
culty was low, dysphoric participants showed higher SBP reactivity than nondysphorics, 
which is the very opposite of a motivational deficit. Accordingly, dysphoria can increase 
effort intensity when task difficulty is low, as shown in the present studies, or unfixed 
(i.e., individuals are asked to “do their best” instead of attaining a defined performance 
standard), as has been shown in previous studies (Brinkmann & Gendolla, 2007).  
Regarding our research sample, it is of note that our studies involved groups of 
dysphoric students with CES-D scores from 16 up to 51, averaging at 30 (Study 1) and 
25 (Study 2), respectively. This is beyond the usual cut-off score of 16 (Radloff, 1977) 
and thus makes us confident that these samples represent cases of dysphoria with—at 
                                                   
20 Other methods summarized by Rosenthal (1978) like the “method of adding probabilities”, the 
“method of adding ts”, or the “method of adding logs” revealed virtually the same results. 
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least—subclinical symptoms of depression. Of course, future research may benefit from 
including clinical measures (e.g., structured clinical interviews) and clinical samples.  
The finding that dysphoria can boost effort intensity in the context of easy and 
unfixed challenges confirmed our predictions derived from the notion that a central char-
acteristic of dysphoria and depression is an enduring negative mood (DSM-IV; American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) and from theorizing about the role of mood states in 
resource mobilization in terms of the MBM (Gendolla, 2000). In support of this reasoning, 
both studies found that dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals differed significantly with 
respect to their momentary mood state—dysphorics’ mood was much more negative than 
nondysphorics’ mood.  
With respect to perceived task demand, Study 2 found the expected dysphoria 
main effect—that was paralleled by the correlation of mood and perceived task demand—
as well as an increase in demand appraisals from the easy-nondysphoric to the difficult-
dysphoric condition, even though the task difficulty main effect was not reliable. One 
plausible reason for the different results in Study 1 is that those participants had the 
opportunity to practice on the concentration task before making their judgments, but 
participants in Study 2 did not. Therefore, individuals in Study 2 had to rely much more 
on other information than task difficulty—for instance their momentary mood state. This 
explanation is in accordance with the MBM-postulate that the effective weight of moods 
in evaluations and judgments depends on the amount of other accessible, diagnostic 
information (Abele et al., 1998; Abele & Petzold, 1994; Gendolla, 2000). Moreover, given 
that appraisals are considered to be explicit as well as implicit (Kappas, 2006), the 
absence of an effect on the three self-report questions in Study 1 does not exclude the 
possibility that implicit difficulty appraisals influenced the mobilization of resources. In 
this context, it has to be pointed out that experienced task demand during rather than 
before performance is thought to be the critical variable, which is, however, difficult to 
assess.  
According to the MBM logic, mood states should mediate dysphoria effects on 
demand appraisals and effort mobilization, and demand appraisals should mediate dys-
phoria effects on effort mobilization. The present studies did not find evidence for this 
assumption reported by Gendolla and Krüsken (2002c): In Study 1, demand appraisals 
did not form the expected pattern. In Study 2, demand appraisals and negative mood—
but not positive mood—tended to show the expected associations with SBP reactivity. 
These correlations were, however, weak, and the indirect effects were not reliable.  
Thus, at this time, we cannot tell whether an informational impact of momentary 
mood was the mechanism underlying the dysphoria effects on resource mobilization. On 
the one hand, our experimental design with a maximum of 16 participants per cell and 
restricted variance within the conditions does not provide adequate statistical power for 
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examining a causal chain with three to four variables. Therefore, it might be that the 
weak evidence of Study 2 comes out more clearly in a design with more statistical power. 
In favor of this assumption is evidence concerning not only mood congruency effects on 
evaluations and judgments in depression and dysphoria (Scott & Ingram, 1998) but also 
mood effects on perceived task demand and effort mobilization in studies within the 
same experimental design as the present ones (Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002b, 2002c). On 
the other hand, it might be that naturally occurring dysphoria differs from manipulated 
transient mood states in some respects: Even though dysphoria has been shown to have 
similar effects on effort mobilization, the principal mechanism might be something other 
than via momentary mood and demand appraisals—or at least the consciously experi-
enced and verbalized parts of them. Future researchers interested in dysphoria and 
depression effects on cardiovascular reactivity should investigate the underlying mecha-
nism, maybe using a stronger or even more obvious manipulation of objective task diffi-
culty in order to achieve a stronger impact on demand appraisals. Future researchers 
might furthermore manipulate more than two levels of task difficulty to examine a 
broader range of the predictions depicted in Figure 8.  
A finding of the present studies that also deserves discussion is that task per-
formance was affected only by task difficulty—which is a rather trivial effect—whereas 
dysphoria had no significant impact. Furthermore, effort was weakly or not related to 
performance in both studies and both difficulty conditions. Previous research, on the one 
hand, has shown positive associations between performance and SBP reactivity and has 
thus provided evidence that, in some circumstances, effort may increase performance 
(Gendolla et al., 2001; Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c). On the other hand, 
the vast body of research reporting cognitive deficits in clinical and subclinical depres-
sion, including impairments in the domains of attention, memory, and executive func-
tions (see Burt et al., 1995; Rogers et al., 2004, for reviews), suggests diminished per-
formance of dysphoric participants, especially in the difficult condition where they mobi-
lized less effort.  
We attribute the absence of such performance effects in the present studies to the 
fact that participants were university students who are unlikely to suffer from massive 
cognitive deficits. Moreover, as we did not focus on cognitive deficits in dysphoria, we 
selected tasks that met our criteria of simplicity and minimal physical demand rather 
than tests specially designed to reveal cognitive impairments. At this point, it is also of 
note that performance and effort are complex constructs and that it would be incorrect to 
equate the two; performance on a task is an outcome that is determined by effort, abil-
ity, and strategy use, and different tasks are differentially influenced by these factors 
(Locke & Latham, 1990). Furthermore, task performance only reflects the effectiveness 
of behavior but not its efficiency, which is the relationship between outcome and invested 
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effort (see Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). The absence of dysphoria 
effects on performance in our studies might thus represent a case of successful effort 
mobilization (see Hockey, 1997). 
In summary, the present research demonstrates that dysphoria influences 
resource mobilization but does so with dependence on task characteristics. In accordance 
with R. A. Wright (1996), we regard resource or effort mobilization as a direct indicator 
of one specific aspect of motivation, namely the intensity of motivation at a given point in 
time (Brehm & Self, 1989). This means that sympathetically mediated cardiovascular 
reactivity displays the mobilization of resources to actively cope with demands. In this 
sense, we conclude from our studies that dysphoria and depression are not necessarily 
associated with a general motivational deficit. We have shown that dysphoria can even 
lead to increased effort intensity—and thus to enhanced motivational intensity—given the 
specific task characteristics of an easy task or a task without fixed performance stan-
dards as shown in the studies by Brinkmann and Gendolla (2007).  
To be clear, our studies were not concerned with a problem specifically prominent 
in depression, namely the initiation of actions. However, under the condition that behav-
ior has been instigated, our research demonstrates that measures of effort mobilization 
may complement and possibly also explain performance measures. There are instances 
when dysphoric individuals are willing to mobilize much effort and others when they 
withhold effort, which might also have an impact on performance. Moreover, this sheds 
light on a pattern of task engagement that may be maladaptive: High engagement at a 
point that does not call for much effort but disengagement at a point where it would not 
be necessary to withhold effort. On the other hand, this implies that reduced daily 
demands (i.e., easy tasks but also do-your-best tasks) can lead to high task engage-
ment—an experience from which dysphoric individuals ultimately may benefit in terms of 
experienced efficacy.  
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1. Summary of the Results 
In this part, we first summarize the results, which have been described in more 
detail in the preceding experimental part, with reference to the six hypotheses formu-
lated before. Afterwards, we discuss these results and integrate them with respect to the 
main research question concerning motivational issues in depression and dysphoria. We 
conclude with an outlook on clinical and health-related implications of our results. In the 
last section, we delineate limitations of the present and suggestions for future research. 
1.1 Mood 
Our research question was chiefly grounded on the assumption that the dysphoric 
students would be in a more negative mood than the nondysphoric students. All four 
studies clearly confirmed this first hypothesis—on the global mood score as well as on 
the separately analyzed positive and negative scales of the UWIST mood adjective 
checklist (Matthews et al., 1990). It should be noted that several weeks passed between 
the trait measure of depressive experiences by means of the CES-D and the assessment 
of momentary mood state at the beginning of the respective experiment. This corrobo-
rates the persisting nature of depressed mood. In Study 2, we assessed mood after the 
cognitive task. This confirmed that cardiovascular effects were not influenced by prior 
measurement that might elicit heightened salience of momentary mood.  
1.2 Demand Appraisals 
According to the logic of the MBM (Gendolla, 2000), mood has an informational 
impact on task-related appraisals of difficulty, demand, ability, and so forth. Such 
demand appraisals during task performance are considered to mediate mood effects on 
effort mobilization—that is, on cardiovascular response. Studies 1 and 2 did not assess 
these variables. In Studies 3 and 4, task demand appraisals were measured after task 
instructions but prior to task performance by means of self-reports that were merged to 
a perceived task demand index. In those studies, we reasoned that both available 
sources of information (i.e., mood state and task difficulty) would have a joint effect on 
perceived task demand. As pointed out in Hypothesis 5, we expected task demand to be 
the highest in the difficult-dysphoric group and the lowest in the easy-nondysphoric 
group with the two other groups in between. Study 3 did not reveal any differences in 
demand appraisals between the four experimental groups. Study 4, in contrast, showed a 
significant main effect of dysphoria, confirming that dysphoric individuals perceived the 
task as more difficult and themselves as less capable. Even though the task difficulty 
main effect was not reliable, cell means were in the expected order. However, mediation 
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analyses did not corroborate statistical mediation of dysphoria effects on SBP reactivity 
via perceived task demand.  
As discussed in chapter 3.8 of the experimental part, differences in the possibility 
to exercise oneself in the task before making the judgments are most probably respon-
sible for the null effect in Study 3. Especially with respect to the nonsignificant mediation 
analyses, we have to point at the fact that the number of participants in each cell was 
rather small and adapted to reveal the more prominent effects on cardiovascular reactiv-
ity. This means that our studies presumably lacked sufficient statistical power to detect 
the more subtle effects on self-report measures. In addition, it has to be underlined that 
self-report questions are subject to certain problems including the tendency to answer 
them in a social desirable and self-defensive manner (e.g., Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 
1983; Rhodewalt & Fairfield, 1991). In summary, the present series of studies can pro-
vide only preliminary evidence for the influence of dysphoria on ability perception.  
1.3 Cardiovascular Baseline Measures 
As outlined in the theoretical part (chapter 3.1), there are few conclusive results 
with respect to differences in cardiovascular baseline activity in depression or dysphoria 
compared to nondepressed or nondysphoric individuals. Most of the studies and theoriz-
ing focuses on cardiovascular reactivity to various challenges (see e.g., Carroll et al., 
2007; Kibler & Ma, 2004). However, Light et al. (1998) report evidence for dysphoric 
individuals’ enhanced cardiovascular activity under resting conditions.  
In contrast to this latter study, but in accordance with Hypothesis 2, dysphoric 
participants in our four studies did not have higher SBP or DBP baseline values than 
nondysphoric participants. Study 4 found that nondysphoric participants had higher HR 
baseline values than dysphoric participants. But as this result only emerged in one of four 
studies, it should not be over-interpreted or generalized. Study 4—the only one that 
included enough men to analyze gender differences—revealed higher SBP baseline values 
for men than for women as well as an interaction effect of gender and task difficulty for 
DBP baseline values. Gender differences in cardiovascular measures are, however, a 
common finding (Carroll et al., 2007; Wolf et al., 1997).  
Taken together, the present four studies indicate that there are no differences in 
cardiovascular baseline activity between dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals—at least 
in subclinical and relatively young samples like ours. This finding is important in light of 
the differences in cardiovascular response to various behavioral challenges that we dis-
cuss in the following.  
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1.4 Systolic Blood Pressure Reactivity 
SBP response to the cognitive tasks corroborated our predictions in all four stud-
ies. Specifically, confirming Hypothesis 3, Studies 1 and 2 revealed stronger SBP reactiv-
ity of dysphoric participants compared to nondysphoric participants. In those studies, no 
performance standards were given and participants were asked to do their best, that is, 
to memorize as many letter strings as possible or to work as precisely and quickly as 
possible on the d2 task. It has to be acknowledged, however, that in Study 1 this effect 
emerged only on the first of three reactivity measures. We interpreted this in terms of 
self-regulation difficulties in dysphoria. Presumably, dysphoric participants failed to 
maintain effort mobilization over the 5-min performance period and disengaged. This 
interpretation seems reasonable given the differences in task characteristics between the 
d2 task that continuously re-attracts attention to each new stimulus and the more static 
memory task with a long list of letter strings that does not change over the 5-min per-
formance period.  
In Studies 3 and 4, participants were confronted with an easy or a moderately dif-
ficult performance standard. Confirming Hypothesis 4, these studies revealed the 
expected crossover interaction pattern. This means that dysphoric participants had 
stronger SBP reactivity than nondysphoric participants under easy task conditions but 
lower SBP reactivity under difficult task conditions. Single comparisons revealed reliable 
differences between the cells, except for the difficult condition in Study 3 and a marginal 
effect in the easy condition in Study 4. We suspected that the difficult task condition of 
Study 3 had not been difficult enough for dysphoric participants to completely withhold 
effort as intended. Therefore, we provided a more difficult standard in Study 4—even 
though it was about a different type of task. An interesting result of these two studies is 
that the crossover interaction pattern is mainly caused by the nondysphoric participants 
who had significantly higher SBP reactivity in the difficult than in the easy task condi-
tions. However, in both studies, SBP reactivity of dysphoric participants did not differ 
between the easy and the difficult task conditions. We discuss this finding in more detail 
in the following (see chapter 2.3).  
The fact that SBP reactivity very well reflected our hypotheses about effort mobili-
zation is not surprising. As outlined in the theoretical part, SBP reactivity mainly depends 
on myocardial contractility and TPR. TPR is not systematically linked to the activation of 
the SNS but myocardial contractility is determined by sympathetic discharge to the heart. 
Therefore, SBP reactivity represents an indicator of beta-adrenergically mediated SNS 
activity (see Brownley et al., 2000; Levick, 2003; Papillo & Shapiro, 1990). Sympathetic 
discharge to the heart, in turn, is considered to correspond to experienced task demand 
in active coping (Obrist, 1981). Therefore, we regard SBP reactivity as an indicator of 
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effort mobilization and thus as an indicator of the intensity of motivation at a given point 
in time (see Brehm & Self, 1989; R. A. Wright, 1996).  
1.5 Diastolic Blood Pressure and Heart Rate Reactivity 
The pattern of DBP and HR reactivity did not consistently correspond to the pat-
tern of SBP reactivity and thus adds to the mixed evidence of those cardiovascular meas-
ures with respect to effort mobilization (see chapters 3.4 and 3.5 in the theoretical part). 
HR is influenced by both the sympathetic and the parasympathetic branches of the auto-
nomic nervous system and can reflect SNS activation only to the extent that this influ-
ence is not masked by the inhibitory effect of the PNS. Studies 1 and 3 did not show any 
HR differences. In contrast, Study 2 revealed stronger HR reactivity for dysphoric partici-
pants; and Study 4 revealed stronger HR reactivity in the difficult task condition inde-
pendent of dysphoria. HR reactivity in Study 2 mirrored SBP reactivity so that it seems 
plausible to conclude that HR reactivity reflected effort mobilization in that study. In 
Study 4, the higher HR reactivity in the difficult condition mirrored to some extent the 
nonsignificant trend toward higher SBP reactivity in the difficult condition. Even though 
HR failed to show an interaction effect and thus did not perfectly mirror SBP reactivity, 
we interpret the HR pattern in terms of effort mobilization: Participants in the difficult 
condition mobilized more effort than in the easy condition, qualified by the influence of 
dysphoria.  
DBP mainly depends on the resistance in the vasculature, that is, TPR. Because 
SNS activation leads to vasoconstriction in some and vasodilation in other blood vessels, 
TPR—and thus DBP—are only unsystematically influenced by sympathetic activation. In 
accordance with that, only Study 2 revealed a nonsignificant trend toward higher DBP 
reactivity of dysphoric participants. As this trend mirrors SBP reactivity, it represents one 
of the rather rare cases when DBP reactivity may be interpreted in terms of effort mobili-
zation. On the other hand, given the null effects on DBP reactivity in the other three 
studies, this trend should not be over-interpreted.  
1.6 Performance 
In our four studies, we applied two different kinds of cognitive tasks in order to 
generalize the findings of cardiovascular reactivity across domains. Specifically, Studies 1 
and 4 employed a memory task consisting of memorizing a list of senseless letter strings. 
Studies 2 and 3, in contrast, employed a modified version of the d2 task by Brickenkamp 
(1981) that calls for attention and concentration on the presentation of different stimuli. 
Therefore, as discussed above, both tasks differed with respect to required self-regula-
tion abilities and the possibility to exercise oneself in the task before performing. How-
ever, both tasks had been selected with the aim to present simple tasks that are not 
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physically demanding. This allows attributing effort mobilization to mental and not to 
physical demand.  
With respect to previous studies about mood influences on cardiovascular reactiv-
ity within the same paradigm (Gendolla et al., 2001; Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002a, 2002b, 
2002c), one could expect a positive relation between task performance and effort 
mobilization. On the other hand, in light of the vast body of research showing cognitive 
deficits in depression and dysphoria (see chapter 2.2.2 in the theoretical part), one could 
expect better performance of nondysphoric participants. Consequently, we had not for-
mulated a priori hypotheses about performance results in our studies.  
Results uncovered an effect of dysphoria on task performance only in Study 1. 
Here, in accordance with memory deficits in depression, dysphoric participants performed 
worse than nondysphorics. Because our memory task mainly asked for controlled proc-
esses in the memorization and free recall of senseless letter strings, this result fits well in 
the evidence that especially controlled processes are impaired in depression and dyspho-
ria, whereas automatic processes are often unaffected (Hartlage et al., 1993; Hertel, 
1998; Jermann et al., 2005). In contrast, Study 2 did not find performance differences; 
and Studies 3 and 4 only revealed difficulty main effects inasmuch as participants in the 
easy task conditions performed better than participants in the difficult task conditions. 
When interpreting these effects, it has to be considered that the tasks had not been 
selected for being particularly sensitive to dysphoria effects on cognitive performance.  
In general, correlations between performance indices and SBP reactivity did not 
indicate substantial associations. Nevertheless, correlation coefficients in Study 1 indi-
cated a trend toward a negative association between performance and effort, as one 
would expect from the SBP and performance results (i.e., higher SBP reactivity but worse 
performance in dysphoria) reported above. In contrast, correlation coefficients in Study 4 
showed a trend toward a positive association between performance and effort in the diffi-
cult condition. This fits in the finding that in the difficult condition nondysphoric partici-
pants mobilized more effort than dysphoric participants. Therefore, both studies using 
memory tasks indicate worse performance of dysphoric participants—despite high effort 
mobilization in Study 1. This worse performance of dysphoric participants corresponds to 
the general evidence for memory deficits in depression and dysphoria, especially for 
controlled processes (e.g., Burt et al., 1995; Hartlage et al., 1993; Jermann et al., 
2005). However, it is of note that the correlations were not substantial and that the other 
two studies using the concentration task did not find associations between effort and 
performance.  
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2. Discussion 
The main conclusion that we draw form the results summarized on the preceding 
pages is a confirmation of our central hypothesis: Dysphoria is not necessarily associated 
with a motivational deficit. Rather, it depends on task characteristics whether dysphoria 
leads to decreased or increased effort mobilization. This conclusion is chiefly based on R. 
A. Wright’s (1996) integration linking sympathetically mediated cardiovascular activity to 
motivational intensity. In the following sections, we critically discuss our main conclusion 
and the other findings summarized above and integrate them in a broader framework of 
related research. Specifically, we discuss to what extent naturally occurring dysphoria 
can be compared to experimentally induced mood and which mechanisms may be 
responsible for mood and dysphoria effects on cardiovascular reactivity. Furthermore, we 
examine more closely dysphoric participants’ pattern of cardiovascular reactivity. We dis-
cuss the possible impact of dysphoria on maximally justified effort and, finally, the rela-
tion of effort mobilization to performance outcomes.  
2.1 Experimentally Induced Mood, Naturally Occurring 
Dysphoria, and Clinical Depression 
The present research program builds on the assumption that depression and dys-
phoria are, amongst other symptoms, characterized by a persistent negative mood 
(DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Mineka et al., 1998; Scott & Ingram, 
1998) and on previous research about the influence of manipulated transient mood 
states on cardiovascular reactivity (e.g., Gendolla & Krüsken, 2001a, 2002c). Our studies 
have provided convincing evidence for the stability of negative mood in our dysphoric 
samples. Moreover, the present results about cardiovascular reactivity parallel the results 
by Gendolla and Krüsken. This makes us confident that the effects of naturally occurring 
dysphoria on effort mobilization are comparable to the effects of transient mood states 
on effort mobilization.  
In their discussion about the magnitude of the influence of natural versus 
manipulated mood, Scott and Ingram (1998) emphasize that manipulated mood states 
tend to be stronger and therefore to have a stronger influence on dependent measures. 
They argue: “When affect-induction studies produce findings that parallel the cognitive 
features of depression, this type of evidence strengthens the case for the role of affective 
states in producing cognitive features in depression” (p. 203). We think that their rea-
soning can be extended with respect to physiological processes and measures. From this 
perspective, the present findings concerning the effects of (supposedly weaker) naturally 
occurring mood strengthen the assumption advanced in the theoretical part, namely that 
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the persistent negative mood of dysphoric or depressed individuals plays an important 
role in the cardiovascular and motivational features of depression.  
Nevertheless, the debate about the generalizability of findings from subclinical to 
clinical samples and about analogue versus clinical depression should not be neglected at 
this point. As discussed in the theoretical part, researchers do not agree whether sub-
clinical depression should be regarded as analogue to clinical depression (see chapter 
2.1.3). Moreover—provided that one adopts the dimensional perspective—there is a dis-
crepancy between scientific practice that often compares extreme groups and methodo-
logical considerations in favor of investigating the whole spectrum of depression scores. 
Our approach using extreme groups of nondysphoric and analogue dysphoric students 
bears the risk of underestimating and overestimating the effects at the same time: On 
the one hand, as some reviews about cognitive deficits in depression conclude, dysphoric 
individuals’ results often lay in between the control group and the clinical depression 
group (Mineka & Gilboa, 1998). Transferred to the psychophysiological domain, this sug-
gests that our cardiovascular findings may be even more pronounced in a group of clini-
cally depressed patients. On the other hand, the extreme group approach admittedly 
enhances the probability of finding differences that do not come out so clearly when 
investigating the whole spectrum of depression scores (MacCallum et al., 2002). There-
fore, at this point, we have to underline that the parallelism of our results to those 
obtained by Gendolla and Krüsken is encouraging but that the generalizability ultimately 
has to be proven in clinical samples.  
2.2 Mediation of Dysphoria Effects on Cardiovascular 
Reactivity 
In this place, it is also important to discuss possible mechanisms that are respon-
sible for dysphoria effects on effort mobilization. According to the MBM logic (Gendolla, 
2000), moods, together with other factors as for instance performance standards, func-
tion as diagnostic information for task-related demand appraisals during performance. 
This perceived task demand, in turn, is considered to influence effort mobilization, that 
is, cardiovascular response. Consistent with this notion, studies by Gendolla and Krüsken 
have demonstrated subjective task demand to vary in dependence on the induced mood 
state (Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002b) and to statistically mediate the relation of mood and 
SBP reactivity (Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002c).  
Studies 1 and 2 of our research program did not assess task-related demand 
appraisals and cannot give an answer to this question. Studies 3 and 4 addressed this 
issue by assessing perceived task demand immediately prior to task performance by 
means of self-reports. We regard this as the best approximation for demand appraisals 
during performance that cannot be assessed without interrupting the ongoing task. Only 
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Study 4 revealed demand appraisals to differ in dependence on dysphoria. Additionally 
conducted mediation analyses, however, did not find evidence for the proposed indirect 
effect of mood and demand appraisals. As discussed in more detail in chapter 3.8 of the 
empirical part, we think that a lack in statistical power necessary for this type of analyses 
is responsible for the null effects.  
A methodological consideration that has not been discussed so far pertains to the 
advantages of the experimental approach in contrast to the mediational approach. A 
recent article by Spencer, Zanna, and Fong (2005) argues for the stepwise exploration of 
a hypothesized causal chain by means of several experiments—each investigating one 
specific link. According to the authors, this approach should be preferred in cases when 
the mediating variable can be manipulated easily. With respect to our research program, 
one of the hypothesized mediating variables—mood—has been manipulated and proven 
its influence on effort mobilization in previous research (see Gendolla & Brinkmann, 
2005; Richter et al., 2006, as well as chapter 4 of the theoretical part for reviews). The 
other hypothesized mediating variable—demand appraisals—has been manipulated indi-
rectly in previous research by manipulating objective task difficulty and/or subjective 
ability perception (see e.g., R. A. Wright, 1998; R. A. Wright & Franklin, 2004, for 
reviews). This means that the mood-demand appraisals link and the demand appraisals-
cardiovascular reactivity link have already been corroborated. As discussed in the 
experimental part, the present research adds to this evidence the link of dysphoria to 
negative mood and higher subjective task demand. Consequently, even if statistical 
mediation did not corroborate our hypothesis, we are confident that the hypothesized 
causal chain with mood and task demand as mediating variables withstands in light of 
previous evidence of studies within the same experimental paradigm as the present 
research.  
2.3 Modulation of Effort Mobilization in Dysphoria 
An interesting finding from Studies 3 and 4 that has not been discussed so far is 
the fact that the crossover interaction of dysphoria and task difficulty was mainly due to 
differential effort mobilization in the nondysphoric group: Nondysphoric participants con-
sistently mobilized more effort in the difficult than in the easy conditions. In contrast, 
dysphoric participants’ SBP reactivity did not differ between the easy and the difficult 
conditions and was different from zero in the difficult condition. At least two explanations 
seem plausible.  
On the one hand, in both studies, participants in the difficult conditions had higher 
SBP reactivity than participants in the easy conditions, even if the difficulty main effect 
was not significant. This suggests that the difficult conditions caused participants to 
mobilize slightly more effort. But the significant interactions and especially the significant 
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single comparison in Study 4 confirm the lower SBP reactivity of dysphoric students in 
the difficult conditions. This shows that dysphoric participants indeed disengaged to some 
degree—even though not completely. 
On the other hand, one could argue that nondysphoric participants effectively 
regulated (i.e., adapted) their effort level to the demand of the respective task condition: 
less effort in the easy and more effort in the difficult condition. Dysphoric participants, in 
contrast, did not show this modulation of effort intensity in dependence on task demand. 
One could reason that this represents a case of impaired self-regulation insofar as dys-
phoric individuals seem not to adapt their effort mobilization but to mobilize a certain 
level of resources independent of the task at hand. Even if this interpretation is not in 
accordance with our general reasoning and the assumption about the comparability of 
dispositional and transient mood states, it offers an interesting perspective for under-
standing motivational issues in depression. One might argue that depression is charac-
terized by a motivational deficit in terms of a deficient motivation and/or ability to regu-
late task engagement and energy resources appropriately.  
In order to test both interpretations against each other, future research should 
manipulate objective task difficulty at more than two levels, including extremely difficult, 
almost impossible levels. Our assumption about the parallelism of dispositional and tran-
sient mood states is strengthened, if dysphoric and nondysphoric participants clearly dis-
engage from an extremely difficult task (see studies that included an extremely difficult 
condition, e.g., Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002c; R. A. Wright et al., 1997; R. A. Wright et al., 
1994). However, if dysphoric individuals’ resource mobilization level does not differ 
across a vide range of difficulty levels and does not correspond to nondysphorics’ disen-
gagement from an extremely difficult task, the alternative interpretation about dys-
phorics’ inability to appropriately regulate and modulate effort mobilization should be 
advanced.  
2.4 Depression and Perfectionism: The Role of Potential 
Motivation 
Another issue not discussed so far is the relation of depression and dysphoria to 
the level of potential motivation, that is, the level of maximally justified effort. As 
reported in the theoretical part, several authors, in accordance with clinical observations, 
suggest that depressed individuals are perfectionistic and set too high performance stan-
dards that exceed their level of perceived self-efficacy (Cervone et al., 1994; Flett et al., 
1998; Scott & Cervone, 2002; Tillema et al., 2001). This means that, theoretically, 
depression and dysphoria might interfere with potential motivation insofar as the level of 
maximally justified effort might be elevated in depression. In the present studies, we did 
not manipulate the classical factors that determine potential motivation, that is, our par-
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ticipants’ needs or the incentive and instrumentality of successful task performance. We 
thus assumed that the level of maximally justified effort was identical in all conditions. 
However, an alternative explanation for the results of Studies 1 and 2 might be that dys-
phoria led to the striving for a higher performance standard in the do-your-best tasks 
and therefore to higher effort mobilization compared to the nondysphoric participants. As 
we did not include any measure of standard setting (e.g., a self-report check), we cannot 
rule out this interpretation. 
However, there are several aspects that argue against an influence of dysphoria 
on standard setting in our studies. First of all, it has to be pointed out that the studies by 
Scott and Cervone (2002) and Tillema et al. (2001) are not exactly comparable to our 
research insofar as their studies assessed participants’ self-reported standards. It is 
questionable whether such verbalized standards are equivalent to the more implicit per-
formance standards that actually influence effort mobilization. In addition, the studies by 
Scott and Cervone and Tillema et al. mainly involved standards in the academic domain. 
This is a domain where high ego-involvement—justifying high effort (see Gendolla & 
Richter, 2005a, 2006)—can be expected. However, this is not necessarily the case in our 
cognitive tasks that were presented without direct relation to participants’ academic 
career.  
Moreover, Carver and colleagues (Carver, 1998; Carver & Ganellen, 1983) neither 
found evidence for the assumption that depression is associated with high standards nor 
that high standards are a predictor for depression. Furthermore, previous studies about 
mood influences on effort mobilization did not show effects of mood states on reported 
importance of success (Gendolla & Krüsken, 2001a, 2002c). Given the parallelism of our 
dysphoria studies with the mood studies, we are confident that there were no influences 
on success importance in our studies.  
Finally, we have addressed this question separately in another study in our labo-
ratory (Brinkmann, Gendolla, & Grotta, 2007). In this computerized experiment, univer-
sity students worked on several short cognitive tasks similar to the tasks used in the pre-
sent research: a memory task, a concentration task, a mental rotation task, and a crea-
tivity task. After instructions but before beginning the respective task, participants could 
choose among ten increasing, but not further specified, difficulty levels. Dysphoria was 
assessed by means of the CES-D and the BDI-II several weeks before as well as directly 
after the experimental session. Results revealed no association of the depression scores 
and the chosen difficulty levels. In summary, several aspects argue against dysphoria 
effects on the level of maximally justified effort in the present studies, even though the 
possibility cannot completely be ruled out. 
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2.5 Performance and its Relation to Effort Mobilization 
In the theoretical part, performance impairments in depression and dysphoria 
have been presented. Taken together, the present studies did not invariably find evi-
dence for cognitive deficits in our dysphoric samples. Rather, the effect of objective task 
difficulty dominated performance outcomes. In this section, we focus on the relation of 
performance and effort mobilization in general and under conditions of dysphoria and 
depression in particular.  
First of all, as we have underlined in the respective discussion sections in the 
empirical part (chapters 2.6 and 3.8), performance and effort mobilization cannot be 
equated. Nevertheless, performance measures have been used and are still used to infer 
a person’s motivation in the respective task (e.g., Atkinson, 1957; Kukla, 1972). How-
ever, there is ample evidence that characteristics of the person and of the task influence 
the association between performance and effort. It is obvious that performance repre-
sents the outcome of energy mobilization and that not only effort but also personal abili-
ties and strategy use contribute to this outcome (Heckhausen, 1991; Locke & Latham, 
1990). Likewise, Eysenck et al. (2007) emphasize the distinction between the effective-
ness of behavior that is reflected by performance outcome and the efficiency of behavior 
that is reflected by the relation of outcome to invested effort. As outlined by Hockey 
(1997), effort mobilization can be used in a way to compensate for lower task-related 
abilities or for high stress and workload with the goal of protecting performance (see also 
Kukla, 1974).  
This notion of compensatory effort mobilization is intriguing, particularly with 
regard to depression and dysphoria. Under the condition that depressed individuals have 
cognitive deficits, it seems plausible to assume that effort mobilization aims at compen-
sating for these impairments by means of increased task engagement. In this sense, the 
effect of dysphoria on SBP reactivity in the present studies might have been caused by 
ability differences with respect to the memory and concentration tasks.  
However, there are several arguments suggesting that effort mobilization in our 
studies did not aim at compensating for cognitive deficits. First of all, compensatory 
effort mobilization implies that depressed individuals do not have a motivational deficit 
concerning specific tasks with specific characteristics. It implies rather that they are gen-
erally more motivated in terms of task engagement than nondepressed control partici-
pants and thus that we would find a dysphoria main effect. This assumption is corrobo-
rated neither by clinical observation nor by our data that show lower SBP reactivity of 
dysphoric participants in the difficult task conditions. Moreover, as we have argued 
above, it is unlikely that our dysphoric university students had strong cognitive impair-
ments that they had to compensate for.  
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Nevertheless, we do not exclude that resource mobilization leads to better per-
formance. On the contrary, it is very likely that, to some extent, higher resource invest-
ment contributes to better performance. Yet we think that effort mobilization in our 
studies did not primarily aim at compensating for cognitive deficits but was influenced by 
participants’ momentary mood and their task-related demand appraisals as discussed 
above.  
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3. Outlook 
This last chapter concludes the present thesis with several considerations that 
place our research in a broader context and delineate connections to clinical psycho-
pathology and other health-related issues. Finally, in the last section, we state some 
methodological and theoretical limitations of the present research program and provide 
suggestions for future research.  
3.1 Effort Mobilization in Clinically Depressed and Other 
Patients 
We have already delineated the potential generalizability of our results to clinical 
depression. Research on characteristics of depressed mood, dysphoria, and clinical 
depression suggests that results can indeed be transferred from subclinical to clinical 
samples and vice versa in many cases (e.g., cognitive biases, motivational systems). 
However, it is also possible that motivational features in a clinical population differ from 
motivation in subclinical individuals. Clinically depressed patients are most probably 
characterized not only by negative affect and distress but also by somatic and vegetative 
symptoms. Changes in appetite or sleep habits may have an additional impact on moti-
vation. One clinical observation is of particular importance with respect to motivation: the 
loss of interest or pleasure in almost all activities appreciated before (DSM-IV; American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994). As our research is not concerned with the initiation aspect 
of motivation, our findings do not tell us about how to overcome this deficit.  
However, our results tell us about effort mobilization once an action has been 
instigated. According to our findings, easy tasks and tasks without predefined per-
formance standards cause dysphoric individuals to mobilize more energy. This may ulti-
mately lead to the experience of success because effort mobilization is one of the factors 
that may positively influence performance outcomes. As mentioned by Austin et al. 
(2001), situations that are highly structured tend to mask motivational deficits. One can 
therefore imagine confronting depressed patients with clearly structured tasks with easy 
or unfixed difficulty. Such tasks should cause them to mobilize energy and by this means 
strengthen their self-esteem and self-confidence.  
The potential generalizability of our findings is, however, not limited to depres-
sion. As mentioned repeatedly, there is a high degree of comorbidity of depression and 
other psychopathologies, especially anxiety disorders (Kessler et al., 2003). Moreover, 
there are approaches as for instance the tripartite model (Clark & Watson, 1991; Mineka 
et al., 1998) that regard negative affectivity as a general characteristic of almost all 
psychopathologies. Likewise, Hokanson, Rubert, Welker, Hollander, and Hedeen (1989) 
report correlational results demonstrating that various psychosocial characteristics are 
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similar in depression and other psychopathologies involving negative affective states. As 
our theoretical reasoning is mainly based on the influence of negative mood on effort 
mobilization, one can imagine that similar results emerge for other negative affective 
states, for example when comparing groups with low versus high anxiety. Of course, 
compared to depression, other psychopathologies are not to the same extent character-
ized by a motivational deficit in terms of action initiation and loss of interest or pleasure. 
However, the basic mechanism proposed by the MBM (Gendolla, 2000), namely that 
mood-congruent evaluations of task demand influence resource mobilization, should 
apply to other clinical groups as well. Under the assumption that most clinical and sub-
clinical psychiatric individuals are in a more or less stable negative mood, these people 
should evaluate daily demands as more demanding and therefore show higher cardio-
vascular reactivity for certain types of tasks but lower reactivity for others, depending on 
task characteristics and difficulty.  
3.2 Negative Affectivity and Physical Health 
In a related domain, Suls and Bunde (2005) support the assumption that depres-
sion effects are comparable to the effects of other psychopathologies characterized by 
negative affectivity. As outlined in chapter 3.1 of the theoretical part, a large body of 
recent studies suggests that subclinical and clinical depression is associated with greater 
risk for the development and worsening of cardiovascular diseases (e.g., Frasure-Smith & 
Lespérance, 2005a; Rugulies, 2002; Wulsin & Singal, 2003). Suls and Bunde qualify 
these results by showing that negative affectivity as a component of various psycho-
pathological states underlies the relationship of depression and coronary heart disease.  
However, regardless of whether one refers to depression or to negative affectivity 
in general, it is obvious that the causal chain supposed to be responsible for its associa-
tion with cardiovascular diseases should be closely examined. The findings of the present 
research offer one piece of information for this causal chain.21 Several authors emphasize 
that a heightened cardiovascular response to daily demands and stressors can cause 
essential hypertension, which in turn is regarded as a mediator and precursor of the 
development of cardiovascular diseases (Blascovich & Katkin, 1993; see also Gendolla & 
Richter, 2005b; Light, 1987; Light et al., 1992). Some studies have indeed demonstrated 
(slightly) enhanced cardiovascular reactivity of depressed individuals (Kibler & Ma, 2004; 
Light et al., 1998). Our research corroborates this for easy tasks and for tasks without 
performance standards but goes beyond simply comparing depressed and nondepressed 
groups. As demonstrated by our results, but also by the studies by Gendolla and col-
                                                   
21 We are, of course, aware of other biological third variables that have been proposed to partly 
account for the relation of depression and cardiovascular diseases (Frasure-Smith & Lespérance, 
2005a). 
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laborators and R. A. Wright and collaborators (see Gendolla & Brinkmann, 2005; Richter 
et al., 2006; R. A. Wright & Kirby, 2001, for reviews), cardiovascular reactivity depends 
on the characteristics of the various tasks and on the context within which these tasks 
are presented. According to the present results, one can expect a connection of depres-
sion (and negative affectivity in general) to hypertension and cardiovascular disease in 
dependence on the types of daily demands that those people generally face and on the 
extent of task engagement that they habitually show.  
The notion that negative affect (as a transient state as well as an affective dispo-
sition) has detrimental effects on people’s health applies not only to cardiovascular prob-
lems but to a broad range of physical and mental health problems. As summarized for 
instance by Salovey et al. (2000), negative mood is associated with a weaker immune 
system and a higher vulnerability for various diseases. Moreover, negative mood 
(together with high self-focus) leads to increased symptom perception and decreased 
well-being (see also Gendolla, Abele, Andrei, Spurk, & Richter, 2005). In contrast, posi-
tive mood is associated with more coping resources, more information seeking and plan-
ning with regard to health behavior, decreased symptom perception, and lower vulner-
ability for diseases. Finally, the reciprocal influence of positive mood and social support 
represents a buffer against health problems (Salovey et al., 2000). Taken together, their 
affective disposition makes depressed individuals more vulnerable for health-related 
problems. This applies not only to the domain of cardiovascular problems but to a broad 
range of physical and mental diseases. It is not difficult to imagine the resulting vicious 
cycle, in which the negative effects of negative affect foster depression and depressed 
mood—and vice versa.  
3.3 Limitations of the Present Studies and Suggestions for 
Future Research 
Finally, we delineate some important limitations of the present research and at 
the same time provide suggestions for future research. The first point pertains to the 
broad question of sample selection. As already mentioned, authors that adopt the conti-
nuity perspective of psychopathological phenomena in general and depression in par-
ticular—as we do as well—recommend using the whole range of depression scores in 
order to meet the implications of psychopathology as a continuum (MacCallum et al., 
2002; A. M. Ruscio & Ruscio, 2002). Research within the framework of motivational 
intensity theory (Brehm & Self, 1989) raises some problems with respect to such a 
correlational approach—especially when the nonlinear relationship for disengagement is 
to be investigated. For this reason, we decided to compare different groups of partici-
pants. Nevertheless, future studies might consider assessing the whole range of depres-
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sion scores. In this case, nonlinear tests are required in order to test at which point of 
the depression continuum disengagement from a difficult task occurs.  
Another recommendation for data collection pertains to the use of additional 
measures, as for instance a structured clinical interview, to assure that participants clas-
sified as dysphoric or depressed meet the respective criteria and to screen out other 
psychopathologies, if desired. This suggestion mainly concerns the comorbidity of 
depression and anxiety (Kessler et al., 2003; Mineka et al., 1998). As discussed in the 
preceding sections, it is interesting to investigate whether the results of the present 
research are restricted to depression and dysphoria or whether they also apply to other 
states of negative affectivity like for instance anxiety. 
A second point for improvement concerns further implications of motivational 
intensity theory and the MBM (Gendolla, 2000). In particular, it is interesting to extend 
the difficulty spectrum to a broader range of performance standards including extremely 
difficult tasks. This would allow testing conclusively the hypothesized saw tooth curve 
depicted in Figure 3 (chapter 4.4.2 of the theoretical part) and seeing how depressed and 
dysphoric individuals regulate their task engagement, even at impossible levels of task 
difficulty (see discussion in chapter 2.3 of this part). Moreover, from the discussion in 
chapter 2.4 it turned out that future research should not only hold constant but also 
measure the importance of success, that is, the level of potential motivation. This would 
allow controlling for confounding influences.  
Furthermore, as already discussed as well, assessment of experienced task 
demand and confirmation of the mediating role of those judgments is a crucial point for 
the integration of the MBM and motivational intensity theory. This means that sensitive 
operationalizations for the assessment of subjective task demand before—and ideally 
during—performance have to be found. It could be that more subtle, implicit measures 
are more appropriate than explicit self-report questions. Moreover, direct manipulation of 
demand appraisals is desirable (see the proposition of Spencer et al., 2005, to directly 
manipulate the potential mediating variable). Possible lines for operationalizing this sug-
gestion pertain to (mood) discounting, priming procedures, and bogus information about 
actual task difficulty.  
A final note relates to the cardiovascular measures used in the present studies. 
From the description of the cardiovascular system and possible indicators of sympathetic 
and parasympathetic activation in chapter 3 of the theoretical part it turned out that SBP 
is a good and reliable but not the most direct indicator of beta-adrenergic sympathetic 
discharge to the heart. Therefore, depending on available facilities, it is desirable to 
include impedance cardiography in order to measure PEP, which is a more direct index of 
myocardial contractility and of beta-adrenergic sympathetic activation. A disadvantage of 
impedance cardiography and related measures is, however, the more obtrusive place-
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ment of electrodes that might more strongly influence the experimental situation than 
the more common blood pressure cuff.  
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L’introduction 
La dépression est un trouble fréquent qui peut avoir des effets importants sur la 
qualité de vie. Selon des données récentes aux Etats-Unis comme en Europe, les taux de 
prévalence sur la vie s’élèvent à environ 16% et 14% pour un épisode de dépression 
majeure (ESEMeD/MHEDEA 2000 Investigators, 2004; Kessler, 2002; Kessler et al., 
2003). D’après l’organisation mondiale de la santé (2001), la dépression est considérée 
comme la cause la plus importante concernant les « years of life lived with disability ». A 
cause de ce grand impact de la dépression sur la vie et la société, de plus en plus 
d’efforts sont entrepris afin d’investiguer et de comprendre l’étiologie de la dépression, sa 
phénoménologie, sa course ainsi que les effets de différents traitements.  
Parmi les déficits fréquemment associés à la dépression, comme par exemple des 
particularités cognitives ou émotionnelles, un déficit évident des personnes dépressives 
concerne leur manque de motivation. Ceci a été mis en évidence par la recherche 
concernant l’approche et l’évitement comportemental, l’initiation des actions ainsi que la 
sensibilité aux récompenses (Fowles, 1994; Heckhausen, 1991; Henriques & Davidson, 
2000; Hertel, 2000). Cependant, sur la base d’un des symptômes les plus importants de 
la dépression, c'est-à-dire l’affect négatif, et sur la base de la recherche concernant 
l’influence de l’humeur sur l’intensité de la motivation (Brehm & Self, 1989; Gendolla, 
2000), l’hypothèse selon laquelle la dépression ne soit pas nécessairement associée à des 
déficits motivationnels est indéniable. Notre recherche vise donc à investiguer les effets 
de la dysphorie sur une des dimensions de la motivation, c’est-à-dire sur l’intensité de la 
motivation. Pour cela, nous nous basons principalement sur deux théories : la théorie de 
l’intensité de la motivation (Brehm & Self, 1989) et le « mood-behavior-model » (MBM; 
Gendolla, 2000). De plus, nous nous basons sur les travaux de R. A. Wright (1996) qui a 
élaboré la théorie de l’intensité de la motivation et introduit l’opérationnalisation de la 
mobilisation de l’effort par la réponse cardiovasculaire d’une personne. Suivant les diffé-
rentes caractéristiques d’une tâche mentale, nous nous attendons à trouver une réacti-
vité cardiovasculaire—indiquant une mobilisation de l’effort plus importante—chez des 
personnes dysphoriques lorsqu’il n’y a pas de standard de performance prédéfini ainsi 
que si un standard facile est exigé.  
 
La dépression et la motivation 
La première partie théorique se réfère aux sujets de la classification et de la phé-
noménologie de la dépression ainsi qu’aux particularités motivationnelles et cognitives 
des personnes dépressives. Pour commencer, il est important de noter que l’intensité de 
la motivation n’est qu’une dimension du concept de la motivation qui englobe en plus les 
dimensions de l’initiation, de la direction et de la persistance d’un comportement (Geen, 
1995; Vallerand & Thill, 1993). La classification de la dépression fait généralement réfé-
French Summary 
 
129
rence à celle du « Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders » (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2000). Elle distingue les troubles dépressifs (« unipo-
laires ») des troubles bipolaires. Parmi les formes du trouble dépressif elle distingue le 
trouble dépressif majeur de la dysthymie et du trouble dépressif non spécifié. Un épisode 
dépressif majeur est caractérisé principalement par une humeur dépressive et une perte 
d’intérêt ou de plaisir ainsi que par d’autres symptômes psychiques et somatiques. De 
grandes enquêtes ont révélé que les symptômes dépressifs sont relativement stables, 
c’est-à-dire qu’ils persistent au cours du temps, malgré le fait que les personnes passent 
d’une catégorie diagnostique à une autre (Angst & Merikangas, 1997; Judd et al., 1997). 
Cela souligne l’importance qu’il faut accorder aux formes de dépression sous-syndro-
miques, comme par exemple la dysphorie.  
Le terme dysphorie ne correspond pas à une catégorie diagnostique et son usage 
est controversé. Dans notre recherche nous nous référons au terme dysphorie pour faire 
référence à des échantillons « analogues », non-cliniques (Kendall et al., 1987). Directe-
ment lié à cette controverse est celle de la dépression comme une variable catégorielle 
ou dimensionnelle. Selon le point de vue catégoriel, la dépression clinique est qualitati-
vement différente de l’humeur dépressive sous-clinique. Cela implique la recherche com-
parant des groupes cliniques avec des groupes de contrôle (Gotlib, 1984; Santor & 
Coyne, 2001). Par contre, la perspective dimensionnelle souligne le continuum des pro-
cessus normaux et anormaux et l’importance de la recherche avec le spectre entier, 
c’est-à-dire avec des personnes cliniques comme avec des personnes tout-venants 
comme par exemple des étudiants (A. M. Ruscio & Ruscio, 2002; J. Ruscio & Ruscio, 
2000; Vredenburg et al., 1993; Watson et al., 2005). Cette dernière perspective étant 
bien confirmée par des recherches récentes (Hankin et al., 2005; Solomon et al., 2001), 
nous adoptons ce point de vue dans notre recherche qui se base sur des échantillons 
d’étudiants, appelés par la suite des participants « dysphoriques » versus « nondyspho-
riques ».  
Concernant la phénoménologie de la dépression en lien avec notre question de 
recherche, il est avant tout à noter qu’une des caractéristiques les plus importantes de la 
dépression et de la dysphorie est une affectivité négative générale et persistante qui est 
largement comparable au concept de névrotisme. Cette affectivité négative faisant partie 
de la phénoménologie d’autres psychopathologies comme par exemple des troubles 
anxieux, il a été postulé qu’elle soit un facteur principal sous-jacent à beaucoup de psy-
chopathologies (Clark & Watson, 1991; Mineka et al., 1998). Une particularité plus 
spécifique de la dépression et de la dysphorie se réfère aux déficits cognitifs et 
neuropsychologiques. Les personnes souffrant d’une dépression clinique mais aussi de 
symptômes sous-cliniques sont souvent entravées dans leurs fonctions mnésiques, sur-
tout en ce qui concerne les processus contrôlés. Des atteintes des fonctions attention-
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nelles et de la mémoire à courte terme sont en lien direct avec cela ainsi que des fonc-
tions exécutives en général impliquant avant tout des problèmes à se concentrer et à 
s’empêcher de ruminer (Burt et al., 1995; Elliott, 1998; Hartlage et al., 1993; Hertel, 
1998; Hertel & Gerstle, 2003; Van der Linden, 2007).  
Au-delà des déficits cognitifs en général, les personnes dépressives ou dyspho-
riques sont caractérisées par des biais cognitifs négatifs. Il est bien documenté que ces 
personnes reconnaissent et se souviennent préférentiellement des stimuli négatifs liés à 
la tristesse comparés aux stimuli neutres (Gilboa & Gotlib, 1997; Gotlib, Kasch et al., 
2004). Un biais similaire se trouve aussi concernant l’attention qui est portée 
préférentiellement au matériel négatif (Gotlib, Krasnoperova et al., 2004; Koster et al., 
2005). Finalement, et d’une importance particulière pour notre recherche, la dépression 
et l’affect négatif sont susceptibles de biaiser les évaluations et jugements d’une manière 
négative. Cela concerne entre autres les jugements concernant le plaisir d’une activité 
imaginée, ses propres capacités, la satisfaction avec sa propre performance ainsi que les 
standards visés (MacLeod, 1999; Mineka & Gilboa, 1998; Scott & Ingram, 1998; Williams 
et al., 1997).  
A part des déficits du genre plutôt cognitif, on peut constater que certaines de ces 
altérations cognitives sont en lien étroit et influencées par des processus motivationnels. 
Entre autres, le manque d’initiation spontanée des stratégies visant à contrôler l’attention 
et à se concentrer sur une tâche est responsable pour les déficits mnésiques des per-
sonnes dépressives, surtout concernant des tâches mnésiques nécessitant des processus 
contrôlés (Hertel, 2000; Hertel & Gerstle, 2003). En plus, la rumination sur soi-même et 
son affect négatif ainsi que l’intrusion des pensées négatives sont des particularités 
dépressives qui, d’un côté, ont un grand impact sur le fonctionnement cognitif, mais qui, 
de l’autre côté, dépendent surtout des capacités de la régulation de soi, c’est-à-dire des 
fonctions motivationnelles. Ainsi, il a été démontré que le fait d’empêcher les personnes 
dépressives de ruminer résulte en des interprétations, des attributions, des descriptions 
de soi et des estimations moins négatives, similaires à celles des personnes nondépres-
sives (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Lyubomirsky et al., 1999; Pyszczynski et 
al., 1989). Dans le domaine de la régulation d’affect, il a été démontré en plus que les 
personnes dépressives ne se servent pas du rappel des souvenirs positifs afin de réguler 
leur affect négatif comme le font les personnes nondépressives (Josephson et al., 1996).  
Un aspect important du concept de motivation, qui présente des particularités en 
cas de dépression, est la conception des deux orientations motivationnelles de base. 
D’après Gray (1982), on distingue le système d’approche comportemental (SAC) réagis-
sant à des signes de récompense du système d’inhibition comportemental (SIC) réagis-
sant à des signes de punition. Transféré au domaine de la psychopathologie par Fowles 
(Fowles, 1994), il a été démontré par le biais de questionnaires, de mesures comporte-
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mentales et de mesures (neuro-) physiologiques que la dépression est associée à une 
faible activation du SAC ainsi qu’à une désinhibition du SIC. Ainsi, les personnes dépres-
sives et d’humeur dépressive reportent moins de plaisir lors de différentes activités 
(MacPhillamy & Lewinsohn, 1974), sous-estiment la valeur de récompenses et s’y atten-
dent moins (Layne et al., 1982). De plus, Henriques et collaborateurs ont montré que des 
personnes dépressives et d’humeur dépressive sont moins motivées à gagner une 
récompense ou à éviter une punition (Henriques & Davidson, 2000; Henriques et al., 
1994). Sur ne niveau cérébral, la dépression est caractérisée par une sous-activation 
relative des régions préfrontales gauches, régions liées aux comportements d’approche 
ainsi qu’à l’affect positif (Davidson, Pizzagalli, Nitschke et al., 2002; Gotlib et al., 1998; 
Harmon-Jones et al., 2002; Tomarken & Keener, 1998). Finalement, et également en lien 
avec la sous-estimation de résultats potentiels, il a été postulé que des personnes 
dépressives sont souvent très perfectionnistes et visent des standards de performance 
élevés, malgré une plus basse perception de leur efficacité de soi (Cervone et al., 1994; 
Scott & Cervone, 2002; Tillema et al., 2001).  
La revue de la littérature sur la dépression, la motivation et la cognition suggère 
que des personnes dépressives manquent de motivation et sont caractérisées par de 
déficits motivationnels et de la régulation de soi. Toutefois, selon la théorie de l’intensité 
de la motivation (Brehm & Self, 1989) et l’impact d’une humeur négative sur la mobilisa-
tion de l’effort (Gendolla, 2000), nous faisons l’hypothèse selon laquelle des personnes 
dépressives et dysphoriques ne mobiliseraient pas toujours moins d’effort. Par la suite, le 
cadre théorique pour cette hypothèse ainsi que l’opérationnalisation de la mobilisation de 
l’effort par des mesures cardiovasculaires sont présentés. 
 
La mobilisation de l’effort 
Avant de décrire plus en détail les mesures cardiovasculaires, il est à noter que les 
liens entre la dépression et la (ré-) activité cardiovasculaire ont été sujet d’investigation 
auparavant. Cette recherche a été instiguée avant tout par le fait que la dépression est 
liée au développement et à l’aggravation des maladies cardiovasculaires (Frasure-Smith 
& Lespérance, 2005b). Il a été postulé qu’une dysrégulation de la balance des systèmes 
nerveux sympathiques et parasympathiques mènerait à une forte réactivité cardiovascu-
laire qui finalement prédisposerait à une vulnérabilité pour des maladies cardiovascu-
laires (Carney et al., 2005; Kibler & Ma, 2004; Light et al., 1998). Néanmoins, des étu-
des par rapport à l’activité et à la réactivité cardiovasculaire chez des personnes dépres-
sives obtiennent des résultats mixtes, témoignant d’une activité et d’une réactivité car-
diovasculaire plus élevée pour quelques études (Light et al., 1998), mais pas pour 
d’autres (Carroll et al., 2007; Kibler & Ma, 2004).  
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La tâche principale du système cardiovasculaire est celle de maintenir la pression 
artérielle et d’assurer l’écoulement du sang et l’alimentation des organes avec de 
l’oxygène. Le fonctionnement du système cardiovasculaire est influencé et contrôlé par 
plusieurs facteurs, entre autres par la régulation du système nerveux autonomique. Une 
activation de la branche sympathique du système nerveux autonomique entraîne géné-
ralement une augmentation de la fréquence cardiaque (FC) et de la contractilité du cœur. 
De plus, le débit sympathique cause la constriction et la dilatation des vaisseaux, dépen-
dant du récepteur impliqué. Par contre, une activité parasympathique peut inhiber la FC 
(Brownley et al., 2000; Lovallo, 2005; Stern et al., 2001). Mesurer les paramètres du 
système cardiovasculaire peut donc donner une vue sur l’état actuel de l’organisme et 
inférer l’activité autonomique. Parmi les paramètres cardiovasculaires les plus communs, 
la pression artérielle systolique (PAS) est considérée comme une mesure sensible et 
fiable vis-à-vis d’une influence du système nerveux sympathique parce qu’un décharge-
ment sympathique beta-adrénergique conditionne directement la force de la contractilité 
myocardique, qui avec la résistance totale des vaisseaux détermine la PAS. Comme 
mentionné plus haut, la FC n’est pas seulement déterminée par l’activation sympathique, 
mais aussi par l’activation parasympathique. En conséquence, elle peut reproduire 
l’influence sympathique seulement dans la mesure où celle-ci n’est pas masquée par 
l’inhibition parasympathique. La pression artérielle diastolique (PAD), qui est déterminée 
avant tout par la résistance totale des vaisseaux, ne représente pas toujours un bon indi-
cateur pour l’influence sympathique parce que la résistance totale des vaisseaux ne varie 
pas systématiquement lors des déchargements sympathiques (Brownley et al., 2000; 
Levick, 2003; Papillo & Shapiro, 1990). 
La recherche en psychophysiologie s’est intéressée au système cardiovasculaire 
parce que celui-ci répond à beaucoup de processus psychologiques (Papillo & Shapiro, 
1990). Une contribution importante pour la compréhension des réponses individuelles 
aux exigences comportementales a été apportée par Obrist (1976, 1981). Il montre que 
la mobilisation du système cardiovasculaire est proportionnelle non seulement lors d’une 
tâche physique, mais aussi lors d’une tâche mentale. En outre, Obrist démontre que des 
tâches mentales du type « active coping »—c’est-à-dire des situations où l’individu a du 
contrôle sur les résultats de ses actions—suscitent une réponse du système nerveux 
sympathique beta-adrénergique. Ainsi, il est possible de quantifier l’engagement pour 
une tâche mentale par la réactivité du système cardiovasculaire et plus spécifiquement 
par des paramètres influencés par la stimulation beta-adrénergique du cœur, comme par 
exemple la PAS ou la FC (Light, 1987; Obrist et al., 1987; Papillo & Shapiro, 1990). Des 
recherches sur l’engagement pour une tâche sous différentes conditions de performance 
ont confirmé ces implications, se basant sur l’hypothèse que « l’active coping » corres-
pond à la mobilisation de l’effort et que la réactivité cardiovasculaire (et surtout la réacti-
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vité de la PAS) est élevée lors des exigences comportementales, en anticipation d’une 
tâche ainsi que pendant une tâche (T. W. Smith et al., 1989; T. W. Smith et al., 2000).  
De plus nombreuses évidences encore proviennent des travaux de R. A. Wright 
(1996) qui a intégré l’approche d’Obrist et la théorie de l’intensité de la motivation 
(Brehm & Self, 1989). Cette théorie suppose que les individus évitent de gaspiller de 
l’énergie et mobilisent donc leur énergie proportionnellement à l’impression subjective 
des exigences d’une tâche. De plus, la théorie distingue entre l’intensité de la motivation 
à un moment donné et la « motivation potentielle » qui est déterminée par des facteurs 
classiques comme les besoins d’une personne, les attraits (« incentive values ») d’une 
tâche et l’instrumentalité d’une tâche. Ces facteurs constituent le maximum qu’une per-
sonne est prête à investir pour une tâche donnée et ne déterminent l’intensité de la 
motivation que d’une façon indirecte. En outre, la théorie de l’intensité de la motivation 
distingue entre des tâches à difficulté fixée, c’est-à-dire des tâches pour lesquelles le 
niveau de performance est défini et des tâches à difficulté non fixée, c’est-à-dire des 
tâches pour lesquelles l’individu peut choisir le niveau de performance lui-même (avec 
pour consigne de faire de son mieux). La théorie suppose que pour les tâches à difficulté 
fixée, l’intensité de la motivation (l’intensité de l’effort) augmente proportionnellement 
avec la difficulté de cette tâche jusqu’au point où la mobilisation de l’effort ne semble 
plus possible ni justifiée. Autrement dit, on ne mobilise pas le maximum d’effort poten-
tiellement possible, mais autant d’effort que nécessaire pour avoir du succès (voir chapi-
tre 4.4.2, Figure 3, Panel A). Par contre, pour les tâches à difficulté non fixée l’intensité 
de la motivation est censée varier directement avec la magnitude de la motivation 
potentielle (Brehm & Self, 1989). 
R. A. Wright et collaborateurs ont effectué des études confirmant les prédictions 
de la théorie de l’intensité de la motivation concernant la réactivité cardiovasculaire 
(surtout de la PAS) juste avant et pendant l’exécution d’une tâche : Pour une tâche à 
difficulté fixée, la mobilisation de l’effort augmente proportionnellement avec sa difficulté, 
jusqu’au point où la tâche semble trop difficile ou l’effort ne semble plus justifié (R. A. 
Wright, 1984; R. A. Wright, Brehm et al., 1990). R. A. Wright et collaborateurs ont 
également montré des interactions entre le niveau de difficulté et les besoins, les attraits 
et l’instrumentalité. Ainsi, ils ont démontré que la motivation potentielle (qui elle-même 
n’avait pas d’effet sur la réactivité cardiovasculaire) modérait la relation entre la difficulté 
et l’effort (Storey et al., 1996; R. A. Wright & Gregorich, 1989; R. A. Wright, Shaw et al., 
1990). En ce qui concerne des tâches à difficulté non fixée, des études ont confirmé la 
supposition que l’organisme cherche à atteindre le niveau de performance le plus élevé 
justifié et que la mobilisation de l’effort dépend directement des facteurs influençant la 
motivation potentielle (R. A. Wright et al., 2002; voir R. A. Wright, 1996, 1998; R. A. 
Wright & Kirby, 2001, pour une revue).  
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Une spécification de la théorie de l’intensité de la motivation particulièrement 
importante pour notre recherche consiste en l’influence de la capacité perçue face à la 
tâche. Wright et collaborateurs ont fait l’hypothèse selon laquelle les personnes avec des 
capacités subjectives faibles estiment la difficulté d’une tâche plus haute et mobilisent 
plus d’effort comparées aux personnes avec des capacités subjectives fortes. Cela impli-
que aussi que les personnes avec des capacités faibles abandonnent à un niveau de diffi-
culté objective plus bas (voir chapitre 4.4.2, Figure 3, Panel B, pour le patron similaire 
par rapport à l’influence de l’humeur). Les auteurs ont corroboré leurs hypothèses 
concernant la réactivité de la PAS (R. A. Wright & Dismukes, 1995; R. A. Wright et al., 
1997; R. A. Wright et al., 1994). Wright et collaborateurs ont également élargi leurs 
hypothèses quant à l’influence de l’optimisme dispositionnel (Kirby et al., 2003, cité dans 
R. A. Wright & Franklin, 2004) et de la déplétion des ressources (R. A. Wright et al., 
2003; R. A. Wright & Penacerrada, 2002), en se basant sur le même raisonnement, 
c’est-à-dire que le pessimisme et la déplétion entraînent la perception des ses propres 
capacités comme étant plus faibles.  
 
Le mood-behavior-model 
Sur la base des effets de congruence à l’humeur, Gendolla (2000) a appliqué les 
postulats de son mood-behavior-model (MBM) aux prédictions de la théorie de l’intensité 
de la motivation (Brehm & Self, 1989) et aux travaux de R. A. Wright (1996, 1998). Le 
MBM suggère que l’humeur en soi (par opposition à une émotion) n’a pas d’implications 
motivationnelles spécifiques et stables, mais qu’elle peut influencer le comportement via 
deux processus—l’influence informationnelle et l’influence directive de l’humeur—qui 
peuvent agir indépendamment l’une de l’autre ou simultanément (Gendolla, 2000).  
L’influence directive, se réfère à l’initiation et à la direction du comportement en 
commun avec la poursuite d’un motif hédonique. L’influence directive est censée avoir un 
effet sur les préférences comportementales et les intérêts dans les situations de choix. La 
force de l’influence directive est déterminée conjointement par la force du motif hédo-
nique d’une personne et par l’instrumentalité d’un comportement pour satisfaire ce motif. 
Le MBM suggère ainsi que la force de l’influence directive dépend plutôt des variables 
contextuelles que de la valence de l’humeur elle-même, dans la mesure où le motif 
hédonique est censé être déterminé par l’intensité de l’humeur, par la saillance de 
l’humeur ainsi que par le contexte situationnel. Autrement dit, le modèle suggère non 
seulement qu’une humeur négative peut déclencher un comportement visant à réguler 
l’affect actuel négatif, mais aussi qu’une humeur positive peut entraîner l’individu à avoir 
un comportement visant à maintenir l’affect actuel positif.  
L’influence informationnelle se réfère aux effets de congruence à l’humeur sur les 
jugements et les évaluations et prétend que l’humeur est une forme d’information qui est 
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intégrée à d’autres informations au moment de faire un jugement par rapport à un com-
portement. Ainsi, le model prédit qu’une évaluation sera plus positive voire plus optimiste 
dans le cas d’une humeur positive et plus négative voire plus pessimiste dans le cas 
d’une humeur négative. Le poids de l’influence informationnelle est censé être fonction 
du poids effectif informationnel de l’humeur et de l’étendue des associations amorcées 
par l’humeur. L’influence informationnelle de l’humeur est censée avoir un effet sur 
l’intensité et la persistance du comportement et prédit que l’humeur peut influencer la 
mobilisation de l’effort pour atteindre un but via des évaluations et des jugements 
congruents à l’humeur.  
En appliquant le MBM aux prédictions de la théorie de l’intensité de la motivation 
(Brehm & Self, 1989), Gendolla et collaborateurs démontrent l’influence informationnelle 
de l’humeur sur la mobilisation de l’effort, opérationnalisée comme réactivité cardio-
vasculaire. Basé sur l’effet de congruence à l’humeur, la difficulté d’une tâche semble 
plus élevée pour les personnes d’humeur négative que pour les personnes d’humeur 
positive. Cette évaluation, en revanche, influence la mobilisation de l’effort. Les études 
sont constituées habituellement en trois phases : une phase d’habituation pour relever 
les mesures cardiovasculaires de base, une phase d’induction de l’humeur et finalement 
une phase d’effort, pendant laquelle les personnes travaillent sur une tâche mentale. Les 
résultats correspondent aux prédictions : n’ayant pas d’influence sur la réactivité cardio-
vasculaire pendant la phase de l’induction de l’humeur, l’humeur manipulée se manifeste 
sous forme de différences dans la mobilisation de l’effort pendant le travail sur une tâche. 
Pour une tâche sans standard de performance, les personnes d’humeur négative mobili-
sent plus d’effort que les personnes d’humeur positive—l’humeur étant la seule source 
d’information par rapport à la difficulté (Gendolla et al., 2001; Gendolla & Krüsken, 
2001b, 2002a, 2002c, Etude 2). Pour les tâches à difficulté fixée, les résultats confirment 
le patron illustré en chapitre 4.4.2, Figure 3, Panel B : les personnes d’humeur négative 
mobilisent plus d’effort pour une tâche facile, mais moins d’effort pour une tâche difficile, 
comparées aux personnes d’humeur positive, prouvant ainsi l’effet d’interaction entre la 
difficulté et l’humeur (Gendolla & Krüsken, 2002c, Etude 1). 
Au delà des effets de l’humeur sur la mobilisation de l’effort, Gendolla et collabo-
rateurs ont également investigué l’interaction entre la motivation potentielle et la diffi-
culté de la tâche. Brehm et Self (Brehm & Self, 1989) soulignent que l’effort maximale-
ment justifié, c’est-à-dire la motivation potentielle, est déterminée par l’importance du 
succès : un rendement plus important justifie plus d’engagement qu’un rendement moins 
important. Dans une expérience de Gendolla et Krüsken (2002b) la contingence d’une 
récompense a été manipulée par la promesse d’une période de relaxation, indépendam-
ment de la performance (condition non contingente) ou à la condition que les sujets 
réussissent la tâche (condition contingente). Les résultats montrent le patron 
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d’interaction prédit : si la récompense est indépendante de la performance, les personnes 
dans une humeur négative mobilisent plus d’effort pour la tâche facile, mais moins 
d’effort pour la tâche difficile. Par contre, si la récompense est dépendante de la perfor-
mance, les personnes d’humeur négative mobilisent plus d’effort que les personnes 
d’humeur positive pour la tâche facile, mais également pour la tâche difficile. Ces résul-
tats montrent qu’il est possible d’augmenter la motivation potentielle et d’inciter les per-
sonnes d’une humeur négative à surmonter leur déficit motivationnel par rapport à une 
tâche difficile.  
 
Les hypothèses 
Sur la base de la notion d’un déficit motivationnel et de la recherche montrant 
l’influence de l’humeur sur l’intensité de la motivation, notre recherche vise à investiguer 
les hypothèses suivantes :  
1) Les personnes dysphoriques sont caractérisées par une humeur négative. 
2) La ligne de base cardiovasculaire ne diffère pas entre les participants dysphoriques et 
nondysphoriques. 
3) Pour une tâche sans standard de performance, les participants dysphoriques mobili-
sent plus d’effort que les participants nondysphoriques. 
4) Pour une tâche avec difficulté fixée, un patron d’interaction entre la dysphorie et la 
difficulté de la tâche se produit, avec les participants dysphoriques mobilisant plus 
d’effort pour une tâche facile mais moins d’effort pour une tâche difficile que les par-
ticipants nondysphoriques.  
5) Pour une tâche à difficulté fixée, la demande subjective de la tâche dépend de la dys-
phorie et de la difficulté de la tâche, avec une progression de la difficulté perçu de la 
condition facile-nondysphorique à la condition difficile-dysphorique.  
6) Aucune hypothèse directionnelle n’est formulée quant à la performance aux tâches 
mentales.  
Nous avons conçu une série de quatre études testant chaque fois les Hypothèses 
1 et 2 comme conditions fondamentales pour les prédictions suivantes. Les Etudes 1 et 2 
sont des réplications conceptuelles investiguant l’Hypothèse 3 pour deux tâches diffé-
rentes sans standard de performance. Les Etudes 3 et 4 sont également des réplications 
conceptuelles investiguant les Hypothèses 4 et 5. Dans chaque étude, la performance est 
analysée d’une manière exploratoire. Suivant la perspective dimensionnelle de la dépres-
sion, nous avons recruté des étudiants et étudiantes après un examen de dépistage 
quant à la dépression, réalisé quelques semaines avant l’expérience. Favorisant 
l’approche des groupes extrêmes, nous avons ensuite sélectionné des personnes avec 
des scores bas (nondysphoriques) ou élevés (dysphoriques) pour participer à nos études. 
La mobilisation de l’effort—notre variable dépendante centrale—a été opérationnalisée 
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par la réactivité cardiovasculaire. Suivant l’approche d’Obrist (1981) et de R. A. Wright 
(1996) nous nous sommes attendus à ce que la réactivité de la PAS soit particulièrement 
susceptible de représenter nos hypothèses.  
 
Etudes 1 et 2 
Les deux premières études ont été conçues afin de tester l’hypothèse selon 
laquelle les étudiantes dysphoriques mobiliseraient plus d’effort pour une tâche mentale 
sans standard de performance que les étudiantes nondysphoriques. Pour cela, les deux 
études (N = 35 et N = 25) comparent des groupes d’étudiantes avec des scores sur la 
« Center for Epidemiologic Studies – Depression Scale » (Radloff, 1977; version française 
de Fuhrer & Rouillon, 1989) situés dans le quartile inférieur et le quartile supérieur. Lors 
de la deuxième étude, les participantes étaient priées de remplir une deuxième fois le 
questionnaire à la fin de l’expérience. Seules les personnes dont le deuxième score 
confirmait l’appartenance au groupe de départ étaient retenues pour les analyses.  
Le déroulement était presque identique pour les deux études. Les mesures cardio-
vasculaires étaient récoltées d’une façon intermittente, non invasive et obtenues au 
moyen d’un moniteur multicanal informatisé (PAR Physioport III, Par Electronics, Berlin, 
Allemagne) qui utilise l’oscillométrie pour déterminer la pression artérielle systolique 
(PAS, millimètres de mercure), la pression artérielle diastolique (PAD, millimètres de 
mercure) ainsi que la fréquence cardiaque (FC, battements par minute). Un brassard 
était fixé sur le bras non dominant des participantes et gonflé automatiquement dans des 
intervalles fixes (chaque 2 minutes en Etude 1 et chaque minute en Etude 2) pendant les 
deux phases de mesure : la phase d’habituation de 8 minutes et la phase de performance 
de 5 minutes. Afin de vérifier si l’humeur varierait en fonction du groupement, l’humeur 
actuelle était relevée à l’aide d’une version traduite de l’échelle « UWIST mood adjective 
checklist » (Matthews et al., 1990). Dans l’Etude 1, l’humeur actuelle était relevée au 
début de l’expérience ; dans l’Etude 2, l’humeur était relevée après avoir travaillé sur la 
tâche afin de montrer que la saillance de l’humeur n’influencerait pas la réactivité cardio-
vasculaire au cours de la tâche.  
Les deux études différaient par rapport à la tâche mentale : une tâche mnésique 
dans l’Etude 1 et une tâche de concentration dans l’Etude 2. La tâche mnésique deman-
dait de mémoriser des séries de lettres du type « non-sens ». Chaque série consistait en 
quatre lettres choisies aléatoirement (p. ex. IWKS). Afin de présenter une tâche sans 
standard prédéfini, la liste consistait en 15 séries de lettres avec l’instruction de mémori-
ser autant de séries que possibles. Après le temps de mémorisation, les séries rappelées 
étaient à noter. La tâche de concentration demandait de discriminer la lettre « d » 
accompagnée de deux barres de la lettre « d » accompagnée de moins ou plus de barres 
ainsi que de la lettre « p » accompagnée également de un, deux, trois ou quatre barres. 
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Les participantes avaient à indiquer, si la lettre présentée constituait le stimulus-cible en 
appuyant sur une des deux touches. Afin de présenter une tâche sans standard, le temps 
de présentation n’était pas fixé. Les participantes recevaient l’instruction de travailler 
aussi précisément et aussi rapidement que possible. 
Par rapport à l’humeur actuelle, les résultats montraient que les participantes 
dysphoriques étaient d’une humeur plus négative et moins positive comparées aux parti-
cipantes nondysphoriques (ps < .01), indépendamment du fait que l’humeur était relevée 
au début de l’expérience (Etude 1) ou après la tâche (Etude 2). La ligne de base cardio-
vasculaire était calculée comme moyenne des deux (Etude 1) ou trois (Etude 2) derniè-
res mesures pendant la phase au repos, puisque pendant cette phase d’habituation les 
mesures cardiovasculaires diminuent normalement. Seules les dernières mesures, qui ne 
différaient plus (ps > .16), étaient alors prises en compte pour établir la ligne de base. 
Confirmant l’hypothèse, la ligne de base de la PAS, de la PAD et de la FC des deux études 
ne différait pas selon les groupes dysphoriques et nondysphoriques (ps > .13). Pour 
obtenir la réactivité cardiovasculaire, des scores de changement étaient calculés (Llabre 
et al., 1991) en soustrayant la ligne de base de la moyenne des mesures obtenues pen-
dant la phase à l’effort. Des analyses préliminaires montraient que la réactivité de la PAS 
corrélait négativement avec la ligne de base de la PAS (Etude 1) et que la réactivité de la 
FC corrélait négativement avec la ligne de base de la FC (Etude 2). Afin d’éviter des 
effets du type « carry-over » et des biais liés à la loi des valeurs initiales (Llabre et al., 
1991), nous avons ajusté la réactivité de la PAS (Etude 1) et de la FC (Etude 2) par rap-
port à la ligne de base. Les autres scores de réactivité n’étaient pas ajustés.  
Pour l’Etude 1, l’analyse de la réactivité de la PAS montrait que les participantes 
dysphoriques avaient une réponse plus importante (M = 5.92, SE = 1.49) que les partici-
pantes nondysphoriques (M = 3.64, SE = 1.07). Pourtant, cette différence n’était pas 
significative (p = .11, unidirectionnel). Regardant de plus près les scores de change-
ments pour chaque point de mesure pendant la phase à l’effort, il s’est avéré que les 
participantes dysphoriques avaient une réactivité plus prononcée surtout au début de la 
tâche (M = 7.31, SE = 1.64) comparées aux participantes nondysphoriques (M = 3.59, 
SE = 1.15), t = 1.88, p = .03 (unidirectionnel ; voir chapitre 2.4.2, Figure 6). Il n’y avait 
pas de différences entre les deux groupes quant à la réactivité de la PAD et de la FC dans 
l’Etude 1 (ps > .17, unidirectionnel). L’Etude 2 confirmait la réactivité de la PAS plus 
importante dans le groupe dysphorique (M = 8.72, SE = 2.00), comparé au groupe non-
dysphorique (M = 4.20, SE = 1.39), t = 1.76, p < .05 (unidirectionnel ; voir chapitre 
2.5.2, Figure 7). L’analyse de la réactivité de la FC révélait également une réponse plus 
prononcée dans le groupe dysphorique (p < .04, unidirectionnel). En plus, la réactivité de 
la PAD montrait tendanciellement le même patron (p < .06, unidirectionnel). Concernant 
la performance aux tâches mentales, l’Etude 1 indiquait une meilleure performance 
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mnésique des participantes nondysphoriques sur tous les indices de performance (ps < 
.06), tandis que pour la tâche de concentration dans l’Etude 2 aucune différence n’a été 
observée (ps > .40).  
 
Etudes 3 et 4 
Ces deux études ont été conçues afin de tester les prédictions de la théorie de 
l’intensité de la motivation (Brehm & Self, 1989) concernant l’influence de la dysphorie 
sur la mobilisation de l’effort si la difficulté d’une tâche mentale est fixée, c’est-à-dire si 
des standards de performance sont définis. Les deux études sont des réplications 
conceptuelles avec un design 2 (dysphorique vs. nondysphorique) x 2 (tâche : facile vs. 
difficile). Comme pour les deux premières études, des étudiants dysphoriques et non-
dysphoriques ont été choisis selon leur score sur l’échelle CES-D et testés encore une fois 
à la fin de l’expérience (N = 45 femmes et 8 hommes et N = 41 femmes et 23 hommes, 
respectivement).  
Les mesures de la pression artérielle étaient récoltées de la même façon que dans 
les deux premières études de manière intermittente avec le Par Physioport. La FC était 
récoltée de manière continue à l’aide d’un électrocardiogramme (Psylab System, Contact 
Precision Instruments, London, Angleterre). Ces valeurs continues étaient converties en 
une valeur moyenne par minute afin d’avoir les mêmes intervalles que pour la pression 
artérielle. L’humeur actuelle était relevée au début de l’expérience à l’aide de l’échelle 
UWIST. Après avoir reçu les instructions pour la tâche mais avant d’exécuter celle-ci, les 
participants étaient priés d’indiquer comment ils évalueraient la difficulté de la tâche, 
leurs propres capacités ainsi que leur probabilité de succès. Comme tâche mentale, la 
tâche de concentration « d2 » était utilisée dans l’Etude 3. Elle était similaire à celle de 
l’Etude 2, avec l’exception qu’un standard de performance était défini en limitant le 
temps de présentation à 1000 ms (condition facile) ou à 160 ms (condition difficile). 
Dans l’Etude 4, la tâche mnésique consistant en des séries de lettres du type « non-
sens » était utilisée de la même manière que dans l’Etude 1, avec l’exception qu’un stan-
dard de performance était défini en demandant aux participants de mémoriser la liste 
entière qui consistait en quatre séries (condition facile) ou en neuf séries (condition diffi-
cile).  
Quant à l’humeur actuelle au début de l’expérience, les deux études confirmaient 
que les participants dysphoriques étaient d’une humeur moins positive et plus négative 
comparés aux participants nondysphoriques (ps < .01). L’analyse de la demande subjec-
tive de la tâche (composée des trois questions d’auto-évaluation) n’indiquait pas de dif-
férences entre les quatre conditions pour l’Etude 3 (ps > .31). Par contre, la demande 
subjective montrait le patron attendu pour l’Etude 4. La tâche était perçue comme plus 
difficile dans la condition difficile-dysphorique et comme moins difficile dans la condition 
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facile-nondysphorique. Néanmoins, uniquement l’effet simple de la dysphorie était fiable 
(p < .02), mais pas celui de la difficulté. La ligne de base pour la PAS, la PAD et la FC 
était établie en moyennant les valeurs des quatre (Etude 3) et trois (Etude 4) dernières 
mesures récoltées pendant la phase d’habituation. Pour l’Etude 3, il n’y avait pas de dif-
férences entre les quatre conditions concernant la ligne de base de la PAS et de la PAD 
(ps > 29), à l’exception d’un effet tendanciel pour la FC, indiquant des valeurs plus éle-
vées des personnes dysphoriques (p = .07). L’Etude 4, par contre, révélait une différence 
entre les hommes et les femmes concernant la ligne de base de la PAS, une interaction 
entre la difficulté et le genre concernant la ligne de base de la PAD et un effet simple de 
la dysphorie concernant la ligne de base de la FC (ps < .05). Pour l’Etude 3, la ligne de 
base ne covariait pas avec les scores de changements (ps > .40) et, en conséquence, la 
réactivité n’était pas ajustée. Par contre, la ligne de base dans l’Etude 4 covariait avec les 
scores de changement (ps < .05) et, par conséquent, la réactivité était ajustée par rap-
port à la ligne de base.  
Pour l’Etude 3, la réactivité de la PAS corroborait le patron prédit, c’est-à-dire une 
interaction entre la dysphorie et la difficulté de la tâche (p < .03 ; voir chapitre 3.5.2, 
Figure 9). Des analyses détaillées révélaient que les participants dysphoriques (M = 5.73, 
SE = 1.25) avaient une réactivité plus prononcée dans la condition facile que les partici-
pants nondysphoriques (M = 1.51, SE = 1.25), t = 2.24, p < .02 (unidirectionnel). 
Contrairement aux prédictions, la différence dans la condition difficile n’était pas signifi-
cative (p = .17, unidirectionnel). Pour l’Etude 4, le même patron d’interaction quant à la 
réactivité de la PAS s’est avéré (p < .03 ; voir chapitre 3.6.2, Figure 10), avec une dif-
férence tendancielle entre les participants dysphoriques (M = 6.24, SE = 1.37) et les 
participants nondysphoriques (M = 3.37, SE = 1.45) dans la condition facile, t = 1.44, p 
< .08 (unidirectionnel), ainsi qu’une différence significative dans la condition difficile 
entre les participants dysphoriques (M = 5.06, SE = 1.14) et les participants nondyspho-
riques (M = 8.58, SE = 1.62), t = 1.77, p < .05 (unidirectionnel). Concernant la réacti-
vité de la PAD et de la FC, il n’y avait pas d’effets en Etude 3 (ps > .30). Dans l’Etude 4, 
la PAD ne différait pas selon les conditions (ps > .19) ; par contre, la réactivité de la FC 
était plus élevée dans la condition difficile comparée à la condition facile (p < .03). Fina-
lement, la performance aux tâches mentales indiquait pour les deux études que les parti-
cipants dans les conditions faciles avaient de meilleures performances que ceux dans les 
conditions difficiles (ps < .01), même si les indices de performance étaient ajustés par 
rapport au nombre de stimuli « d2 » ou au nombre de séries de lettres.  
 
Discussion 
Pour résumer, nos quatre études ont corroboré l’hypothèse selon laquelle des étu-
diants avec des scores de dépression élevés seraient de plus mauvaise humeur, même si 
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l’expérience avait lieu quelques semaines après l’examen de dépistage de la dépression. 
L’effet de congruence à l’humeur sur la demande subjective de la tâche s’est avéré 
uniquement dans l’Etude 4, dans laquelle les participants dysphoriques percevaient la 
tâche mnésique comme plus difficile et leur capacité comme moins élevée que les parti-
cipants nondysphoriques. Avec l’exception de la FC dans l’Etude 4, nos expériences n’ont 
pas trouvé de différences entre les participants dysphoriques et nondysphoriques concer-
nant la ligne de base cardiovasculaire, contrairement à, par exemple, l’étude de Light et 
al. (1998). Nos hypothèses principales concernant la mobilisation de l’effort ont été 
confirmées par la réactivité de la PAS. Les deux premières études ont montré que les 
participantes dysphoriques avaient une réactivité plus importante pour les tâches sans 
standard de performance comparées aux participantes nondysphoriques. Les deux études 
suivantes ont corroboré le patron d’interaction entre la dysphorie et la difficulté de la 
tâche. Dans ces études, les participants dysphoriques avaient une réactivité plus impor-
tante dans les conditions faciles, mais une réactivité moins prononcée dans les conditions 
difficiles, comparés aux participants nondysphoriques. A l’exception de la FC dans les 
Etudes 2 et 4, le patron de réactivité de la PAD et de la FC ne correspondait pas au 
patron de la PAS (voir Brownley et al., 2000; Levick, 2003; Papillo & Shapiro, 1990). 
Quant à la performance aux tâches mentales, uniquement l’Etude 1 révélait une diffé-
rence entre les participantes dysphoriques et nondysphoriques concernant la tâche 
mnésique, tandis que les autres études n’indiquaient ni déficits cognitifs des participants 
dysphoriques ni associations entre la mobilisation de l’effort et la performance cognitive.  
Notre série d’expériences a confirmé notre hypothèse centrale selon laquelle la 
dysphorie n’est pas nécessairement associée à un déficit motivationnel, mais que cela 
dépend plutôt des caractéristiques de la tâche ainsi que de sa difficulté si la dysphorie 
entraîne une mobilisation de l’effort plus ou moins élevée. Nos prédictions étaient princi-
palement fondées sur le fait que la dysphorie et la dépression sont avant tout caractéri-
sées par une humeur négative persistante (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; 
Mineka et al., 1998; Scott & Ingram, 1998) et sur la recherche qui montre l’influence de 
l’humeur sur la mobilisation de l’effort. La similarité de nos résultats quant à la dysphorie 
et des résultats de Gendolla et collaborateurs quant à l’humeur manipulée (p. ex. 
Gendolla & Krüsken, 2001a, 2002c) indique que ce patron de mobilisation de l’effort 
serait également comparable à celui qu’on trouverait auprès d’une population clinique. 
Néanmoins, cette hypothèse reste à être confirmée sur un échantillon clinique. De même, 
à l’avenir, il serait intéressant d’aborder la question de savoir si un patron similaire se 
trouve également auprès d’un échantillon anxieux ou auprès d’autres psychopathologies 
caractérisées par une humeur négative persistante (voire une affectivité négative) ainsi 
que par des évaluations pessimistes congruentes à l’humeur. Notre raisonnement 
concernant l’influence de la dysphorie sur la mobilisation de l’effort est fondé sur les 
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effets de congruence à l’humeur sur la perception de la demande d’une tâche qui en 
revanche détermine la mobilisation de l’effort. Même si l’Etude 4 ne corrobore que par-
tiellement cette influence et même si la médiation statistique ne s’est pas avérée signifi-
cative, la médiation de ce processus par l’humeur et par la demande subjective est très 
probable vu les études antérieures, manipulant non seulement l’humeur, mais aussi la 
perception subjective (R. A. Wright, 1998; R. A. Wright & Franklin, 2004, pour des 
revues).  
Une question intéressante à aborder est le résultat des Etudes 3 et 4 montrant 
que la réactivité de la PAS des participants dysphoriques ne diffère pas en fonction de la 
difficulté de la tâche. Il semble donc que ces personnes n’ajustent pas leur effort en 
fonction des exigences objectives, ce qui peut être un indice pour une régulation de soi 
altérée. Il reste désormais à investiguer à l’aide d’expériences manipulant un spectre plus 
large de difficultés possibles et impossibles si les personnes dysphoriques montrent un 
clair désengagement à un moment donné ou non. Pour finir, il est important de discuter 
de l’absence de corrélations entre la mobilisation de l’effort et la performance dans trois 
de nos quatre études. Dans ce cas, il est avant tout à souligner que la performance est le 
résultat d’une action et que non seulement l’effort, mais aussi d’autres facteurs comme 
des capacités personnelles et des stratégies contribuent à ce résultat (Eysenck et al., 
2007; Locke & Latham, 1990). Cela soulève la question de savoir si la mobilisation de 
l’effort a été utilisée par nos participants dysphoriques comme moyen pour compenser un 
déficit cognitif éventuel (Hockey, 1997). Cependant, nos deux dernières études montrent 
des performances comparables entre des personnes dysphoriques et nondysphoriques, 
malgré une mobilisation de l’effort moins importante des participants dysphoriques dans 
la condition difficile. En outre, notre échantillon d’étudiants n’est pas un échantillon très 
susceptible de souffrir de déficits cognitifs, même parmi les étudiants avec des scores de 
dépression élevés.  
Pour conclure, nous traitons quelques limites de notre recherche et montrons en 
même temps des suggestions pour la recherche future. Quant à notre échantillon, il est 
important de noter que nous n’avons pas investigué tout le spectre du continuum 
dépressif, mais uniquement des étudiants avec des scores bas ou élevés. Pour l’avenir, il 
est recommandable de tenir compte de la perspective dimensionnelle en investiguant le 
spectre entier du continuum dépressif. Une deuxième suggestion pour la recherche à 
venir serait de présenter aux participants également des tâches très difficiles voire 
impossibles afin de pouvoir tirer des conclusions plus univoques concernant le désenga-
gement du groupe dysphorique. Concernant les autres implications de l’intégration du 
MBM (Gendolla, 2000) avec la théorie de l’intensité de la motivation (Brehm & Self, 
1989), il est crucial de montrer le processus médiateur proposé, notamment quant à la 
demande subjective de la tâche. A cette fin, une manipulation intéressante serait par 
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exemple la procédure de « mood discounting » (voir Schwarz & Clore, 1996). Finalement, 
le concept de la mobilisation de l’effort ou de l’engagement pour une tâche implique 
l’activation du système nerveux sympathique et plus spécifiquement des récepteurs beta-
adrénergiques du cœur (Obrist, 1981). Sachant que la contractilité du cœur est un 
indicateur plus direct pour cette influence sympathique beta-adrénergique que la PAS, la 
récolte des mesures comme par exemple de la période de pré-éjection (« pre-ejection 
period ») du cœur est à prendre en considération afin d’améliorer la fiabilité des conclu-
sions.  
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